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ABSTRACT 
Empire, Reform, and Internationalism: Britain and the Changing Politics of Opium,       
1875-1931 
by  
CASE Simon John 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Throughout the nineteenth century, opium occupied a position of great significance within 
the British Empire, comprising by the 1870s as much as 17% of the total revenues of the 
British India Government. Opium also made up the greater part of British exports to China, a 
legacy of early-century market exploitation and highly favourable commercial treaties signed 
following two opium wars fought by the two countries. Between the emergence of an 
organised anti-opium movement in 1875 and the close of the final international Geneva 
Opium Conference of 1931, British opium policy experienced a complete transformation. 
The development of British responses to the issue of opium offers a case study in the cultural 
history of international relations, while also offering insights into developments in the 
political scene in Britain.  
 
A critical issue at the heart of the transition from elite to mass politics in Britain at the crux 
of the emergence of a new socio-political landscape after the passage of the 1867 Reform 
Act, the increasing importance of public opinion and popular politics, the course of debate 
over opium characterised shifts in the British domestic political scene, highlighting the 
defining transitions in political action and social activism of the period. Opium was also a 
central focal point in the transformation of the global geopolitical environment at the turn of 
the twentieth century, with the emergence of hostile rival powers seeking to challenge 
British commercial and geopolitical pre-eminence, particularly in the form of the United 
States and Japan in Asia, with a radically different and reforming American approach to 
imperial policy in the region. This thesis examines these transitions, exploring the different 
phases of opium policy, and identifying the driving forces, causational factors, and 
continuities that defined these processes of reform, comprising a re-reading of the history of 
opium reform as a critical juncture within the cultural sphere of international relations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
DECLARATION 
I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, 
and I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have 
been duly acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________ 
CASE Simon John 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL OF THESIS 
 
EMPIRE, REFORM AND INTERNATIONALISM: BRITAIN AND THE 
CHANGING POLITICS OF OPIUM, 1875-1931 
 
By  
CASE Simon John 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Panel of Examiners: 
_________________________ (Chairman) 
Prof. Tejaswini NIRANJANA 
_________________________ (External Member) 
Prof. David POMFRET 
_________________________ (Internal Member) 
Prof. Niccolò PIANCIOLA 
_________________________ (Internal Member) 
Prof. Mark HAMPTON 
 
Chief Supervisor: Prof. Mark HAMPTON 
Co-supervisor: Prof. LAU Chi Pang 
 
Approved for the Senate: 
 
___________________________________ 
 
Chairman, Postgraduate Studies Committee 
 
___________________________________ 
Date 
i 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 
Acknowledgements …………………………………………………………………………. ii 
 
 
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………. 1 
 
 
Literature Review ………………………………………………………………………….. 11 
 
 
1. Between elite and mass cultures of reform: The anti-opium movement and the 
politics of imperial reformism in late-nineteenth century Britain ………………... 22 
 
 
2. Diplomacy, imperial expediency, and the reform debates in British politics: The 
Liberal government of 1906 and the resumption of the anti-opium position ……...75 
 
    
3. Empire, trade and diplomacy in China: The United States’ Open Door Policy shift 
and the challenge to British pre-eminence ………………………………………. 101 
 
 
4. Moral capital and the new internationalism: Opium regulation and the cultural basis 
of “legitimate empire” in the early twentieth century …………………………… 149 
 
 
Conclusions ………………………………………………………………………………. 182 
 
 
Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………………... 190
ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
To my supervisor, Professor Mark Hampton, I owe a debt of gratitude that I fear can never 
be repaid, both for his constant encouragement and support, and for his enthusiasm in urging 
me to pursue and develop my initial ideas into the project that they have become. Without 
this, there could have been no dissertation, and I would not have grown to be the person that 
I am today. I would also like to thank Professor John Carroll for his warm responses and 
discussions of my early thoughts, which greatly inspired me to pursue the project. I am 
tremendously appreciative to Professors David Pomfret, Tejaswini Niranjana, and Niccolò 
Pianciola, whose critiques and suggestions during my examination both challenged and 
inspired me, and whose expertise and enlightened perspectives have proven invaluable in 
giving shape to the final project. I have benefited from being part of an engaging and prolific 
academic community during my time at Lingnan University, and I am incredibly thankful for 
the support of Professors Mark Hampton, Niccolò Pianciola, Han Xiaorong, William Liu 
Guanglin, Poon Shuk Wah, Grace Chou, and Diana Lemberg, within the Department of 
History, and for the expert assistance of Ann Wong and Vincy Au of the department’s 
administrative team. I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to my friends for their 
ever present support, especially to Luca Yau, James Fellows, Ylber Marku, Peter Law,  
Andy Pisavadia, Peter Case, Alicia Presa García, Jovita Law, Charlie Angelo, Mat Pitts,    
Joe Melhuish, Tom Hatch, Enyi Hu, Zardas Lee, Vivian Kong, Rodney So, and Kong Rong, 
for their feedback and inspirations, and for their companionship. Special thanks must go to 
Luca for her constant encouragement and positivity, always uplifting, and to Ylber and 
James for their refreshing cynicism. I am indebted to my grandmothers Eileen and Primrose, 
who cheerfully hosted me through long spells of research in London, without whose 
generosity I would have finished this research a much poorer man. My thanks must also go 
to my mother Lucy, and to my father Steve, who may never read this, but whose support 
throughout my studies have made it possible.  
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated with love 
to the memory of my dear friend Andy Pisavadia. 
  
1 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century, opium occupied a position of great significance within 
the British Empire, comprising by the 1870s as much as 17% of the total revenues of the 
British India Government. Opium also made up the greater part of British exports to China, a 
legacy of early-century market exploitation and highly favourable commercial treaties signed 
following two opium wars fought by the two countries. By the turn of the twentieth century, 
however, British opium policy was beginning to undergo a reformation, as British 
geopolitical and economic priorities evolved in a period of great global flux. This thesis 
examines these transitions, exploring the different phases of opium policy, and identifying 
the driving forces, causational factors, and continuities that defined these processes of 
reform, comprising a re-reading of the history of opium reform as a critical juncture within 
the cultural sphere of international relations.   
 
In the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, British governments’ positions regarding 
opium underwent significant changes, encompassing diverse priorities and approaches across 
metropolitan and imperial branches of government, within the contexts of domestic social 
pressures, political currents, and international arbitration. Between the emergence of an 
organised anti-opium movement in 1875 and the close of the final international Geneva 
Opium Conference of 1931, British opium policy experienced a complete transformation. 
The development of British responses to the issue of opium offers a case study in the cultural 
history of international relations, while also offering insights into developments in the 
political scene in Britain. A critical issue at the heart of the transition from elite to mass 
politics in Britain at the crux of the emergence of a new socio-political landscape after the 
passage of the 1867 Reform Act, the increasing importance of public opinion, and popular 
politics, the course of debate over opium characterised shifts in the British domestic political 
scene, highlighting the defining transitions in political action and social activism of the 
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period. Opium was also a central focal point in the transformation of the global geopolitical 
environment at the turn of the twentieth century, with the emergence of hostile rival powers 
seeking to challenge British commercial and geopolitical pre-eminence, particularly in the 
form of the United States and Japan in Asia, with a radically different and reforming 
American approach to imperial policy taking hold in the region.  
 
Negotiating these domestic and international debates would encompass a series of profound 
transformations in British policy and the British world position, witnessing the rise of a 
popular socially reformist domestic Liberal administration by 1906 which immediately 
began to take control of the issue, and a subsequent reversal of Britain’s global opium 
system over the decade that followed, as Britain sought to minimize its national 
responsibility for opium consumption within an increasingly aware and interconnected 
international world. This comprised a reprioritisation of British economic interests in China, 
the nature of imperial rule in India, and a complete “rebranding” of Britain’s international 
role and image, as critical transnational entanglements between legitimising discourses of 
imperial domination forced major changes in the politics of British imperial rule. Through 
renegotiating its opium system in India and trade practices with China, and by taking a 
position of leadership in the global reforming process, British policymakers attempted to 
forge for the empire a new global role and identity as a proponent of a new kind of 
imperialism. British governments in these key years attempted to manoeuvre the empire into 
assuming a new position as a primary leader in the new international institutions of the 
interwar years, adding a veneer of internationalist and moralistic legitimisation to the 
prosecution of British imperialism. This was an attempt at realigning the British position 
from that of the imperial unilateralism that so defined the nineteenth century experience of 
empire to a position aligned to give the impression of the empire as a responsible and 
internationalist global actor, temporarily masking the effects of imperial decline in the years 
before the events of the Second World War brought the full extent of this decline to light. 
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For the imperial powers, and for Britain in particular, the international movement for the 
suppression of opium formed the cultural basis of their emergence as responsible global 
actors. This thesis explores how such transitions were possible, the forces and imperial 
entanglements that necessitated them, and the impulses and causations that facilitated and 
expedited them. 
 
The study examines the development of the politics of opium in Britain between the years 
1875 and 1931, covering the beginnings of organised anti-opium agitation in Britain in 1875 
up to the date of the final Geneva Opium Conference in 1931, which took place under the 
auspices of the League of Nations. Within its investigation of the processes at work in 
shaping the overarching thematic categories of reformism and internationalism in impacting 
on the British position, this thesis analyses the ways in which British government policy 
changed between these years, exploring the effects of a variety of international, imperial and 
domestic factors upon a series of interconnected processes that impacted upon key shifts in 
policy, upon the development of prevailing attitudes, and upon the British government’s 
approach to opium. It examines the reasons for the changing priorities behind the direction of 
opium policy, linking these developments to wider British and global themes and trends. A 
major contention of the thesis is that, in this period of transition from 1875-1931, British 
opium policy went through three distinct phases, shaped by several key domestic, imperial 
and international factors, reflecting transitions which in turn profoundly affected wider 
developments in British imperial and foreign policy into the twentieth century. From the 
status quo of the British opium system of cultivation, taxation, and exportation in British 
controlled India and free trade networks to East and Southeast Asia, with only limited 
domestic opposition, the situation was to change to a period of government-sanctioned 
conservative imperial reform at the turn of the twentieth century, and by the end of the 
period of study the subject would see Britain taking part in substantial international action to 
resolve issues related to opium and to regulate the production and trade in drugs.  
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Each of these phases represented a distinct moment in the development of the British 
approach to opium policymaking, the debates which took place, and the implementation and 
direction of the British policies which were produced. The development of opium policy 
from that of imperial autonomy in British India, largely free from metropolitan interference 
until the early years of the twentieth century, to that characterised by close interaction and 
cooperation in establishing and implementing international drugs control initiatives by the 
1930s, reflected significant shifts not only in the direction of British imperial and 
commercial policy, but in British political culture, the decline in the unilateralism of British 
imperial policy, and the challenge to the very position of the country with regards to other 
key global actors.  
 
In short, the trajectory of British opium policy examined in this thesis encompasses the 
processes by which Britain transitioned from a unilateral imperial power pursuing its own 
course of imperial and commercial policy, continued under the control of highly autonomous 
regional imperial governments such as that of the British government in India, to a position 
as a global leader within an emerging “comity of nations” following the First World War. As 
such, the development of the British approach to opium policy, particularly with regards to 
its international contexts and implications, offers significant insights into the changes that the 
country undertook in its geopolitical transition from autonomous nineteenth century imperial 
power to early-twentieth century key member of the international community of leading 
imperial nations, at the forefront of the conception and implementation of a new kind of 
cooperative imperialism. It was in the realm of opium policy that British global policy and 
priorities changed first, and changed most remarkably: a significant marker for a changing 
British empire that was completely reorganising its approach to international diplomacy, 
commercial operations, and the exercising of global power. 
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The course of this policy transition occurred against the backdrop of domestic and 
international opposition, whilst facing sustained opposition from the imperial sphere, and the 
end result of the move towards British liberal internationalism by the 1920s was by no means 
an obvious outcome. Though an organised and initially well-funded movement in support of 
the reform of Britain’s opium system emerged in the years after 1875, it was never able to 
engender the kind of popular feeling necessary to transmute the campaign from its somewhat 
socially elite, and organisationally narrow, circles into a genuinely popular movement. The 
anti-opium campaign gained traction among the traditionally reformist base of the Liberal 
Party, particularly among its liberal non-conformist wing, and within the nationwide social 
and religious networks that sustained it, but made little effort to reach out to appeal to the 
main body of the British public, or to operate the kind of participatory, broad-based 
campaign needed for the enthusing of a mass movement. This was a curious omission given 
the political context of the post-1867 Reform Act landscape, and its expansion of the 
electorate, and was illustrative of a movement born of traditional reformist sentiments – one 
which was failing to successfully negotiate the new emergent mass politics of the country, or 
to mediate its traditionally paternalistic position in transitioning to the new demands of the 
modern setting. In many ways it was indicative of the decline of this traditional approach to 
politics and society, and the issues that these failures highlighted would continue to haunt the 
prosecution of liberal politics in Britain into the twentieth century, when the party was 
increasingly eclipsed by the Labour Party, which more effectively addressed the demands of 
mass politics in appealing to the wider electorate. The anti-opium movement was sustained 
and empowered by the same networks and social-political forces that had driven the 
successful, and popular, abolitionist movement of the late-eighteenth to early-nineteenth 
century, but it never gained the same degree of popular appeal that the abolitionists were 
able to achieve: it achieved recognition and support in parliament by the 1890s, but never 
won any significant amount of support among the general public. The movement failed to 
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achieve a broad base of public support, to excite and sustain a favourable public opinion, or 
to secure immediate political action on the issue of opium, but in the long term, as would 
become apparent by 1906, it was able to achieve overwhelming parliamentary support, to 
secure a firm position for its sentiments in Liberal foreign policy, and to establish and 
popularise key discourses relating to the consumption of drugs. An examination of this early 
domestic anti-opium movement during the last three decades of the nineteenth century, 
together with its roles, achievements and critical continuities, forms the basis of chapter one 
of the thesis. 
 
The anti-opium movement acted to establish and disseminate new discourses about opium, 
its consumption, cultural genealogy, and dramatic social implications, along with the British 
government’s role in the cultivation and trade of the substance. Indeed, this popularising of 
opium discourses, and their extension to perceptions and understanding of race, society and 
culture, particularly of China, was perhaps the most enduring legacy of the British anti-
opium movement. These discourses would help to inform the developing position of British 
parliamentarians regarding opium, dramatically influencing perceptions of the substance and 
informing a significant cultural aspect of the question. Chapter one also comprises an 
examination of the role of the anti-opium movement, and the debates that it was involved in, 
in informing perceptions of opium in Britain, and in informing the cultural bases that 
influenced later political developments, and the social perceptions of opium into the 
twentieth century. 
 
The campaign coordinated by the anti-opium movement eventually roused enough sympathy 
among British parliamentarians so as to pressure Gladstone’s minority Liberal government 
into addressing the issue through the calling of a Royal Commission, the Royal Commission 
on Opium, which took place from 1893 to 1895. The commission conducted an investigation 
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of the British opium system in India, covering its cultivation, taxation, consumption, and 
exportation, but in the end largely approved the status quo, recommending no significant 
changes in India. The failure of the Royal Commission to approve a government sanctioned 
reform sapped much of the momentum from the anti-opium movement, and it petered out 
over the following years. But despite the failure of the Royal Commission, and the decline of 
the reform movement, its legacies remained in the anti-opium sympathies of many 
parliamentarians, and in the political capital invested in the anti-opium discourses that it had 
propagated. Significant continuities in personnel, discourses, and parliamentary support 
remained from the anti-opium movement’s heyday of the early 1890s, and the full extent of 
these continuities were revealed in the aftermath of the electoral victory of the socially 
reformist Liberal Party in 1906, the first majority Liberal government since 1885. It was this 
government which began to pursue a bilateral approach to opium reform, together with the 
similarly reform-minded late Qing government in China, a process by which British policy 
was renegotiated and transitioned towards a diversification of British trade with China and 
crop replacement in India. An examination of the politics behind this most significant of 
changes in British opium policy, and its reliance on prevailing continuities in the dynamics 
of British anti-opium politics, together with an assessment of the underlying economic 
conditions that made this predominantly politically motivated transition fiscally palatable, 
forms the basis of chapter two of the thesis. 
 
The move towards bilateral renegotiation of British opium policy was closely followed by an 
American led initiative to expand the scope of opium regulation into the sphere of 
international politics. The United States had become an Asia-Pacific imperial power in its 
own right following its victory in the Spanish-American War in 1898, and had developed its 
own distinct opium policy, centred on the tenets of regulation and suppression, within its 
new colonial territory of the Philippines. Following the report of the Philippine Commission 
of 1905, the discourses surrounding American policy were increasingly directed towards 
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those of the pursuit of a moral imperialism, to the eking of moral capital, and thereby 
colonial legitimisation, from American imperialism. This approach crossed over into 
American foreign policy in China, where it took the form of the American Open Door Policy 
and Dollar Diplomacy, an economic approach that placed the American position outside of 
the reliance merely on the treaty ports, which contrasted with the position of the other 
imperial powers. The United States applied pressure on the imperial powers to converge with 
its position in China, and this would increasingly cover the sphere of opium policy, as 
American officials at the United States State Department began to push for the organising of 
commissions and conferences of international arbitration on the issue. This became 
particularly pronounced with the beginning of the presidency of William Howard Taft in 
1909, who had been the colonial Governor General of the Philippines at the time of the 
organising of the Philippine Commission, when American opium policy had been first 
developed. This approach would culminate in the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909, 
which first broached the issue in a multilateral international setting, and led to the much 
more successful Hague Opium Conferences of 1911, 1913, and 1914, which produced 
conventionalised agreements under the framework of international law. This move towards 
an internationalisation of the issue also reflected the focus of the Taft Presidency on the 
paramountcy of international law, a prioritisation which is also reflected by the Taft’s 
administration’s approach to pursuing the Taft Arbitration Treaties, negotiated with Britain 
and France in 1911. The concentration of this international political and economic action 
within the context of foreign policy in China involved a significant imperial entanglement 
between imperial powers at odds over their respective foreign policies in the region, and 
seeking to challenge the position of British pre-eminence. As such, American initiatives 
were fiercely resisted by Britain in these early years of the international movement for 
reform, as British administrators mediated between the competing political impulses of 
bilateral opium reform, the notion of imperial autonomy, and the complicated geopolitical 
situation in East Asia. Though these early American international proposals encountered 
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resistance, they laid the groundwork for later initiatives, which built upon an underlying 
current of the convergence of geopolitical priorities, and a general warming of  relations, 
between the United States and Britain. An examination of the currents of these political and 
economic policy developments in China, and their impacts on the course of British opium 
policy within the context of the developing imperial dynamics of the region, is examined in 
chapter three of the thesis. 
 
Following the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909, the initiative that had been pioneered 
by the United States, and overseen by the Taft administration as part of its foreign policy 
approach for the ‘legalising of international relations’1 through concerted multilateral 
international meetings, this approach was expanded in the region. The issue of opium 
remained one of paramount importance, and the United States State Department acted to 
organise and facilitate further international conferences to conventionalise the 
recommendations reached during the 1909 commission, culminating in the Hague Opium 
Conferences of 1911, 1913 and 1914. During these conferences, despite having been 
staunchly opposed to the very notion of multilateral action on opium, Britain eventually 
joined the initiative, and grew to become one of its most vocal supporters. This transition 
represented a further development of the British position that had been reached with the 
Anglo-Chinese Opium Agreement of 1907, and a broadening of the scope of British reform 
from the sphere of direct bilateral negotiations to one of multilateral cooperation and 
coordination. Essentially, the British commitment to reform was entrenched, and the failsafe 
built into the 1907 agreement whereby the course of British reform in India enacted within 
the agreement might be abandoned in the case of the Chinese government’s failure to 
conduct a parallel suppression campaign of Chinese domestic opium cultivation, was 
effectively jettisoned by the British government. The future course of British opium policy 
                                                          
1 J. Noyes, ‘William Howard Taft and the Taft Arbitration Treaties’, Villanova University Charles 
Widger School of Law Digital Repositrory, 56, 3 (2011), p. 535. 
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had been settled upon as being one of reform, international regulation and suppression, and 
the decision to support and enact opium regulation within this international framework, 
reached during the negotiations at the Hague Opium Conferences, set a new policy direction 
for Britain, heralding the beginnings of a phase of internationalist leadership in Britain’s 
global role, and a proto-typical “comity of nations” approach in British foreign policy. This 
new British approach to opium and foreign policy would expand in the interwar years to 
comprise its position of leadership within the League of Nations, and especially within the 
League’s Opium Advisory Committee, a position which was also attained through continued 
international efforts for the regulation of the production and traffic in opium and other drugs, 
during the course of the Geneva Opium Conferences of the 1920s. In the years following the 
First World War, tensions in the region between the imperial powers were building, 
particularly as Japanese foreign policy became increasingly expansionist and the narcotics 
economy in Japanese-controlled North China expanded in relative obscurity and unmolested, 
and as British geopolitical priorities began to change, culminating in the ending of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the continued convergence of Anglo-American relations. The 
convergence of Anglo-American relations, and the development of a shared approach to 
global opium policy, within the context of the imperial entanglement in China, produced an 
environment where the imperial powers were competitively vying for economic space in the 
country while simultaneously seeking to renegotiate their regional, and for Britain its global, 
positions through the forging of legitimising discourses of moral imperialism with relation to 
opium policy. This process of the convergence of British and American priorities, interests, 
and eventually policy in the sphere of opium, and how it was, throughout the course of the 
negotiations at the Hague Opium Conferences, to become a lynchpin of the new 
internationalist conception of moral imperialism, with a focus on propagating legitimising 
discourses of imperial power, colonial rule, and economic exploitation in the emergent early-
twentieth environment of internationalism, forms the basis of chapter four of the thesis. 
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Literature Review 
 
 
The literature on opium 
 
David Owen’s British Opium Policy in India and China represents the earliest 
comprehensive attempt to define the development of British opium policy, charting it 
through a synthesis of evidence from anti-opium literature and British Government archival 
sources. Due to the nature of its publication in 1934, it is limited in the scope that it covers, 
as the more recent government documents remained classified at the time of its publication, 
and it focuses mostly on the nineteenth century background to British policy in India, and the 
China trade.2 Much of Owen’s analysis was, in turn, informed by the earlier work of H. B. 
Morse, who in his multi volume work The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to 
China, 1635-1834 examined in great detail the background to the British trade between India 
and China before the First Opium War, and the Canton System within which this trade 
operated.3 While Morse laid much of the foundations of the modern scholarship on the India-
China trade, Owen added to this with a focus on the trade in opium specifically.  
 
Following on from Morse and Owen’s earlier studies, writing about the India-China opium 
trade can be broken down into several wider bodies of scholarship. One such subject area is 
that of opium and empire, perhaps the most useful study on which is Carl Trocki’s Opium, 
Empire and the Global Political Economy.4 Trocki focuses on the value of the opium trade 
in financing and sustaining the development of empire in India, and in forging the 
                                                          
2 D. Owen, British Opium Policy in India and China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934). 
3 H. B. Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635-1834, 4 volumes 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926-1929). 
4 C. Trocki, Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A study of the Asian Opium Trade, 
1750-1950 (London: Routledge, 1999). 
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commercial networks into East and South East Asia. He argues that, following the First 
Opium War, opium was also crucial in providing the foundations of the British imperial 
economic and political structures in China, in addition to what he argues was an 
indispensable part of the development of British capitalism and commerce more generally. 
Opium was such an indispensable part of the imperial establishment and commerce in Asia, 
Trocki contends, that there would likely not have been a British Empire without it. 
 
The role of opium in shaping the changing commercial and diplomatic contexts of nineteenth 
century Asia are explored in John King Fairbank’s groundbreaking study Trade and 
Diplomacy on the China Coast.5 These themes are also examined in Mark Greenberg’s 
British Trade and the Opening of China.6 The focus of these works is on the diplomatic 
developments in China, the limitations of the Canton System in a world increasingly 
dominated by free trade, the commercial origins of the conflict between Britain and China, 
and the opening of the treaty ports and establishment of British commercial dominance in the 
region. The position of opium is largely incidental to this broader focus, though still central 
to the course of events described. 
 
Aside from these studies, the scholarship relating to the Anglo-Chinese opium trade is 
dominated by works with a focus on the Opium Wars and their impact on the diplomatic 
relations of Britain and China, with J. Beeching’s The Chinese Opium Wars, H. Chang’s 
Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, and J. Y. Wong’s Deadly Dreams representing a 
notable few.7 Such works, although primarily focusing on the conflicts of the period, do 
                                                          
5 J. K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-
1854 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1953). 
6 M. Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1951). 
7 J. Beeching, The Chinese Opium Wars (London, 1975); Chang, H. Commissioner Lin and the Opium 
War (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964); J. Y. Wong, Deadly Dreams: Opium, Imperialism and the 
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address the position of the opium trade in events, but do not touch much upon the impact of 
contemporary debate on the course of events, perhaps in part due to the fact that most such 
debate occurred later after the war – as this thesis explores, from the mid-1870s. Elements of 
the factors in support for the trade are, however, identified in the core works which focus on 
the Opium Wars. Indeed, in his study of the Arrow War, Wong notes that the war was, in its 
genesis, as much a result of British diplomatic confusion and misdirection by key individuals 
stationed in China as of a real British desire to protect and enhance the opium trade, but he 
also emphasizes the significance of Britain’s trade imbalance with China and the opium 
trade’s financial importance to the British imperial machine in addressing it, concepts which, 
if substantiated, also bear relevance to the continued prosecution of the opium trade.  These 
works go some way in identifying interpretations as to the reasons for British support for, or 
rather defence of, the British opium traders in Canton, but do not adequately address the 
underlying political processes that formed the basis of these decisions. They also, in focusing 
predominantly on the opium wars, stop short of examining the development of the politics of 
opium from the 1870s onwards, when the British anti-opium movement emerged and the 
domestic debate over opium began in earnest. 
 
Opium consumption and regulation in Britain, and the politics of debating the opium trade 
 
In terms of the British domestic contexts of discussion, Virginia Berridge has analysed the 
position of opium in British society, its transition from an easily available and widely used 
substance to one placed under strict controls, and the development of regulatory institutions 
and the culture of regulation in British society and among the medical profession in 
                                                          
Arrow War (1856-1860) in China (Cambridge, 1998). See also: J. Lovell, The Opium War: Drugs, 
Dreams and the Making of China (Oxford: Picador, 2011). 
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particular.8 Terry Parssinen has examined the cultural contexts of the hysteria behind drug 
use in the early twentieth century, and the public health campaign that grew up around the 
consumption of opium in Britain.9 Kathleen Lodwick has analysed the role of Protestant 
missionaries in helping to bridge the divide in anti-opium politics in China and the West, and 
as actors in the dissemination of knowledge back to Britain.10 In Narcotic Culture: A History 
of Drugs in China Frank Dikötter, Lars Laamann and Zhou Xun question the well-trodden 
narrative that China was, from the early nineteenth century, a nation overrun with opium 
addicts and exploited by opium from external imperialistic sources. They examine the 
cultural bases of opium consumption in the country, including as traditional medicine and as 
moderate social convention, and the ways in which events in China and the discourses that 
they helped give rise to caused an international “narcophobia”. They also make the argument 
that most consumers were involved in only moderate consumption in social settings, and that 
the introduction of synthetic opiate cures as a “modern” alternative to opium smoking in the 
early twentieth century was ‘a cure which was far worse than the disease’.11  
 
These studies predominantly focus on specific areas of empire and commerce, Anglo-
Chinese relations, consumption and regulation in Britain, or on topics that are otherwise 
connected with opium. This thesis sets out to provide an examination of the development of 
British opium policy and to explore the various causative factors – domestic, imperial, and 
international – which informed and impacted upon the course and transitions of 
policymaking in the international sphere, and to explore the ways in which the course of 
                                                          
8 V. Berridge, Opium and the People: Opiate Use and Drug Control Policy in Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Century England (London: Free Association Books, 1999), pp. 115-117. 
9 T. M. Parssinen, Secret Passions, Secret Remedies: Narcotic Drugs in British Society, 1820-1930 
(Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1983). 
10 K. Lodwick Crusaders Against Opium: Protestant Missionaries in China 1874-1917 (Lexington, 
KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996). 
11 F. Dikötter, L. Laamann, X. Zhou, Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 2004), p. 207. 
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British opium policy reflected parallel developments in global events. 
 
Liberalism and humanitarianism 
 
Liberalism as an ideology was central to informing much of the debate about opium in 
Britain in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with a focus on the importance of 
moral concerns and the responsibility that Britain should hold in its global position defining 
much of this opposition. This traditional liberal position was dominated by concerns 
regarding the importance of the country pursuing moral politics, a significant theme in the 
late-nineteenth century that came to define the foreign policy of the Liberal Party during the 
tenure of William Gladstone as leader. This foreign policy coexisted with a preference for 
liberal imperialism and the civilising mission in the liberal perception of the British global 
role, as well as an emphasis on Britain’s supposed humanitarian character and moral 
responsibilities as a Christian nation. 
 
In Smyrna’s Ashes: Humanitarianism, Genocide, and the Birth of the Middle East, Michelle 
Tusan examines the ways in which notions of humanitarianism acted to shape British foreign 
policy in the last years of the Ottoman Empire. In doing so she explores the use of 
humanitarianism as a basis for the propagation of legitimising discourses of British 
imperialism as a focus of British foreign policy in providing humanitarian assistance to 
Christian victims of expulsion and persecution in the former Ottoman Empire in the years 
around its dissolution following the First World War, which she argues provided British 
foreign policy in the region with a sense of ‘humanitarian responsibility’, and which also 
allowed for the ‘articulation of a vision of a moral and just British Empire’. Tusan identifies 
this humanitarian element in British foreign policy as particularly emanating from the liberal 
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side of British politics and the Liberal Party in parliament, tracing it back to the ideological 
“moral politics” of William Gladstone of the late-nineteenth century.12 This ideological 
characterisation of liberal political thinking was critical in informing the late-nineteenth 
century domestic opposition to the British opium system, and in affecting change in the 
course of the development of British opium policy in the early twentieth century. I argue 
that, particularly for the non-conformist elements within the Liberal Party from the mid-
1870s, the anti-opium movement and the campaign against the opium trade to China 
provided a similar outlet for such liberal humanitarian impulses, offering a target for liberal 
activism. The campaign against the opium trade again brought these inclinations to the fore 
in the sphere of British foreign policy, and many liberals similarly viewed the British 
position regarding opium cultivation in India and the trade to China and elsewhere in Asia as 
casting aspersions over the character of British imperialism. 
 
This humanitarian aspect in the tradition of the ideology of British liberalism can also be 
traced back to the protest and political action that informed the earlier campaigns against 
slavery and the slave trade, as the abolitionist campaign drew upon the same kinds of liberal 
humanitarian impulses. For many years this humanitarian explanation dominated the 
historiography of abolitionism in British history, until a series of scholars introduced an 
economic explanation for the relatively fast change in the fortunes of the abolitionist cause in 
Britain in the early nineteenth century. This economic explanation, first made by Eric 
Williams in Capitalism and Slavery, hinged on the core argument that abolitionism, though 
attracting increasingly strong public and parliamentary support, only became politically 
implementable once economic arguments relating to the challenge of slave labour to the free 
labour economy during the industrial revolution, and the surge in the popularity of free trade 
                                                          
12 M. Tusan, Smyrna’s Ashes: Humanitarianism, Genocide, and the Birth of the Middle East 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), passim, pp. 4, 5. 
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as a political ideology, had taken hold in Britain.13 In the cause of abolitionism, though, the 
political notion of moral capital also existed as a significant element in the promotion of anti-
slavery as a campaign. This concept has been examined in great detail by Christopher Leslie 
Brown in Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism, in which Brown explores the 
ways in which the abolitionist position was utilised, not simply as a moral or humanitarian 
position in support of the emancipation of slaves, but also as a political position for the 
extraction of moral capital, and so as to best secure the continued prosecution of the British 
Empire. He argues that this was particularly the case during the American Revolutionary 
War, when the position was imbued with additional political power as both the British and 
colonial sides vied for the moral high ground, and dealt with the promotion of anti-slavery as 
a way of differentiating themselves from one another during the war, in doing so propagating 
legitimising discourses in support of their own positions.14  
 
This thesis examines the ways in which a similar vein of politically-minded extraction of 
moral capital was enacted through the reform of Britain’s opium system, and involvement in 
the opium trade with China. I argue that, by 1911, the British case for opium reform 
similarly hinged on maximising moral capital, as British policymakers, though harbouring 
many underlying liberal humanitarian ideals of empire, and within a broadly favourable 
economic environment, sought also to stress Britain’s moral position, within an international 
context where opium reform and suppression was increasingly the imperial status quo, as the 
United States had begun implementing a reformist regime in the Philippines and Japan was 
similarly enacting in Taiwan. This process of reform and the search for moral capital 
                                                          
13 E. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Edn. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
1994); See also: S. Drescher, Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition (Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977);  S. Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery: British Abolition in 
Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987);  D. Eltis, Economic Growth and 
the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
14 C. L. Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2006). 
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occurred at a time of significant imperial entanglement in Asia during the first two decades 
of the twentieth century, and in China in particular, as the imperial powers increasingly vied 
for commercial access to the country, and the United States in particular sought a change to 
the status quo (effectively a challenge to British pre-eminence) through its Open Door Policy 
from 1899. The American approach by the time of the Taft administration, from 1909, was 
one of investment and the maintenance of peace and stability, pushed through a propagating 
of moral and interactive discourses of imperial commerce, as was exemplified by its Dollar 
Diplomacy approach to foreign relations. To meet this rival imperial approach, I argue that 
Britain too sought legitimising discourses for its commercial establishment in the region, 
making the extraction of moral capital desirous. In light of the discursive and operational 
similarities of the British abolitionist and anti-opium movements, discussed in chapter one of 
this thesis, this additional notion of the extraction of moral capital through reform as a 
political end in itself is an interesting further dynamic of comparison with the earlier 
abolitionist campaign. 
 
Internationalism 
 
The debate over opium, both in its mostly domestic nineteenth century context, and 
international twentieth century context, was rooted in internationalism and an awareness of 
global events. The opposition to the British opium trade from within Britain, and its 
subsequent government sanctioned investigation and later reform, did not occur in isolation, 
but was situated within an international environment which acted upon the key processes in 
these developments, and which, by the twentieth century, was perhaps the most critical 
driving factor in supplying the impetus for reform, as international actors, agents, and bodies 
provided sustained pressure on the British government.  But internationalism itself was a 
political ideology with a not insignificant genealogy of its own in Britain, and was not born 
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merely of the international meetings of the early twentieth century in which it was perhaps 
most clearly manifested; British internationalism had a history of its own within the 
traditions and sympathies of nineteenth century liberal thought. In terms of the literature on 
internationalism in Britain, and its links to the emergence of an internationalist geopolitical 
sphere in the early twentieth century of which Britain became an integral player, Casper 
Sylvest has traced the development of the British internationalism that came to define much 
of Britain’s approach to foreign policy in the early twentieth century back to the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, placing it within the Anglo-American context which this 
internationalism took on by the interwar period. As Sylvest argues, the arguments and 
strategies of the new internationalism of the twentieth century grew out of the political 
environment of the second half of the nineteenth century, the product of the ‘culmination of 
a tradition of internationalist thinking among liberal intellectuals in Britain’.15 With relation 
to the underlying political situation during the decades of opium protest and reform about 
which this thesis is concerned, Sylvest’s study offers an illuminating examination of the 
ideology and political background at the heart of liberal internationalism, and helps to 
explain the prevailing political environment in which the modern Liberal Party was 
operating by the turn of the twentieth century. This thesis seeks to demonstrate these 
continuities in liberal internationalism through a focus on their impact on the course of 
debate and reform of Britain’s involvement in the cultivation and trade in opium, exploring 
the ways in which traditional liberalism, and its global humanitarian focus, developed by the 
early twentieth century into a more truly internationalist force in British politics; opium is a 
topic about which these trends crystallised, and around which new international contexts of 
humanitarianism, arbitration, and legalism emerged. 
 
                                                          
15 C. Sylvest, British Liberal Internationalism, 1880-1930. Making Progress? (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2009), p. 197. 
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When it came to the point of the realisation of the internationalist moment in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century, with the international conferences of the 1900s to the early 
1910s, the League of Nations after 1919, and the internationalism of the British Liberal 
government coming to prominence through limited reform of imperial policy in India, and of 
opium policy on the global stage, it was in the context of a far-reaching and pioneering 
American internationalist foreign policy. This internationalist character in American foreign 
policy developed within the context of a questioning of the best principles to pursue in 
American imperial policy; with its acquisition of a Pacific empire, and the subsequent 
colonial encounter with opium consumption and accompanying policy questions in the 
Philippines, American policymakers were faced with a whole range of new responsibilities 
and policy areas that were in need of a clear sense of government direction. This American 
connection is critical in understanding the British policy shift in the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, and represents a convergence of two quite different forms of 
internationalism. In Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth 
Century, Frank Ninkovich has identified the beginnings of an intrinsically global focus in 
American foreign policy at the turn of the twentieth century, noting that Theodore Roosevelt 
was the first President of the United States to situate American foreign policy within the 
dynamics of “civilisational” values and modernity, essentially a form of liberal imperialism 
with American characteristics, and to conceive of the role of the country as necessarily 
global in nature, at a time of the expansion of the American world position with its colonial 
territorial acquisitions following the Spanish-American War. Roosevelt was a transitional 
figure, indicative of the shift from traditional American leaders towards more globally 
minded modern presidents, as he straddled both worlds. Ninkovich follows that the 
presidency of William Howard Taft, who succeeded Roosevelt in the White House, marked 
the beginnings of a modern and coherent American internationalism, with Taft’s personal 
passion for international law contributing to an approach favouring the legalising of 
international relations, most clearly demonstrated by the negotiations behind the Taft 
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Arbitration Treaties, with a prioritisation on maintaining global peace. Ninkovich has noted 
the commercial nature of the Taft administration’s foreign policy, characterised by its 
“Dollar Diplomacy”, a position which helps explain the American foreign policy approach in 
China around the time of the critical Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909, and subsequent 
Hague Opium Conferences from 1911.  Crucially, for the Taft administration the 
modernisation of China was of central importance to American commercial interests in the 
country, with significant implications for the position of opium.16 Taft is a critical figure in 
the development of an inclusive and multilateral internationalist environment that would 
define the commissions and conferences of the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
and a focus on the development of internationalism within American politics, and especially 
under Taft’s presidency, helps to ground the parallel British transitions that took place during 
this time within a wider global context. This thesis examines the British responses to the Taft 
administrations internationalist initiatives in China during the period between 1909 and 
1914, exploring the development of the British position within the changing imperial 
dynamics and foreign policy contexts in the region, as well as the liberal continuities that 
encouraged this nascent Anglo-American cooperation in international affairs on the British 
side. It explores the ways in which this development contributed to the utilisation of this 
period of internationalism in British foreign policy priorities to exploit moral political capital 
from the British transition away from opium revenues and an increasingly criticised 
involvement in supplying the trade to China, and towards a leadership position in 
international affairs that would come to define the British position in the subsequent decades, 
particularly through the workings of the League of Nations.  
 
                                                          
16 F. Ninkovich Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), chapters 1-2. See also, F. Ninkovich, Global 
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Chapter One 
Between elite and mass cultures of reform: The anti-opium movement and the politics 
of imperial reformism in late-nineteenth century Britain 
 
During the nineteenth century, the India-China opium trade operated from India, where 
opium was cultivated under a British state monopoly, to China and other smaller regional 
markets where it was sold. A monopoly over the production of opium had been held by the 
Mughal Empire on the Indian subcontinent, and a similar monopoly system was taken on by 
the British East India Company on its expansion in India during the eighteenth century. The 
opium trade expanded in volume following the transition to the formal British Indian empire 
after the end of East India Company rule in 1857. Thereafter, opium was cultivated and 
taxed in India under a lucrative government monopoly, before being transferred principally 
to the port of Calcutta and shipped to China and other regional markets in the vessels of 
private trading companies. Licenses to grow opium were granted to farmers at the discretion 
of regional authorities acting on behalf of the British India government, and a heavy duty 
was placed on the opium as it was exported.17 Opium cultivated in those autonomous regions 
of the sub-continent controlled by autonomous Indian monarchs also received a heavy tax, in 
this case on its overland journey to the ports from which it was to be exported. The revenue 
generated by these processes was a significant source of income for the British 
administration in India. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the income from opium at 
times accounted for as much as 16% of total revenues for India, and as such the British 
administration was loathe to forfeit it.18 The opium trade was an extremely important part of 
the finances of the British India Government throughout the nineteenth century, and the 
                                                          
17 C. Trocki, Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade, 
1750-1950 (London: Routledge, 1999). 
18 J. F. Richards, ‘Opium and the British Indian Empire: The Royal Commission of 1895’, Modern 
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government of India was inseparably bound up in its cultivation and exportation. It was not 
until a bilateral agreement was reached between the British and Chinese governments in 
1907 that the trade was gradually brought to a close, with the volume of British imports into 
China capped in line with a similar drawing down of Chinese domestic cultivation, although 
smaller markets in British colonial South East Asia and in colonial Hong Kong were to 
survive for at least another forty years.19  
 
This chapter explores the late-nineteenth century origins of the sustained debate over opium 
and the emergence of an organised anti-opium movement from the 1870s, which was active 
in opposing the British involvement with opium, seeking to raise awareness of the issue of 
the cultivation and trade in opium among a somewhat limited public through pamphleteering 
and public meetings, and lobbying parliament through well-trodden (predominantly liberal) 
networks of activism and protest. Although failing to directly spawn a government policy of 
opium reform during its late-nineteenth century heyday, owing to a variety of complicating 
factors in British imperial and foreign policy priorities, the anti-opium movement helped to 
inform the language of debate in parliament to such an extent that it laid the foundations for 
the majority Liberal government of 1906 to implement a policy of reform, first bilaterally 
with China, and then through an extensive multilateral programme in the interwar years. The 
anti-opium movement, both inside and outside of parliament, represented the continuation of 
a long tradition of liberal thought, and drew heavily from the discourses of moral and just 
empire, Christian morality and responsibility, the contemporary lofty ideals of liberal 
imperialism. 
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The course of debate with regards to the liberal anti-opium movement in Britain represented 
a critical juncture in the transition from elite to mass cultures of political action in British 
society, straddling the period of transition which saw the increasing enfranchisement of the 
British working classes. In many respects, the successes and failures of the movement can be 
seen as a case study in the changing dynamics of British politics, and the trajectory of the 
movement’s appeal, and subsequent decline, is in many ways illustrative of the changing 
political culture in the late-nineteenth century landscape. Liberals struggled to effectively 
engage the new mass electorate that was increasingly enfranchised in the years following the 
Reform Act of 1867, and were eventually gradually superseded as the party of the left by the 
new Labour Party in the early twentieth century. That the liberal anti-opium movement did 
not effectively harness the support of the working classes, or even make any serious attempts 
to court it, should perhaps not come as much of a surprise when viewed in this broader 
context. George Bernstein has argued that the new liberalism that emerged in the early 
twentieth century, even with its radical social agenda – with its People’s Budget and early 
attempts at social welfare – defined by the Liberal government that came to power with its 
1906 election victory, itself did not provide effective long term solutions to the problem of 
appealing to the working classes in a new era of mass politics after 1867.20 The anti-opium 
movement operated within traditional social and religious networks of imperial reformism, 
as will be demonstrated and explored in this chapter, and though it provided many of the 
discursive foundations and themes for the twentieth century reformist programme that the 
1906 Liberal government would embark upon regarding opium, it represented the last hurrah 
of the older, more traditional element of the Liberal Party in seeking to affect a humanitarian 
campaign in British society. It was a product of the socially elite non-conformist wing of the 
Liberal Party, and though it was achieve some success in raising the issue in parliament in 
the latter years of the nineteenth century, it quickly fell into obscurity and irrelevance in the 
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years of rapid change that defined the early twentieth century. This chapter explores in detail 
how the anti-opium campaign evolved throughout the latter decades of the nineteenth 
century, what defined and motivated its leaders, and the ways in which it approached reform, 
caught as it was between competing cultures of elite and mass politics. 
 
Debate over the opium trade reached a high point by the middle of the 1870s, as the coherent 
anti-opium movement emerged, with well organised and well-funded groups such as the 
Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade (SSOT) taking a lead in pushing the issue, 
lobbying newspapers and publishers to distribute its information and print materials, 
achieving a reasonably wide readership for its publications among elite circles and some 
recognition among the middle classes, and a sustained presence in parliament through the 
contribution of several loyal MPs.21 The genesis for the formation of the SSOT was largely 
the result of enthusiasm and attention generated by an essay competition organised by 
Edward Pease (brother of Liberal MP and later SSOT parliamentary representative Sir 
Joseph Pease) and other prominent Quaker activists in 1874, which encouraged entrants to 
write papers on the state of the opium traffic from British India.  
 
There had been a certain amount of public debate surrounding the opium trade in British 
society since the 1830s, when the East India Company’s monopoly of the China trade had 
come under attack and by 1834 had been abolished. Debate had reached an early relative 
high point at the beginning of the 1840s in the aftermath of the First Opium War between 
Britain and China, but the arguments and positions which dominated the discourse of these 
                                                          
21 For an account of the interactions between the Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade at 
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early decades were concerned principally with the economic aspects of the trade, and the 
impact of the war on British commerce. Arguments in the national press were dominated by 
key talking points such as ‘the interruption of the British trade’, rather than any strong or 
sustained criticism of British imperial policy.22 British missionaries in China and the region 
had long been critical of the effects of the opium trade, of its perceived moral impacts on the 
Chinese population, and of what they argued was its role in encouraging anti-western feeling 
among the Chinese people.23 These missionaries, though, had relatively little impact in the 
mainstream of British domestic society, their lobbying of parliament was insignificant when 
compared to that of the British anti-opium movement that began to emerge in the 1870s, and 
earlier missionaries in China had had a somewhat difficult relationship with the opium trade, 
many having been sponsored or supported by trading companies operating within the trade. 
Such conflicts of interest had often stifled missionary discontent towards the trade in the 
early years of missionary activity in China after 1841.24 Opposition to the opium trade, and 
to the opium wars, had also seen sporadic attention from among radical circles from the 
1840s through the 1850 and 1860s, and the First Opium War in particular, which also drew 
criticism from the Chartist press, but opposition was not effective, united or centrally 
orchestrated until the middle of the 1870s.25 
 
                                                          
22 See for example: ‘Local Intelligence’, The Northern Liberator, Saturday, August 10, 1839, Issue 
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27 
 
The organised British anti-opium movement that began to emerge in the 1870s was an elitist 
affair for the most part. The leadership of the movement, with the Society for the 
Suppression of the Opium Trade (SSOT) at its fore, was dominated by social elites, by noted 
social reformers, Quaker Ministers and members of parliament, and by wealthy industrialists 
who provided necessary funding. The society shared much of its leadership with the Opium 
Traffic Committee of the main Quaker organisation, the Religious Society of Friends, all of 
whom were active in other areas of social reform and activism. For them, the anti-opium 
cause was but one among many, and they operated within long established networks of 
social activism encompassed in the infrastructure of the organised Quaker movement. The 
Religious Society of Friends consisted of dozens of dedicated committees that met regularly 
to discuss a wide range of different contemporary subjects. The committees, of which the 
Opium Traffic Committee was one since its inception in 1881, were charged with gathering 
information and relevant materials, and the sitting members were expected to act as experts 
to inform the society on the issue. The findings of the committees were then presented 
periodically across the country at regional meetings, Yearly Meetings, and at the national 
Meeting for Sufferings of the Society of Friends at its headquarters in London. In this way 
the Society of Friends was able to sustain an effective deliberative platform and lobbying 
infrastructure for the sharing of ideas and dissemination of information, and for the 
generation of the society’s policy, all of which it was able to bring to bear in support of its 
anti-opium campaigning.26 Although a memorial had been sent by the Society of Friends to 
the British government on the topic of the opium trade in 1859, a committee on the subject 
was only formed by the central Meeting for Sufferings in 1881, the year after another 
memorial was sent. In lieu of a dedicated committee within the Society of Friends, many of 
those Quaker activists who would come to sit on the Opium Traffic Committee after 1881 
took a leading role in the SSOT. It could be argued, therefore, that the SSOT was in essence 
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an offshoot of the organised British Quaker movement as much as of the abolitionist 
movement. It was this infrastructural network that allowed the anti-opium movement to 
function as a viable national movement, and this perhaps explains why much of the 
movement’s leadership were a part of this Quaker establishment. 
 
The British anti-opium movement and the legacy of abolitionism 
 
The anti-opium movement therefore did not emerge out of nothing, but was created and 
sustained through sophisticated existing networks of activism and support. The movement 
was one characterised by its elite leadership, but also by its middle class support base and by 
its notably dissenting non-conformist makeup. It was a movement that Julia Lovell has, in 
describing the anti-opium lobby as it existed in the late-1860s, characterised as ‘an offshoot 
of the middle-class pressure group politics that, in the first thirty years of the nineteenth 
century, had mobilized such vocal opposition to slavery’.27 But by the 1870s the abolitionist 
legacy ran much deeper than mere association. The connection with the organised anti-
opium movement was much more than simply a factor of class and of the politics of 
mobilisation; to the anti-opium movement, the question of self-identity and of the 
continuation of the abolitionist legacy was of central importance. The abolitionist legacy was 
also not only ideological, but encompassed the extension of personal, religious and social 
traditions of public activism and reform. This was no passing resemblance, but rather a 
continuation of the operative networks of the abolitionist movement and of this culture of 
reformism manifest in the imperial sphere. 
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A century earlier, the abolitionists, drawing support from similar radical liberal and non-
conformist constituencies, and with a leadership likewise comprising many Quakers, had 
fought a campaign on humanitarian arguments to advocate the transformation of the British 
world system of the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth century, with slavery and the slave 
trade as the target. The emergent anti-opium movement of the 1870s, though apparently 
spontaneous, drew heavily upon existing networks of support and social advocacy, on groups 
and social circles tied to a long tradition of humanitarian pressure in the empire and of social 
activism in domestic society. Many of those at the head of the anti-opium movement were 
influential individuals who had already developed reputations for social activism and 
politics, and who were already associated with a wide range of institutions and societies with 
similar targets and aims as the anti-opium movement. Many were Quakers, preachers, 
members of parliament, and industrialists, and non-conformism and evangelical Christianity 
defined the identities of many of the movement’s principle leaders and backers.  
 
Most identified themselves as social reformers and campaigners on humanitarian issues. 
Anthony Ashley-Cooper, the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, the philanthropist and social 
reformer, became the first President of the newly formed Society for the Suppression of the 
Opium Trade in 1874. A man immediately associated with his pioneering domestic social 
reforms in the areas of Child Labour, the Factory Acts, and the Ten Hour Working Day, his 
appointment set the tone both for the activities and focus of the society’s work, and for the 
intellectual and political background of its leaders and supporters. In contrast to many of the 
other key figures in the movement, many of whom had ties to the Liberal Party, Shaftesbury 
was a Tory reformer. While most of the most active figures in the anti-opium movement 
came from among the non-conformist wing of the Liberal Party, the cause did receive some 
support from the Conservative benches during important debates in parliament. Frederick 
Storrs-Turner was one of the SSOT’s founding members. A priest and former China 
missionary, he took a prominent position in the society and used his experience in China to 
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author several of its publications.28 Sir Joseph Pease (1828-1903) was a wealthy Quaker 
industrialist and Liberal MP who came from the prominent Pease family, many of whose 
members had been associated with philanthropy, humanitarian enterprises, abolitionism, and 
imperial and social reform. In addition to being the SSOT’s primary financial backer, he was 
also one of the society’s most vocal supporters in parliament, and served as its President 
from 1886 until his death in 1903. He was perhaps the most visible of the SSOT’s 
leadership, owing both to his position as a vocal Liberal MP in the House of Commons and 
to his outspokenness and seriousness of manner, for which he was mercilessly lampooned in 
the satirical print media.29 His father, also named Joseph Pease, was a prominent Quaker 
industrialist and railway pioneer, and was also the first Quaker Member of Parliament in 
Britain. It was his industrial ventures that helped accrue much of the family wealth which Sir 
Joseph Pease was to use to bankroll the SSOT. His uncle, also named Joseph Pease, had been 
an abolitionist and a co-founder of the “Peace Society”, a pacifist society founded in 1816 
advocating universal disarmament and the principle of arbitration, and had been active in 
advocating reforms in India, and was particularly known for his role in publicising the state 
of slavery in India in British society.30  
 
Joseph Gundry Alexander (1848-1918) was another prominent Quaker within the SSOT, and 
wrote prolifically on behalf of the society and for the society’s journal, the Friend of China. 
He was also the long serving secretary of the Quaker Society of Friends’ Opium Traffic 
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Committee, of which he was the most active member, lobbying newspapers, ministers and 
even foreign dignitaries on behalf of the committee. Henry Richards (1812-1888), another of 
the SSOT’s active members of parliament, was a non-conformist and Congregationalist 
minister. He was an active anti-slavery campaigner, and was also the President of the “Peace 
Society” for almost forty years.31 In parliament, the anti-opium movement could always 
count on the support of Sir Wilfrid Lawson, a veteran Liberal MP and a campaigner for a 
number of other liberal and non-conformist dominated social causes, including temperance 
and the control of liquor licenses.32 He was a vocal opponent of the opium trade in 
parliament, raising several important motions. Robert Fowler MP was another prominent 
supporter of the SSOT and the anti-opium cause in parliament. He published several 
pamphlets on the topic, and was a prominent member and treasurer of the Aborigines 
Protection Society, a traditional paternalistic philanthropic group advocating for the 
protection of indigenous peoples. He also travelled in both China and India in the 1870s, and 
wrote an account of his experiences.33  
 
The SSOT and the anti-opium movement, then, were dominated by non-conformists, social 
reformers, and in particular by those from the radical non-conformist wing of the Liberal 
Party. The SSOT’s leadership sat on its General Council, which typically comprised around 
forty-five members. Of the forty-six men who sat on the council in 1876, there were 
seventeen MPs and eighteen Christian ministers. Fifteen of those seventeen MPs were 
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Liberals, and sixteen of the Christian ministers were non-conformists.34 These were also the 
principle constituencies of leadership and support which had defined the abolitionist 
movement of the early nineteenth century. This cross-section of some of the most prominent 
members of the SSOT and anti-opium advocates reveals some clear patterns in the 
backgrounds, ideologies, and other activities of the key individuals in the British anti-opium 
movement. They possessed a strong sense of paternalistic humanitarian responsibility, 
sometimes coming from families with a long history of such activism, and often coming 
from non-conformist backgrounds. Many were active in other imperial and domestic 
movements of a similar character, such as the abolitionist movement and the global pacifism 
movement. Some were also evangelists and missionaries. The majority came from the same 
religious, social and political networks. Many were prominent advocates of abolitionism and 
continued anti-slavery activities into the late nineteenth century, supported the humane 
treatment and protection of indigenous peoples, and the society’s supporters in parliament 
were mostly Liberal MPs and reform-minded Lords, with the conservative MP Robert 
Fowler being of particular note for his being a rare exception to this otherwise overwhelming 
trend.  
 
The cultural inheritance of abolitionism and liberal humanitarianism 
 
The first signs of the emergence of the organised anti-opium movement can be traced back to 
an 1870 debate in the House of Commons, where a resolution was put forward by Sir Wilfrid 
Lawson on the opium trade, the first for 27 years. The motion proposed that: ‘This House 
condemns the system by which a large portion of the Indian Revenue is raised from opium’. 
The motion failed with 48 votes to 150.35 This motion related specifically to India and the 
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cultivation and taxation of opium for revenue purposes than to the China context of its export 
for sale and consumption. The majority of the materials produced by the anti-opium 
movement would also focus on the India context, and the direct British imperial role in the 
trade, principally challenging the morality and necessity of the British India government’s 
monopoly of production and its reliance on revenue from opium. To the anti-opium 
movement, the moral implications of the trade had far-reaching impacts in India and in 
China, but the way to resolve this was to reform the British Empire in India, and to focus on 
the British role. Britain was the imperial power in India, and controlled the cultivation of 
opium, and therefore had a responsibility to limit that production. The point of Chinese 
domestic cultivation and the growth of opium in other regions such as Persia was raised, but 
the focus remained on reforming the British involvement. For the anti-opium movement, 
Britain as a civilised nation should have to live up to the responsibilities entailed by its 
civilised and imperial position, and the economic ‘precariousness’ of the Indian opium 
revenue in light of rising foreign competition served only as a further reason to abandon its 
position in the India finances.  
 
For the anti-opium movement, the opium trade represented imperial excess; Britain’s opium 
system was an unnecessary example of a British imperial regime with a distinctly 
authoritarian and unethical character in India, and a case of commercial exploitation in 
China. The anti-opium writers, in the spirit of traditional humanitarianism, argued that 
Britain’s status as a civilised power and as an empire brought certain responsibilities. They 
were proponents of liberal imperialism and, in a typically paternalistic tone, anti-opium 
writers insisted on the need for responsible empire, playing up the supposed value of the true 
prosecution of moral empire, but above all the responsibilities afforded to Britain by her 
political and commercial clout and by her imperial position. In terms of the stance of the 
anti-opium movement as a foreign policy position, their approach was typical of late-
nineteenth century liberalism. The foreign policy of Gladstonian Liberalism, which defined 
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the stance of the Liberal Party towards global affairs from the 1860s onwards, was 
dominated by concerns of moral politics, and that British intervention should be exercised to 
ensure the protection of ‘morality and justice’ in international affairs.36 This was a position 
that the non-conformist wing of the Liberal Party, which made up a significant part of the 
anti-opium movement, held to be of great importance, and this moralising foreign policy 
characterised their approach to international relations and the high sense of responsibility 
that they placed on the British role in the world. Interestingly, this focus on moral politics in 
the prosecution of British foreign policy also resulted in a significant focus on British 
conduct in imperial affairs, particularly relevant as it related to the British opium policy in 
India, and this dualistic aspect served to unite the positions of moral foreign policy and 
liberal imperialism as the basis of the informing ideology of the movement. This 
occasionally led to a blurring of the discourses, and political focus, of the movement, 
between foreign policy and imperial policy concerns, but ultimately resulted in the 
movement’s position being dominated by the themes of morality, responsibility, and good 
governance. 
 
As Robert Fowler was already arguing by 1875, in the eyes of the anti-opium movement the 
debate over the opium trade boiled down to a case of moral regulation versus the collection 
of revenue, and the maintenance of Britain’s economic exploitation of India through the 
cultivation of opium for export amounted to a British parliament who were ‘utterly 
indifferent to their duties’ to India. In his SSOT sponsored pamphlet entitled The Opium 
Revenue in India, he laid out that on top of what he argued was their dereliction of duty with 
regards to India, the reliance of Britain’s India exchequer on revenue raised by what he 
regarded as the exploitation of the Chinese population with the flooding of their markets 
with a ‘deleterious and poisonous drug’ was a most immoral and unacceptable state of affairs 
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for a civilised nation such as Britain, which ought to face up to its responsibilities as an 
imperial power.37 Fowler argued for a more equitable taxation structure in India, the 
cultivation of edible foodstuffs in India to avoid the effects of famine, which he implied were 
exacerbated by the heavy cultivation of the opium cash crop, and for a legitimate commerce 
with China; Fowler saw the opium trade and the reliance of British India on opium revenue 
as nothing else but a ‘moral disgrace’ for Britain.38 
 
These were themes also strongly put forward by W. E. Ormerod who, writing on behalf of 
the SSOT in 1875, in addition to arguing that the opium trade represented a dereliction of 
Britain’s responsibilities as a civilised nation, also made the case that the trade was 
damaging to Britain’s national prestige and honour. If Britain’s relationship with China were 
a book, he reasoned, then the opium trade represented ‘blotted pages’. He followed that ‘Our 
national honour has been compromised by a policy that was anything but honourable. We 
have slipped the cable of our conscience, trampled upon justice, outraged humanity, and 
draggled the British flag through the mud and mire of a sordid and miserable expediency.’39 
In 1880, the Society published a pamphlet entitled Our National Responsibility for the 
Opium Trade: A Sketch Prepared for the Use of Members of, and Candidates for, 
Parliament. In it the writers argued that the opium trade existed and had been established 
and escalated in volume ‘by virtue of authority derived from Parliament.’ For the SSOT, 
British involvement in the establishment of the trade between India and China was 
undeniable, but more significantly, it was a consequence of the acquiescence of 
responsibility, and a willingness to tolerate immoral revenue practices, by the British 
domestic parliament. They cited both the examples of the state opium monopoly in India, 
which they argued was a clear case of national responsibility in the cultivation process, and 
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the opium wars, which they argued had been fought to at first protect and then to expand the 
British commercial penetration of China, and principally to further the trade in opium.40 As 
such, these complaints chiefly arose from, and were informed by, the dominant traditional 
liberal ideological characterisations of effective foreign policy and imperial rule. 
 
For many of those active in the British anti-opium movement, the notions of national and 
imperial responsibility also blended into the idea of Christian responsibility, which related to 
aspects of what they saw as the Christian identity of Britain. The SSOT argued that Britain’s 
position as a ‘great Christian Government’, meant that it had a duty to act as a moral arbiter 
on the world stage, and that British policy should reflect Christian values, as they saw it.41 In 
1881, Arthur E. Moule, a China missionary and SSOT supporter, published a pamphlet 
entitled The Responsibility of the Church as Regards the Opium Traffic with China on behalf 
of the society. In it, Moule argued that the British government, in allowing and even 
fostering the opium trade, was abandoning its responsibilities as a Christian nation, 
responsibilities of care, compassion and evangelism. In Moule’s view, and for many others 
in the anti-opium movement, while the Chinese government, in opposing the opium trade, 
was acting from a moral position, the British government, in justifying the trade by reference 
to its central position in the Indian revenues, was acting from a purely fiscal position.42 For 
the anti-opium movement then, British opium policy and the reliance of the British India 
government on revenue from opium were contrary to Britain’s responsibilities as a civilised, 
imperial, and Christian nation. 
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The Society counted among its supporters many from the clergy, and especially those from 
among evangelical and non-conformist congregations. They were particularly proud of the 
support of the Lord Bishop of Durham, to whom Arthur Moule had provided a dedication in 
his pamphlet of 1881. Moule, an Anglican missionary, noted the support and attentions of 
non-conformist congregations to the issue of the opium trade, but stressed the need for more 
to be done to appeal to the Church of England.43 To Moule and many others, the issue of the 
opium trade deleteriously impacting on the missionary enterprise of Britain in China was of 
paramount severity. It was not just Christian responsibility and morality at stake in the issue, 
but Christianity’s very survival in China. As Moule put it, ‘England and Christianity are 
united in Chinese thought’, and the actions of the British government both demonstrated an 
abandonment of their Christian duty and also undermined Christian missionary enterprise.44 
As early as 1840, and within the context of the first Opium War, the British press in London 
were publishing anti-opium diatribes from outspoken individuals. A Mr John Sanderson, 
chairing a meeting on the subject of the war, and quite in keeping with the language that 
would later be employed by Moule and others in the anti-opium movement, described the 
opium trade as both ‘discreditable to this country’ and ‘injurious to the character of 
Christianity’.45 At the 1877 General Conference of Protestant Missionaries in China, Moule 
decried the opium trade’s harmful impacts on Christianity, which he blamed as the ‘chief 
hindrance’ acting against evangelical work in the country, and which his colleague Edward 
Pease viewed as undermining Britain’s credentials as a ‘professedly Christian nation,’ by 
extension discrediting missionaries and Christianity in the region.46 W. E. Ormerod similarly 
characterised the impact of the opium trade on Christianity in China as reducing it to a 
‘caricature’.47 Sir Wilfrid Lawson in Parliament also complained of how ‘imposing opium on 
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the Chinese made Britain hated’. For Lawson, this not only meant an abandonment of what 
he called Britain’s ‘Christian duty’, but he argued that the bad blood it generated also acted 
so as to block the expansion of legitimate commerce in the country.48 This concern for the 
process of Christian evangelism was not entirely separate to the instincts that defined the 
“Civilising Mission” in the late-nineteenth century. For the anti-opium movement and its 
evangelical Christian ideology, it was not always so much a case of the “white man’s 
burden” but rather “the Christian man’s duty”, and this theme was reproduced heavily in the 
rhetoric developed in the movement’s many publications. 
 
Harking back to the legacy of the anti-slavery movement that had been born out of similar 
intellectual and social origins, Robert Fowler emphatically quoted from the well-known 
China missionary Walter Henry Medhurst that ‘Slavery was not productive of more misery 
and death than was the opium traffic, nor were Britons more implicated in the former than in 
the latter.’49 But he was not alone in making such a claim or drawing on this comparison. In 
the House of Commons in 1873, the comparison had also been employed and developed by 
Sir Wilfrid Lawson, who characterised the opium trade as at least as insidious and immoral 
as the slave trade, the influence of which was to damage the overseas influence of the British 
Empire.50 The comparison to the slave trade and the system of slavery was a significant 
discursive theme in anti-opium speeches in parliament. The anti-opium movement organised 
itself and conducted its lobbying activities in such a way as to apply sustained pressure in the 
public sphere, in parliament, and by direct interaction with key individuals in government, in 
industry, and even foreign dignitaries. They employed effective tactics of lobbying, and the 
wide dissemination of their arguments through publications, through the press, at town hall 
public meetings, and through the influence of key individuals.  
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Much as the abolitionist movement had done in the late eighteenth century, their activities at 
the grass roots level concentrated on the collection of signatures and the presentation of 
petitions from provincial meetings.51 The anti-opium movement emulated this tactic, seeking 
to combine a degree of grass-roots and provincial activism with parliamentary action brought 
by sympathetic MPs. But this approach was typical of traditional liberal activism, and by the 
late-nineteenth century had not well stood the test of time, as its focus on elite subsections of 
society, and to a certain extent on a more superficial appeal to the middle classes, could not 
be sustainable in the new era of mass politics, where the support of the working classes was 
increasingly crucial to achieving effective political action through public agitation. In May 
1882, when Joseph Pease raised a motion in the House of Commons that the British 
government should reconsider its position of monopoly over the cultivation of opium in 
India, for example, the movement sought to secure petitions from the provinces to bolster 
Pease’s parliamentary action.52 When the topic was again tabled to be raised in parliament by 
Joseph Pease in 1889, the Opium Traffic Committee of the Society of Friends commented 
that, ‘We hope that members of our Society throughout the country will make every effort in 
their power to support him in this action, by organising public meetings, petitions, 
memorials, and interviews with Members of Parliament.’53 But in this rapidly evolving 
political environment of the late-nineteenth century, the anti-opium movement could not 
hope to emulate the widespread success of the Chartists in their garnering of petition 
signatures in the first half of the century, nor even of the similarly traditional liberal petition 
campaign orchestrated by the abolitionists in the beginning of the century; the era when 
these tactics could prove successful in garnering widespread support had already largely 
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passed into history. These were lobbying tactics pioneered by the abolitionists, and the anti-
opium movement was following logical precedent in adopting this course of action, but it 
was far less politically relevant than it had been earlier in the century. In a time where the 
popular press had grown to a position far more prominent than the mostly peripheral, and 
expensive, print pamphlet circuit that the movement utilised, the movement struggled even 
to engender any meaningful support from among the wider public, and its reach remained 
mostly limited to elite circles and certain sympathetic elements among the middle classes.  
 
Despite this instance of the prioritising of petitions, though, the preferred tactic of the anti-
opium movement was the direct presentation of memorials from the SSOT and the OTC to 
government, parliament, and key individuals. Memorials were presented at significant points 
of tension in the debate over the opium trade, before parliamentary votes, in the build up to 
the Royal Commission on Opium of 1893-5, and on occasion directly to the Chinese 
Ambassador.54 The more frequent presentation of memorials in a way summed up the action 
of the anti-opium movement. Despite striving to achieve a degree of grass-roots activism 
with the gathering of signatures and the presentation of petitions, particularly in the first two 
decades of its existence, the movement came to rely more heavily on the presentation of 
memorials from the General Committee of the SSOT and from the OTC of the Society of 
Friends, which in essence sidestepped any degree of popular public interaction, displaying 
the kind of preference for top-down concentration on elite ‘centres of opinion’ that Virginia 
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Berridge has characterised as indicative of its elitist approach.55 This may have been, in the 
end, the outcome of much of the movement’s activism, but it was not its intended effect. 
 
In 1893, after nearly twenty years of the organised anti-opium movement, and of the 
existence of the Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, the lobby’s pressure and 
the political climate was such that it allowed for Gladstone’s Liberal government to 
implement a Royal Commission on Opium. This move came about largely as the product of 
pressure from within parliament, where the elitist focus of the anti-opium movement did 
eventually bear fruit, with a majority of MPs becoming sympathetic to the position of opium 
reform by the early 1890s. The commission investigated the process and conditions of the 
cultivation and preparation of opium in India, whilst ignoring the major markets for Indian 
opium in China and South East Asia. It reported in 1895, and its report did not contain any 
significant recommendations for the implementation of changes to Britain’s opium system in 
India. After two decades of opposition and lobbying for reform, and in the aftermath of the 
failure of the Royal Commission to recommend any changes to the opium system in India, in 
May 1895 the anti-opium lobby in parliament was able to secure overwhelming support 
among MPs for the motion that the opium trade was ‘morally indefensible’. It would take the 
Foreign Office until 1907 to negotiate a plan for the drawing down of the opium trade, and a 
further diversification of its revenue composition in India, and by then the economic 
conditions surrounding the trade had markedly changed. The opium revenue in India was 
less profitable, due in no small part to the massive increase in the Chinese domestic 
cultivation of opium which had occurred since the 1870s, and following its effective 
legalisation in China in 1860 with the ratification of the Convention of Peking in the 
aftermath of the Second Opium War. This drawing of the motion on the discourse of 
morality reflected once more the ideology of the anti-opium movement’s advocates. The 
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same motion had been raised in 1891, but was adjourned due to limits on time.56 By 1895 the 
political environment in parliament had shifted to the point where the motion was passed 
overwhelmingly, vindicating the persistence and impact of the anti-opium movement, and 
perhaps also due in part to a sense of disappointment in the failure of the Royal Commission 
to address some of the concerns that had been raised in parliament by many MPs and Lords 
from all sides.57 
 
Imperial reformism as a distinct ideological critique 
 
The nineteenth century witnessed the development of an increasingly diverse range of 
different attitudes to empire, with several different cultures of imperial criticism, many 
different examples of pro-empire thinking and imperial patriotism, anti-imperialism, and 
imperial reformism competing for influence in the public and parliamentary spheres, and 
coexisting in debates and discussions of empire in British society. Gregory Claeys has taken 
a long term view of the development of imperial criticism in British society, and the 
formation of the ideologies which informed it. Claeys identifies the roots of elements of 
imperial criticism in several trends, the first of which he terms ‘positivist diplomacy’, which 
refers to the way of thinking influenced by the ideas of Auguste Comte, providing the 
‘philosophic and religious groundwork for protecting small nations and indigenous people’, 
through a focus on internationalism and respect for other cultures.58 This was a philosophical 
background which informed quite diverse ideologies, from more radical internationalists to 
more traditional humanitarians. This constituency of thinking also encompassed groups such 
as the Aborigines Protection Society, the support base and leadership of which was to 
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overlap quite heavily with the organised anti-opium movement in Britain. Mira Matikkala 
has taken a slightly different approach to examining the makeup of views of empire in 
British society in the late nineteenth century, considering it as a battle over the meaning of 
“Englishness”. According to Matikkala, enthusiastic imperialists sought a strengthening and 
demonstration of patriotism through the ‘continuous expansion’ of empire, a patriotism 
which they identified with Englishness. This was the kind of imperialism exemplified by the 
expansionism of Disraeli’s government and its supporters. Liberals and anti-imperialists 
increasingly accused those advocating this kind of imperial expansion of ‘militarism’, and 
instead identified with liberal notions of Englishness, including liberty and civilising 
influence. This was not simply a struggle between imperialism and anti-imperialism, but 
rather a contest between imperialisms; one which Matikkala terms ‘the empire of manly 
military values’, and the other of ‘humane liberal values’.59 As Claeys and Matikkala note, 
anti-imperialism and socialist criticism of empire were, although increasingly vocal, still 
marginal trends in the nineteenth century. Missionary evangelism and the concept of the 
civilising mission at the heart of liberal imperialism were widely accepted and supported 
ideals within the anti-opium movement. The movement sought a reforming of the opium 
trade, and of the state of the cultivation of opium in British India, through the auspices of the 
British colonial state in India. The issue of whether the British Empire should have a stake in 
India was never a topic of discussion. The assumptions and political impulses at work in the 
writing of the anti-opium movement were liberal rather than radical in nature, seeking social 
reform and humanitarian intervention, and were far closer to the ideological norms of liberal 
imperialism, with its mantras of social improvement and benign rule, than of imperial 
criticism, per se. 
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Apart from the work of Gregory Claeys and Mira Matikkala, much of the existing 
historiography on the development of imperial criticism in Britain has been somewhat 
limited in the scope of historical time on which it has focussed. Scholars have often chosen 
to focus on particular historical moments of the crystallisation of imperial criticism. Indeed, 
the scholarship is dominated by a focus on the development of popular jingoism and the 
consequent response in the challenge to this expansionist trend in imperial attitudes that 
followed in the events of the Boer Wars in the early years of the twentieth century.60 Bernard 
Semmel has argued that social reform policies were formed in British domestic society and 
only thereafter were they exported to the imperial sphere. He takes stock of, mainly, the 
trends of liberal imperialism and later Fabian socialism, and their paternalistically framed 
championing of the civilising influence, and role, of empire. Semmel also identified the 
scope for transformative divergence that these apparently “popular” currents in imperial 
attitudes had. He regards the Boer War at the turn of the twentieth century as the tipping 
point in the popular vein of imperial support, a focal point upon which imperialist and 
jingoist sentiments and popular support from a broad cross-section of British society centred, 
including even elements of the usually non-interventionist and reformist Liberal Party, who 
were dubbed the ‘Liberal-Imperialists’. This development in the culture of popular ‘empire 
building’ was exemplified by the widespread jingoism and celebrations that greeted the 
lifting of the siege of Mafeking and the resounding victory of the belligerent Conservative 
Party in the so-called Khaki Election of 1900.61 Bernard Porter has focused on the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century criticism of the British Empire in Africa, centring 
mainly on the Boer Wars and the intellectual influence of radical critics such as J. A. 
Hobson. Although the study is useful, particularly in terms of the development of attitudes in 
the last years of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, it focuses almost 
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exclusively on Africa, and in particular on the Boer War. It therefore does not offer 
significant insights into earlier trends in imperial criticism, or give enough breadth of 
coverage to critics of the other theatres of the British world position, in which imperial 
reformism can be identified. These studies do not examine the trend of imperial reformism 
that emerged from within British society, informed largely by liberal principles, and which 
constituted a significant and vocal criticism of imperial excesses in the nineteenth century. 
Although some of the spirit of the “Comteian Positivism” identified by Claeys can be seen in 
the anti-opium movement’s dominant ideology of humanitarian concern, its different 
ideological imperatives, aims and tactics make it a quite distinct phenomenon, as it blended a 
penchant for traditionally Gladstonian liberal foreign policy, with its central tenets of 
morality and justice, with a focus on the reform of empire, through the guiding principles of 
responsibility and ethical imperial rule.  
 
Much of the discourse of the anti-opium movement centred on themes of imperial reformism 
and the reforming of the shape of the British Empire. This discourse is dominated by the 
theme of the need for responsible empire, empire which would act as a vehicle for the 
civilising mission, for the spread of the benefits of British civilisation, for the successful 
prosecution of Christian evangelism, and for Western cultural rather than commercial 
imperialism. This was not imperial criticism, per se, but imperial reformism. Much of this 
discourse drew on thematic notions of Britain’s responsibilities as a “Christian nation”, 
evoking a sense of moral duty on Britain’s part as a notionally civilised and developed nation 
to spread its religious, philosophical, economic, and scientific benefits to other parts of the 
world. It was argued that this should be done while avoiding the exploitative relationships 
with colonial peoples such as the Indian population, and other non-colonial relationships 
with countries such as China, that they took the opium trade to comprise. This represented an 
approach to imperial social and moral reform distinct from those trends of imperial criticism 
and reformism as posited by Semmel, Porter and Claeys. It was a traditional trend of liberal 
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reformism, and not a challenge to empire itself; indeed, this ideology relied on the empire for 
the effective prosecution of the civilising mission. The opium trade was the antithesis to the 
“moral imperialism” of this metropolitan strand of humanitarian moralising critique, 
representing both economic exploitation of Indian cultivators and peasant population, and of 
Chinese national finances, but also the purveyor of the moral and physical degeneration that 
anti-opium advocates saw opium consumption as representing in these places.  
 
Humanitarian pressure groups had long had a place in British domestic society, as is 
evidenced by the various social and political reform campaigns that I have mentioned, and 
many also existed in the imperial sphere. This had been the driving force behind British 
abolitionism and anti-slavery agitation earlier in the nineteenth century, and the legacy of 
these campaigns remained strong, both in the networks that sustained the debate about 
opium, and support for the anti-opium movement, and in the individuals that provided the 
impetus and support for the campaigns. In the post-abolitionist era, perhaps the most 
prominent of these humanitarian societies was the Aborigines Protection Society, which 
stated that it existed to protect the interests of indigenous peoples within the empire and to 
ensure the spread of British civilisation to them. The APS took a dim view of the India-
China opium trade, although it was less focused on the issue than the dedicated groups of the 
anti-opium movement like the SSOT.62 That being said, there was a good deal of crossover 
in terms of those individuals involved in the anti-opium agitation in each group, and in the 
constituencies of support. The Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, and the 
wider anti-opium movement, represented another example of this culture of humanitarian 
imperial reformism in action. This is perhaps most clearly evidenced by the transferability of 
key individuals and the overlapping of support bases, and also ideological foundations, of the 
various reformist campaigns, of which the anti-opium movement was one. Many of those 
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active in the anti-opium movement, for example, hailed from the Religious Society of 
Friends, or were from non-conformist backgrounds. The Religious Society of Friends, the 
Quaker organisation, started its own Opium Traffic Committee in 1881 after the presentation 
of a memorial on the opium traffic to the government by the Society of Friends, with many 
of the same people who staffed the committee of the SSOT and the Aborigines Protection 
Society sitting on the Opium Traffic Committee, and the committee’s Secretary, Joseph 
Gundry Alexander, active in all three of these bodies. Wilfrid Lawson, who represented the 
anti-opium movement in the House of Commons and was responsible for raising several 
important motions for debate on the topic, also worked closely with both the SSOT and the 
APS. 
 
Above all, the dominant critiques from within the anti-opium movement, especially those 
raised in parliament with a need to curry a popular strand of support in the House of 
Commons, were mindful of how to offset the damage to imperial revenues that the drawing 
down of the opium trade might result in.63 Complaints in parliament were more often than 
not raised within the context of debate over the India budget and how it should be comprised, 
and were not as such hostile to the very existence of empire in India. Sir Joseph Pease the 
anti-opium Liberal MP wrote in the Friend of China, the journal of the SSOT, ‘India has 
been administered justly and kindly and in every way calculated to make the people 
appreciate our rule. We have done everything for India.’64 These were not the words of an 
anti-imperialist; indeed, they sit much closer in tone to that of the liberal imperialist 
establishment of the late nineteenth century. 
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The failure to propagate a popular national movement 
 
Virginia Berridge has noted the economic similarities of the late nineteenth century to the 
heyday of the abolitionist movement, and has suggested that such a coinciding of 
‘humanitarianism and economic self-interest’ bears comparison in the case of the anti-opium 
movement. She has identified in the latter half of the nineteenth century the economic factor 
of commercial stagnation in China – British trade in the country growing far slower than that 
in Japan from the 1860s through the 1880s – a situation that she argues makes a comparison 
of the anti-opium movement’s desire for a reform of Britain’s commercial system with that 
of the abolitionist movement viable.65 There had been a great deal of interest in the Chinese 
market from British commerce and manufacturing, but by the 1870s access to this huge 
prospective market had yet to be effectively realised, and opium was often blamed as acting 
as a barrier to further commercial penetration. There is some credence to this comparison 
with the economic conditions present during the successful years of the abolitionist 
movement at the turn of the nineteenth century, as the commercial circumstances of the last 
two decades made the opium trade progressively less profitable, particularly as it was 
steadily undercut by cheaper Chinese-grown competition, but this is certainly not the whole 
story, or even the primary causative factor behind Britain’s eventual reforms that would be 
implemented in the first two decades of the twentieth century. In 1944, Eric Williams 
proposed an economic explanation for the success of abolitionism, linking it to the 
development of industrial capitalism, and in recent years many scholars have acknowledged 
the economic conditions precipitous to the success of the abolitionists in the early nineteenth 
century.66 But, although embracing commercial arguments for the termination of the opium 
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trade (particularly those relating to the encouragement of new markets for British 
manufactures), the anti-opium movement and its emulation of the abolitionist cause were not 
moved principally by the economic similarities to the abolitionist movement, but by shared 
ideological commitments and by a sentimental attachment to the abolitionist movement that 
also encompassed its rhetoric of responsibility and fairness. As I will argue in chapters three 
and four of this thesis, the British government’s decision to introduce reform of the British 
opium system, and to join the eventual internationalist initiative for the global regulation of 
drugs, was born, not primarily of economic conditions, but of political concerns associated 
with the extraction of moral capital. As with the arguments of the anti-opium movement, 
economic factors were a facilitative force, and not a primary mover. 
 
Like William Wilberforce, Thomas Clarkson and other early abolitionists, the anti-opium 
movement did not achieve any kind of immediate victory, but rather acted to influence 
opinion and enact change through sheer force of perseverance and the gradual dissemination 
of information and gathering of political capital of their lobbying activities in the public and 
political spheres. David Brion Davis has argued that the early Quaker leaders of the 
abolitionist movement actively ‘pioneered the development of abolition into a broader social 
movement’.67 Although not as animated in their approach as the early Quaker abolitionists, 
the British anti-opium movement was not static in this regard, but its efforts were mostly 
superficial, and limited in their social scope. Virginia Berridge has argued that the movement 
did not seek to court popular public opinion, and instead preferred to influence ‘centres of 
opinion’, which she argues represents yet another example that the movement was, at its 
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core, ‘obstinately elitist.’68 But this characterisation may be slightly unfair. Although the 
movement chose to concentrate its resources in targeting powerful and influential elites in 
British political, religious, business and publishing circles, it did at several times attempt to 
achieve a wider social penetration through its petition campaigns; the problem with these, as 
has been discussed, was that it was simply a rather dated mode of political campaigning by 
the 1870s.  
 
As the abolitionists had done beginning in the late eighteenth century, the anti-opium 
movement from its inception in the 1870s sought to propagate a climate of what has been 
termed (in the case of the anti-slavery movement) ‘popular revulsion’.69 As has been 
discussed, though, the limitation of this with regards to the anti-opium movement was that 
they lacked the truly popular appeal that the abolitionists had eventually been able to 
engender, partly by design and partly through force of circumstance, and the characterisation 
of the reach of their efforts as “elite revulsion” is somewhat less inclusive and impressive. 
For the abolitionists, this had allowed them to establish a favourable environment that would 
allow for an effective mobilisation of the wellsprings of popular feeling and help imbue the 
movement with effective social and political capital. The language employed by the anti-
opium movement in its publications was often highly emotive, with graphic descriptions of 
the imagined conditions of opium dens, crime and suffering in China, India and South East 
Asia, and with titles including The Poppy Poison in Burma demonstrating a clear tendency 
towards the kind of sensationalist appeal to popular revulsion and sympathy that had proved 
so successful for the abolitionist cause.70 The main detraction that can be made against the 
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anti-opium movement was not so much that it did not seek to move public feeling and 
stimulate the public’s imagination, but rather that it failed in doing so through its 
anachronistic approach. 
 
One area in which the movement clearly failed was in its inclusivity – as mentioned, the 
movement was quite unrepresentative in the upper-middle class and non-conformist nature 
of most of its membership, but it was also unanimously white. The movement almost 
singularly failed to include any non-British voices. Despite some very limited attempts at 
approaching or memorialising visiting Chinese diplomats and later the Chinese Ambassador 
to the United Kingdom in London, no agency was given to any anti-opiumists or, indeed, 
anyone from the countries impacted by and associated with the opium trade, to write for the 
movement.7172 No Chinese, Korean, Burmese, Indochinese, Siamese, Malay or Indian was a 
regular contributing writer or speaker for the movement, and the contribution of anti-
opiumists from these regions was not actively sought. In this respect, far more than with the 
anti-slavery agitation of a hundred years previous, the anti-opium movement set itself apart 
as a distinctly distant and paternalist cause. The lack of any “native” representation, coupled 
with the absence of any charismatic and Anglicised speakers – the first-hand experience and 
charismatic style of Olaudah Equiano and other former slaves had proven highly successful 
in galvanising support for the abolitionist movement – gave the anti-opium movement a 
distinctly white and upper-middle class character, and only acted to reinforce perceptions of 
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its elitism and exclusivity, as they discussed an issue that was imperial and global in scale. It 
is logical to surmise that this factor alone may well have had a significant impact in limiting 
the popular reach of the anti-opium movement, precluding the kind of popular support that 
had existed with the abolitionist cause, although this was also not helped by the movement’s 
preference in concentrating their resources on the lobbying of centres of power such as 
parliament rather than in attempting to reach the mass of the population. Despite the 
gathering of petitions all over the country and the holding of public meetings, without the 
inclusion of working class voices or first-hand speakers, the movement remained something 
of an exclusive gentleman’s club. Non-British anti-opium speakers existed in large numbers, 
particularly in China where the Chinese anti-opium cause had already become a widespread 
movement, and was to become a burgeoning force of popular nationalism through the 1890s 
and into the twentieth century, but no attempt was made by the organised British anti-opium 
movement to co-opt them into the cause, or even to cooperate in any meaningful way.73 The 
Chinese National Anti-Opium Association comprised a truly national anti-opium body in 
China, one which could perhaps have been cooperated with by the British movement. The 
anti-opium movement from within China, from within the officialdom and administrative 
class within the country, was one of imperial reformism in its own way, one moved by the 
same self-preserving modernising impulses of the contemporaneous Self-Strengthening 
Movement in the country.74 The British anti-opium movement, however, did not seek out 
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cooperation with these groups, despite the similarities in their goals that might have made 
them effective allies in their respective causes. Anti-opium activism could also be found 
among the Chinese overseas communities throughout the world, in the British Dominions as 
well as in the United States, with well-known proponents such as the novelist Lao She, the 
revolutionary politician Sun Yatsen and other influential overseas Chinese providing a 
powerful anti-opium voice, and often combining it with nationalist discourses.75 Anti-opium 
opinion also existed in India and South East Asia, though the radical (and often anticolonial) 
politics that often accompanied anti-opium agitation in these areas may well have made 
cooperation with the traditional liberal establishment of the British anti-opium movements 
impossible. The organised anti-opium movement in Britain was at most reformist in its 
relationship with empire and was by no means anti-imperial. 
 
The anti-opium movement may have attempted to emulate many of the tactics of the 
abolitionist movement, and have drawn heavily from its ideology and humanitarian focus, 
but it met with notably less success than had perhaps been anticipated. The latter decades of 
the nineteenth century were a very different social and intellectual space to the late 
eighteenth century and early nineteenth century context in which the abolitionist movement 
had flourished. J. R. Oldfield has argued that the particular middle class fashion for 
abolitionism in its heyday was, in part, born out of a newfound enthusiasm for emulative 
action in the emergent consumer culture of the late eighteenth century.76 Social elites, acting 
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as trend-setters and vectors for the spread of popular culture, could hope to achieve a degree 
of popular influence by example. The cultural context of the late nineteenth century that the 
anti-opium movement existed in was a very different one. The opium trade, when 
acknowledged at all, was associated with British commerce in Asia, and British rule in India, 
associations which came to embody national wealth and power in metropolitan society. The 
opium trade was inextricably bound up in these notions of commerce and imperial rule.77 
 
Oldfield also acknowledges the impact of the American Revolution on popular feeling in 
Britain, and as an important influence in imparting poignant political meaning to the 
abolitionist cause. The revolution sparked ‘heated debate’ about disenfranchisement and 
political representation throughout Britain, encouraging popular feeling which could be 
mobilised and brought to bear in discussing the issue of slavery.78 The anti-opium movement 
drew upon much of the organisational, operational and ideological blueprints of the 
abolitionist movement, but it was a different time, an era steeped in the acceptance and even 
the popular appeal of empire, and its subject lacked the same political gravity as anti-
slavery.79 Having said that, where the movement did excel was in its engendering of 
sympathy among British parliamentarians, and it was here that continuities in the sentiments 
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and discourses of the anti-opium movement would eventually act to influence the 
government sanctioned reforms of the early-twentieth century, once a majority Liberal 
government had come to power in 1906. 
 
New languages of reform and opposition: The establishment of cultural opium discourses 
and the political legacies of the anti-opium movement 
 
The anti-opium movement acted to establish and disseminate new discourses about opium, 
its consumption, cultural genealogy, and dramatic social implications, along with the British 
government’s role in the cultivation and trade of the substance. These discourses would help 
to inform the developing position of British parliamentarians regarding the substance, 
dramatically influencing perceptions of opium and informing a significant cultural aspect of 
the question. The anti-opium movement and the debates that it encouraged informed 
perceptions of opium in Britain, gave inspiration to an emerging literary trend on opium 
consumption, and helped to inform the cultural bases that influenced later political 
developments, and the social perceptions of opium into the twentieth century. 
 
The late-nineteenth century political and social debates over the subject of opium, its utility 
and consequences, and its position in the British world, would rely on, and help to engender, 
many cultural associations. Much of the direct debate over the acceptability of opium as a 
substance can be characterised as an opposition of competing discourses of differentiation 
and normalisation, as both anti-opium advocates and defenders of the opium status quo 
sought to explain opium consumption in British India and in China through comparisons, 
both favourable and unfavourable, to a substance with a recognised position in British 
society and culture. This is quite nicely encapsulated by a series of mutually-contesting 
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articles published in The Lancet medical journal in 1892. The original contributor, Dr. F. J. 
Mouat, formerly a senior medical officer in Calcutta, wrote a piece entitled ‘The Ethics of 
Opium and Alcohol’, broadly arguing for the maintenance of the status quo in the cultivation 
and export of opium in India, and in opposition to the anti-opium position. Mouat extolled 
the virtues of opium consumption for the treatment of fevers, and suggested that, through his 
experience working in provincial hospitals in Bengal, he was certain of the lack of any 
connection between habitual opium consumption and disease. He also wished to dispel any 
associations that he perceived anti-opium arguments to have made between opium 
consumption and social problems and disorder, stating that he had no recollection of any 
such social problems relating to opium consumption in any of the Indian and Chinese 
settlements of his area of Calcutta. Instead, Mouat expressed his view that it was alcohol that 
lay at the heart of such social issues, branding offenders as ‘the worshippers of Bacchus’80, 
invoking images of out of control drunkenness and revelry at odds with the sensibilities of 
late-Victorian society.81 He, moreover, drew the comparison between the widely 
acknowledged link between excessive alcohol consumption and instances of domestic 
violence, and the passivity of opium eaters who were ‘satisfied’ in their ‘dreamy condition’, 
‘useless, but not mischievous’.82 In his original article, Mouat also cited the frequent 
examples of the drunkenness of European sailors on shore leave and soldiers from the 
garrison as causing the majority of public disorder in the city.83 His attributing of the greater 
part of Calcutta’s social disorder to alcohol, a normalised substance with a long genealogy of 
use in British society, acted towards the diminishing of the cultural stigma attached to opium 
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by appealing to the normal experience of The Lancet’s British readers with regards to 
alcohol, and particularly so in his stressing of opium’s relative benignity in comparison. 
 
Robert Pringle, a brigade surgeon in the Bengal Army and formerly a medical officer for 
several prisons working under Mouat, wrote a spirited reply that was also published in The 
Lancet. Pringle cited several instances of Mouat reneging on statements he had made in 
earlier (1860s) jail inspection reports, where he had repeatedly ascribed high levels of deaths 
from the withdrawal of opium from prisoners, or otherwise to a state of emaciation and poor 
health resultant from its previous heavy use.84 Pringle argued that weakness from long-
standing opium habits greatly increased the occurrences of diseases in the prisons, such as 
dysentery, but that this was not recorded in the mortality statistics.85 This association 
between opium and weakness, and subsequently to diseases such as dysentery, was 
questioned by other doctors in later volumes of the journal.86 Focusing more on the health 
aspects of opium consumption and its comparison to alcohol than on the social comparison, 
Pringle argued that, were ‘opiumism’ given its own column as a cause of death in Bengal 
jails, as ‘alcoholism’ had, it would have revealed a significant level of opium related 
mortalities, a fact that he claimed Mouat had overlooked. Pringle stressed the unfavourably 
severe comparison to alcohol in order to emphasise the attending health risks of opium 
consumption to readers, but also sought to remind them that opium was quite different to 
alcohol and much more harmful, particularly given the lack of any significant culture of 
alcohol consumption in India.87 This was a view largely echoed by anti-opium writers in 
relation to consumption in China. In the course of a series of interviews of experts, extracted 
                                                          
84 R. Pringle, ‘The Ethics of Opium and Alcohol,’ The Lancet (September 10, 1892), pp. 605-607. 
85 R. Pringle, The Ethics of Opium and Alcohol, Part II (Blackheath: J. Nichols, 1892), p. 6. Pringle’s 
reply to Mouat’s rejoinder was not published by The Lancet, much to his annoyance, and was 
published privately as a separate document on 18 October 1892. 
86 J. Barcroft Anderson, ‘The Ethics of Opium and Alcohol. “To the Editor”,’ The Lancet (September 
24, 1892), p. 749. Barcroft Anderson adopted a position similar to Mouat’s, while refuting 
opium’s links to dysentery. 
87 R. Pringle, ‘The Ethics of Opium and Alcohol,’ The Lancet (September 10, 1892), pp. 605-607. 
58 
 
from Parliamentary Papers, and published in the form of a pamphlet by the SSOT, the 
society sought to establish the case for the relative perniciousness of opium in various 
different countries and regions, and of the conditions of the trade itself. In an extract from an 
‘East India Finance’ report of 1871, a Mr. T. T. Cooper is quoted as affirming that, despite 
not causing the ‘amount of crime that we suffer from in this country as the result of drink’, 
‘the effects of opium smoking in China are worse than the effects of drink in England’.88 The 
fact that the questions themselves were aimed to directly elicit answers comparing opium to 
alcohol in Britain is telling of the need for comparison with a recognisable substance with a 
stable cultural position in British society. It also implies a lack of direct experience with 
opium consumption for non-medical means in Britain, as the substance enjoyed a mostly 
medicinal position in the cultural zeitgeist before the anti-opium movement had emerged, 
predominantly as a popular self-remedial substance that was publicly available throughout 
the country before the 1868 Pharmacy Act brought such informal drug concoctions under 
more formal state control. 
 
Some other contributors to The Lancet, also with experience of medical service in India, took 
issue with Pringle’s view about opium’s comparative harmfulness in relation to alcohol. A. 
Crombie, Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel at European General Hospital in Calcutta, took a 
combative view towards those in the medical profession who had sought to oppose opium 
over what he perceived to be the more rampant threat of alcohol, the negative effects of 
which he regarded to be demonstrably more serious. He urged that the image of ‘miserable 
depraved specimens of alcoholic humanity hanging round public-houses and street corners in 
England’ not be projected onto those who held the ‘opium habit’ in India, as it was an 
entirely inapplicable characterisation. Crombie regarded the consumption of opium as being 
far and away preferable to that of alcohol: ‘if it is opium, alcohol or ganja let it a thousand 
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times be opium’.89 A League of Nations report of 1930 also thought it worthwhile drawing 
the comparison. In the course of the inspection of Chinese opium houses, it was noted that 
such establishments conformed very little to the stereotypes that had been purveyed in 
previous decades with regards to squalor, crime or immorality, seldom being any worse than 
the public houses in which ‘Western peoples consume beer or stronger alcoholic 
beverages’.90 Such associations were pervasive. 
 
The Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade took a different line regarding the 
comparative severity of opium and alcohol, but they nonetheless relied on this comparison, if 
only to emphasise their view as to the relative harmfulness of opium and its difference 
therein. That is not to say, however, that anti-opium activists took a favourable view of 
alcohol and its social impacts in Britain; many of the key figures and supporters of the anti-
opium movement , hailing from the same liberal and predominantly non-conformist 
constituencies that provided the majority of support for the British temperance movement in 
the mid to late nineteenth century.91 The two movements shared supporters, ideologies, and 
operative networks, but the anti-opium movement never approached the scale of support that 
the temperance movement would eventually receive among the British public, whose late-
nineteenth century Victorian obsession with respectability and “self-help”, key tenets of 
Victorian liberalism, attracted a degree of support for the temperance position from among 
all social classes that the anti-opium movement could not begin to approach.92 Philippa 
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Levine has examined the development of cultures of social protest and the evolution of the 
liberal critique of imperial excesses through a focus on the case study of the movement in 
opposition to the Contagious Diseases Acts of the late-nineteenth century. These movements 
and the anti-opium movement shared many of the traditional arguments against the cold, 
statistical focus of British imperial policy, and the reflection of the Victorian obsession with 
the quantifiable and the regimented as the basis of good policy, which was seen as abusive 
and exploitative in its relationship with the colonial peoples of the empire. Levine argues that 
the subjection of female prostitutes to invasive medical examinations and regimented record 
keeping, together with the assumption of their sole agency in the spread of venereal disease, 
in the colonies reflected too the beginnings of the discourses of a gendered critique of 
empire.93  
 
Opium was viewed by some as so pernicious, so utterly ‘evil’ and nefarious, by many in the 
anti-opium movement that it fully demanded the intervention of the professedly ‘civilized’ to 
deliver the Chinese from its torments – such language was indicative of the movement’s 
liberal imperialist ideology, and gives insight into the culturally reductionist and dismissive 
perspective of many of the movement’s leaders and supporters.94 Other SSOT activists 
asserted opium consumption’s links to ‘poverty and crime’, explicitly endorsing the 
statement that, in India, ‘half of the crimes in the opium districts – murders, rapes, and 
affrays – have their origin in opium-eating’. Such sensationalism relied on the 
characterisation of opium as an inherently pernicious substance at odds with British social 
norms, the transition from opium consumption as a ‘luxury’ to that of a ‘necessity’ being far 
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‘more subtle and insidious’ than that from ‘moderate drinking to drunkenness’.95 
Comparisons to alcohol served both avenues of debate, for the anti-opium movement and 
their opponents, as each sought to appeal to the cultural sphere of the British reading public 
in emphasising opium’s comparative merits or demerits. 
 
In contrast to this tactic of comparison, other elements of the discourses of debate relied on 
the exploitation or employment of the factors of cultural or racial difference, of “othering” 
opium and its users, appealing to notions of their distinction to British norms in order to 
achieve affirmations of, or attacks on, the status quo of opium’s cultivation and trade. The 
perceived ease and readiness among Chinese and Indians to consume opium regularly in 
their daily lives was often explained through the reliance on reference to their racial 
difference, and was used as a rhetorical theme which acted to exaggerate such distancing 
perceptions. As part of a serialised story published in 1897, C. W. Wood wrote that ‘very 
many of these celestials and Indians are mentally and physically inferior, and they go on 
smoking year after year, and seem not the much worse for it’.96 This is a theme that had 
begun to be put forward earlier in the debate, often from among some of those writing in 
defence of the opium trade and of its cultivation in India, to suggest that both Chinese and 
Indians were innately more suited to the consumption of opium, and even that it was a 
necessity to support their physical labour, and to negate feelings of hunger and pain. Mouat 
stated the necessity of opium consumption among Sikh infantrymen that he had witnessed, in 
the course of their frequent forced marches, extolling the virtues of opium as a ‘pick-me-up’, 
allowing the soldiers to march forty miles and still be ‘as fresh as paint’. He categorically 
states that ‘they could not have undergone this exertion in heavy marching order without 
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it’.97 R. Lewins was quick to write in to The Lancet in support of Mouat’s observation of the 
utility of opium to the successful manoeuvring of Sikh soldiers, adding that he had 
experienced the impressive feats of ‘splendid native horsemen’ in China in 1860 during the 
Arrow War who, without opium, were reduced to being ‘incapable of military or any other 
duty’.98 In literary treatments, this theme was also often reproduced. The extremely widely 
read author Rudyard Kipling’s Calcutta opium den in The Gate of the Hundred Sorrows 
serves customers of all racial backgrounds, and his narrator emphasises the significance of 
racial differentiation in opium consumption. ‘Nothing grows on you so much if you’re white, 
as the Black Smoke.99 A yellow man is made different. Opium doesn’t tell on him scarcely at 
all; but white and black suffer a good deal.’100 In this comment, Kipling also alludes to the 
particular threat of opium to the white man, a theme that was to inform the racially centred 
“Yellow Peril” and “Asiatic invasion” literatures of the early twentieth century; Kiplong 
implies that with the consumption of opium, white men are reduced to unthinking, 
immovable idleness but that the labour of Chinese is unaffected. These instances are 
evidence of a readiness to import onto opium a position of utility, even of necessity, in the 
efficient functioning of soldiers and labourers of other races, otherwise often stereotypically 
regarded as physically weak in the period.101 
 
The literary origins of the theme of associating opium consumption with racial difference, 
increasingly prominent by the late-nineteenth century, can be traced back somewhat further, 
however. It is a theme developed in Thomas De Quincey’s extremely widely read 
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Confessions of an English Opium Eater, wherein he describes his encounters with a Malay 
man, who is shown to be so resilient to the effects of opium that he gladly consumes enough 
raw opium, De Quincey frets, ‘to kill three dragoons and their horses’, and apparently 
without consequence. De Quincey tells of his anguish for the ‘poor creature’, but of his final 
resignation that the social awkwardness of upsetting the sense of hospitality surrounding his 
gift of opium, a gift he assumed the man as a Malay would happily appreciate, far outweighs 
the benefits of attempting to save him.102 Fortunately his guest is said to survive, confirming 
the suspicion of Oriental suitability and susceptibility to opium that De Quincey proffers. De 
Quincey’s writing on the subject of opium drew a significant readership among the reading 
public at the time, its influence was wide and its legacy was long lasting. Terry Parssinen has 
highlighted the fact that De Quincey’s Confessions continued to be brought up in public print 
and satirised in newspapers well into the 1870s, which goes some way in illustrating the 
enduring popularity and staying power of many of the literary associations that he 
developed.103 The proliferation of pamphlet publications produced by the anti-opium 
movement from the mid-1870s perhaps goes some way to explaining the position of De 
Quincey’s writings on the subject in the discussions of the 1870s, as a renewed interest in the 
subject of opium appeared in certain aspects of society, but the very fact of their continued 
existence within the public discourse shows their enduring relevance to the discussion of 
opium a half-century after their initial publication, and the sticking power of discourses on a 
subject about which the public had increasingly little personal experience after the regulation 
of opiates in 1868. 
 
Not only was opium consumption often compared with that of alcohol in opium discourses, 
but an oppositional rhetoric of differentiation was also often inherent in writing on the 
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subject, broaching several key themes relating to colonialism, race, and culture. An article 
which appeared in Blackwood’s Magazine in the early nineteenth century, in the years before 
the Opium War, noted that – ‘[It is] a matter of comfort, that we are not to expect, either in 
Christian Europe or America, to see the consumption of opium ever become so universal as 
in Mahometan countries, where the use of wine is forbidden’. Dean Latimer and Jeff 
Goldberg put such an attitude down to a cultural preference for ‘manly alcohol’ which, 
among other things, set the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ race of Britain and the United States apart from 
associations with this ‘effeminizing oriental luxury’.104 In such cases, opium was viewed 
with disdain as foreign, other and emasculating, in contrast to alcohol’s manliness, implying 
the sort of feminising “Orientalist” discourse that often permeates views of Western cultural 
and moral superiority in the nineteenth century. From this cultural perspective, opium use 
was a clear sign of Oriental emasculation, cultural inferiority, and moral degradation. This 
kind of discourse fits the standard “Orientalist” framework that held cultural power for much 
of the nineteenth century, evidencing a Western-authored binary contrast of the ‘active’ 
Westerner and ‘supine or inert non-Western native’, a literary trope that has been identified 
and analysed in a wide range of nineteenth century Western writing on “the Orient”, 
stretching from the Arabian Peninsula to India and China.105 
 
Much of the literature of the anti-opium movement also relied on such modes of thought. 
The Chinese are persistently portrayed as the passive victims of British commercial 
aggression, unable to resist the masculinised power of the British imperial machine. The 
power of the British opium trading interests to influence what writers assumed were the 
vulnerable and impressionable Chinese population, at the whim of British policy, was 
                                                          
104Blackwood’s Magazine, quoted in D. Latimer and J. Goldberg, Flowers in the Blood (New York: 
Franklin Watts, 1981), p. 180. 
105 E. Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Random House, 1993), p. xii. See, for example, M. 
Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The ‘Manly Englishman’ and the ‘Effeminate Bengali’ in the Late 
Nineteenth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). 
65 
 
inherent in the arguments put forward in much of the literature of the anti-opium movement. 
If it was willed among British traders, anti-opium agitators assumed that the ‘vice’ which 
they opposed would have inevitably ‘gathered new victims’ and ‘penetrated into new 
districts’, quite apart from anything the Chinese themselves might actually do.106 In Burma, 
British traders are described as acting to ‘create a taste’ for opium, and of thereby exploiting 
‘simple-minded’ natives.107 Similarly in China, this ‘taste’, having been ‘created by us’ [the 
British], was then said to have inspired the Chinese to take up both the consumption and 
cultivation of opium.108 The Indian cultivators of opium too are characterised as passives 
slaves to the British imperial will, again represented as being exploited and abused, and at 
the mercy of an exploitative British taxation structure on the substance’s extraction and 
transportation. 
 
Much of the anti-opium movement adopted the language of imperial masculinity, in many 
ways inherently congruent with the similar vein of muscular Christianity present in the 
campaign, and the perceived moral duty of the imperialist that defined much of the 
ideological bases of the “civilising mission”. Indeed, the anti-opium movement itself, with 
its Quaker and missionary evangelical Christian support base, was born out of the moralising 
and proselytising zeal of the civilising mission. Throughout the course of debate, being 
enacted ostensibly on their behalf, the Chinese were viewed merely as passive actors. The 
activities of the anti-opium movement were carried out in the spirit of the movement’s own 
agenda; rarely were Chinese or Indians consulted directly. The anti-opium movement was, as 
such, a classic exercise in benign “Orientalism”. Of course, outside of the literature of the 
anti-opium movement, some Chinese were shown to subvert this trend – a man met by the 
author of a piece in Blackwood’s Magazine while traveling in China, Wong Kum Sau is 
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described as both ‘a confirmed opium smoker’ and as having ‘much relish for strong drinks’. 
The author also admits that, prior to their taking to opium, many Chinese ‘sinned a good deal 
more’ with the consumption of ‘intoxicating drinks’.109 Such balancing of the perceptibly 
effeminising opium smoking with the recognisably British, and masculine, social habit of 
consuming strong alcohol had little place in the discourse of the anti-opium movement. One 
reason for this, perhaps, quite aside from their tendency to portray the Chinese as passive 
victims of British aggression in the opium trade, was the fact that the movement was 
dominated by non-conformists, many of whom were also temperance advocates, hostile to 
the consumption of alcohol, and viewing it similarly to opium as a social menace.  
 
The literary backdrop to the cultural discourses established by the work of the anti-opium 
movement was both influenced by the movement’s rhetoric and acted to colour some of the 
language of the movement. Earlier nineteenth century literary treatments of opium in a 
British context had not drawn the same negative associations that would later be made with 
its use in Chinese and Indian contexts. De Quincey’s ground-breaking 1821 writings on his 
experiences of opium-eating in Confessions was well received. As Terry Parssinen has 
argued, Confessions was generally regarded as an innocent and even admirable effort in self-
experimentation.110 Early nineteenth century novels had already begun to utilise opiate use as 
a literary theme denoting associations with notions of “the Orient” and the other.111 The 
character of Lucy Snowe in Charlotte Bronte’s 1853 novel Villette is given an ill-prepared 
dose of laudanum, and rather than being sedated experiences a stimulating response, echoing 
earlier Romantic views of the creativity stimulating effect of opiates. She is ‘alive to new 
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thought’, is enticed to rise and escape the ‘oppressive heat’ of the ‘den’, and wanders 
through an Orientalised dreamscape. In her sensual ramblings Lucy moves from the faintly 
familiar sights of the town of Villette to the Levantine wonders of the fete in the town’s park, 
where she is awed by the sights of ‘the wonders and the symbols of Egypt’, of ‘temple, 
pyramid, obelisk, and sphinx’.112 Bronte employs the motif of the “Oriental dream” in 
Lucy’s opiate-induced fantasy, drawing heavily on the imagery and style of earlier Romantic 
writers, and especially from De Quincey, who develops this theme in his Confessions. 
Indeed, Bronte’s description is highly reminiscent of De Quincey’s dreamscape, Lucy 
Snowe’s need to escape the oppressive warmth of the dormitory akin to De Quincey’s 
‘tropical heat’, though Bronte’s is more exhilarating and less hostile to its Oriental aspects, 
perhaps hinting at the higher sense of realism and vividness in the inevitable sensory and 
emotional troughs of De Quincey’s opium-induced experience.113 Bronte’s representation of 
opiate use concentrated on the identifiably domestic, and ostensibly medicinal, form of 
opium, presumably the derivative laudanum,114 commonly used during the nineteenth 
century as a self-remedy and to induce sleep, the literary legacy of which owes more to the 
writings of De Quincey and his notions of the “Oriental dream” than to concrete associations 
with either China or India. The more negative cultural associations of opium would be 
developed and disseminated later, with the work of the anti-opium movement. 
 
The discourses that would be picked up and developed by the anti-opium movement from 
the genesis of its organisation in the 1870s had already begun to emerge in certain quarters 
of the literary culture just as the movement was beginning to come together. Charles 
Dickens’ representation of the depraved and squalid opium den and its implied far-reaching 
moral consequences in several key scenes in The Mystery of Edwin Drood constitutes an 
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early example of the literary tendency of portraying opium consumption in a degrading and 
undignified manor, and within a domestic British setting. The plot of this unfinished story, 
Dickens’ last work, for he was to die before its completion, centres on the themes of opium 
use and moral decline. A jealous lover, Johm Jasper is revealed to be an opium addict, and is 
commonly presumed to have killed his nephew Edwin Drood while under opium’s 
pernicious influence. The opium den that John Jasper visits in the East End is portrayed as a 
scene of physical and moral depravity, comprising ‘a miserable court, especially miserable 
among many such’, accessed by way of a ‘broken staircase’, with an atmosphere ‘dark’ and 
‘stifling’, the place for the consumption of the opium a ‘squalid bed’.115 In reality, though, 
British travellers, when seeing opium houses in China itself for the first time, often 
expressed their astonishment at the cleanliness, conviviality and sophistication of opium 
houses. By the 1920s, when the discourse of opium and Chinese consumption had been so 
heavily coloured by the discourses of anti-opium writing and literary representations, W. 
Somerset Maugham was to recall his surprise at seeing pleasant elderly gentlemen and 
friends seated at tables instead of the ‘opium fiends’ literary portrayals had led him to 
believe he would find.116 Lillian Nayder has argued that Dickens ‘orientalizes’ Jasper, the 
British villain, assigning him the characteristics of the ‘vampirelike mastery’ of the ‘Chinese 
Opium Master’ and the ‘sexual force of rebellious sepoys’, and in doing so invoking the 
‘sexual myths’ purveyed in contemporary Indian Mutiny and opium den fiction.117 
 
The motif of the opium den, and its inescapably Chinese nature, became an increasingly 
prominent and reproduced image, building on Dickens’ portrayal, but emphasising the 
Chinese connection, and adding to the notions of immorality of the predominantly ethnically 
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Chinese retailers of opium. Other well-known authors seized upon this discourse of the 
opium den and wrote broadly similar treatments of the subject. In his short story, The Gate of 
the Hundred Sorrows, Rudyard Kipling writes about a Chinese-operated opium den in the 
city of Calcutta. Fung-Tching, a grotesque figure with one eye, two missing fingers, and a 
diminutive stature, and said to have murdered his wife in a drunken stupor, is portrayed as 
the very archetype of the Chinese opium master, sapping the energy and taking the stipends 
of those he insidiously traps in his opium lair.118 Such associations between opium, the 
nature of its consumption, and questions of morality, were reproduced and expanded as the 
theme was developed by successive authors. Another of the most widely read and well 
received treatments of opium and the opium den within a British domestic context, but with 
explicit reference to its Chineseness, is that of Oscar Wilde’s 1890 novel The Picture of 
Dorian Gray. The novel charts the descent of the vane and dashing young protagonist, 
Dorian Gray, who, after making a dark pact to forever maintain his youth, quickly starts 
upon a journey into cruelty, immorality and wickedness. At the centre of his transition from 
innocence to immorality is his addiction to opium, and the East End opium den he frequents 
becomes the setting for some of his more profound revelations of cunning, guilt and self-
loathing. In the London of Dorian Gray’s world, ‘there were opium-dens, where one could 
buy oblivion, dens of horror where the memory of old sins could be destroyed by the 
madness of sins that were new’.119 The opium den is a scene for Dorian Gray’s reflections on 
previous immoral actions, including his impulsive and savage murder of his friend Basil 
Hallward, and his cruel jilting of his lover Sybil Vane. The use of opium to obliterate his 
memories is a microcosm of his desire to undo the past. Such representations indelibly 
sought to link opium consumption – with all of its associated discursive connotations of 
criminality and irresponsibility – with the Chinese people, generalising their culture and 
society, and riling up racial fears among British readers about the nature of the Chinese 
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community in London, and public concerns about opium dens in the East End of the city. 
This topic and discursive trend was adopted by the more sensationalist elements of the 
British press, and even, at particular flashpoints, by the mainstream press, spreading and 
exacerbating the negative aspects of many of these discourses far more widely than the anti-
opium movement had been able to achieve with its relatively limited readership.120 
 
Opium was emphasised as a substance of the colonised in anti-opium and in pro-opium 
status quo narratives, as well as in literary fiction; the discourses of opium were saturated 
with the cultural associations of passivity, victimhood and emasculation, feeding the 
development of wider negative colonial discourses that had been taking shape during the 
late-nineteenth century, and which were also being coloured by other contemporary cultural 
and racial theories, such as the increasingly prevalent position of scientific racism in the 
national lexicon. The anti-opium arguments in Britain drew heavily on the colonial 
“orientalising” discourses of the active British and passive native, and much of the debate on 
opium cultivation, trading, and consumption operated on these types of preconceived 
assumptions. The racialised associations of opium consumption with criminality, nefarious 
activity, and immorality developed in many late-nineteenth century works of literature, 
echoing many of the underlying assumptions put forward in the narratives of the anti-opium 
movement, created many negative and enduring cultural associations and stereotypes, 
particularly relating to the Chinese people. The discourses which these narratives and literary 
tropes helped to inform would come to underpin much of the more outwardly hostile writing 
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on opium and Chinese into the twentieth century, such as many of the literary and pseudo-
journalistic works that would come to define the Yellow Peril phenomenon. 
 
The cultural work of the anti-opium movement, with the SSOT at its fore, was of great 
significance in influencing the key centres of elite Liberal opinion regarding the subject. 
Though Gladstone’s governments of the 1880s and 1890s were minority administrations, and 
distracted by more immediately pressing concerns such as that of Home Rule in Ireland, that 
the very year a majority Liberal government was formed in 1906 the erstwhile “morally 
indefensible” motion was passed, and the next year a bilateral reform treaty with China was 
agreed, highlights the significance of this earlier cultural role of the anti-opium movement. 
Certainly, changing economic conditions that saw an increasing challenge to the British-
grown opium helped facilitate these post-1906 transitions, and geopolitical developments 
also helped to inform the changing direction of the British government with regard to its 
foreign and imperial policies, but the cultural role of the anti-opium campaign of the late-
nineteenth century should not be understated. That it was in many ways an anachronistic 
movement has been demonstrated throughout this chapter, but it was nonetheless successful 
in its mobilisation of elite opinion within parliament, and though this did not fit with the 
requirements of engendering a truly popular position in the new era of mass politics, it had a 
cultural role in informing the new liberalism of the post-1906 Liberal Party that attempted to 
drag liberal ideas into this new age. 
 
At the outset of this chapter I suggested that the tendency among the existing historiography 
to categorise the organised anti-opium movement as an ideological or organisational offshoot 
of the abolitionist movement is to understate this connection. The movement arose out of the 
same culture of social activism and humanitarianism as abolitionism, as well as of much of 
the nineteenth century’s domestic social reformism, and was ensconced in the same social, 
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political and religious networks. Its legacy was impossible for the anti-opiumists to ignore, 
and they chose to embrace the connection wholeheartedly, as can be seen from the discourse, 
tactics and the general outlook of their campaign.  
 
The culture of reformism that defined the position of the movement with relation to its 
opposition to the British involvement with opium was part of the intellectual legacy of the 
anti-slavery movement of previous generations and its focus on humanitarian reform of the 
British world presence. This legacy, along with the evangelical and non-conformist support 
base of the movement, also encompassed similar evangelical tendencies in domestic social 
movements such as the temperance movement. This helps explain much of the crossover in 
ideology and supporters between various groups and causes. The imperial reformism 
represented by the British anti-opium movement and those active within it essentially in 
many ways blurred some of the boundaries between liberal imperialism and more critical 
impulses, while also reflecting key principles in the foreign policy approach of Gladstonian 
liberalism. It remained distinct, however, from imperial criticism, drawing much of its 
ideological base and structural form from the legacy of the humanitarian projects of the 
abolitionist movement, and its continued existence showed that this brand of the 
humanitarian reforming of empire was able to survive into the era of new ideas surrounding 
empire in the late nineteenth century, albeit with an increasingly narrowing constituency, as 
it was replaced at the forefront of politics by liberal imperialism and at the edges by 
emergent radical anti-imperialist critiques. 
  
The anti-opium movement was also one dominated by a consideration of Britain’s identity as 
a “Christian nation”, by the need for a reflection of Christian morality in British policy, and 
by the desire to protect Britain’s evangelical enterprises in the world. The opium trade was 
an imperial excess at odds with such notions of Christian duty and identity, and the 
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movement regarded it as a barrier to the all-important considerations of the civilising mission 
and the evangelical process. It was a reformist movement informed by traditional 
humanitarian impulses, but also by deeper ideological affectations; the humanitarian 
framework internalised by the anti-opium movement had a distinctly Christian and 
evangelical character. In a similar spirit to that of the abolitionists of the preceding 
generation, the activities and arguments of the mainstay of the anti-opium movement often 
ran parallel to empire, and were based out of an ostensibly humanitarian concern for the 
impacts of imperial excesses. They sought a humanitarian empire, and were not out to 
challenge the idea of empire. The resistance of those active in the movement to authoritarian 
empire, though outweighed by other fixations, was significant in outlining their inherently 
liberal ideological commitments.  
 
Having embraced many of the tenets and examples of the abolitionist movement, the anti-
opium movement was to achieve notably less success, in respect of its overall social impact. 
Though helping to pressurise Gladstone’s Liberal administration of 1892-4 into agreeing to 
organise a Royal Commission on Opium to investigate the situation of Britain’s opium 
system in India, the movement did not establish a popular basis of support in British society. 
The Royal Commission on Opium was conducted from 1893-5, and reported in 1895. Its 
findings largely supported the continuation of the status quo in India, and no direct remedial 
action was taken by the British government, marking a setback for the anti-opium 
movement. This political defeat acted to sap some of the enthusiasm from the movement, but 
in reality the important cultural work of the movement had already been done. Developments 
in the economic circumstances surrounding the opium trade, such as the decline in the 
profitability of opium exports to China, and Britain’s warming of relations with an 
increasingly modernising Chinese government in the last years of the Qing dynasty and early 
republican administration after 1911, comprised supportive factors in explaining the change 
in British opium policy in the following two decades. But the primary causative factor 
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behind this transition was the fact that the impetus for reform had already been informed and 
engendered by the parliamentary success of the political campaign of the anti-opium 
movement, the ideological commitments of which took shape in a newly reinvigorated 
Liberal Party, which after its election victory of 1906 set about on a course of reform of the 
British opium system.  
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Chapter Two 
Diplomacy, imperial expediency, and the reform debates in British politics: The Liberal 
government of 1906 and resumption of the anti-opium position 
 
The campaign coordinated by the anti-opium movement eventually roused enough sympathy 
among British parliamentarians so as to pressure Gladstone’s minority Liberal government 
into addressing the issue through the calling of a Royal Commission, the Royal Commission 
on Opium, which took place from 1893 to 1895. The commission conducted an investigation 
of the British opium system in India, covering its cultivation, taxation, consumption, and 
exportation, but in the end largely approved the status quo, recommending no significant 
changes in India. The failure of the Royal Commission to approve a government sanctioned 
reform sapped much of the momentum from the anti-opium movement, and it somewhat 
petered out over the following years. But despite the failure of the Royal Commission, and 
the decline of the reform movement, its legacies remained in the anti-opium sympathies of 
many parliamentarians, and in the political capital invested in the anti-opium discourses that 
it had propagated. Significant continuities in personnel, discourses, and parliamentary 
support remained from the anti-opium movement’s heyday of the early 1890s, and the full 
extent of these continuities were revealed in the aftermath of the electoral victory of the 
socially reformist Liberal Party in 1906, the first majority Liberal government since 1885, 
espousing the rhetoric of reform in the social sphere, and now also with the parliamentary 
arithmetic to effectively implement reform in foreign and imperial policy. It was this 
government which began to pursue a bilateral approach to opium reform, together with the 
Qing government in China, a process by which British policy was renegotiated and 
transitioned towards a diversification of British trade with China and crop replacement in 
India. An examination of the politics behind this most significant of changes in British 
opium policy, and its reliance on prevailing continuities in the dynamics of British anti-
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opium politics, together with an assessment of the underlying economic conditions that made 
this predominantly politically motivated transition fiscally palatable, forms the basis of this 
chapter. 
 
The failure of the Royal Commission on Opium and the decline of the anti-opium movement 
 
In 1893, under the peak of pressure that the anti-opium movement and its parliamentary 
lobby was to bring to bear, and in light of increasingly unfavourable economic conditions 
surrounding the China opium trade, Gladstone’s Liberal government agreed to hold a Royal 
Commission of inquiry into the situation of opium cultivation, taxation, and consumption in 
British India. This marked something of a watershed in the opium issue, as it was the first 
time that the government had agreed to begin the prerequisite process of investigation and 
official recommendation needed for any reforming of the system, reflecting what had 
become a popular cause in the House of Commons. This was a measure a long time in 
coming, and anti-opium members of parliament had laid considerable groundwork for its 
proposition, debate, and adoption. The first notable achievement of the lobby in parliament 
was the raising of a motion by Sir Joseph Pease on the 10th April 1891, which proposed that: 
 
This House is of the opinion that the system by which the Indian Opium Revenue is 
raised is morally indefensible, and would urge upon the Indian Government that they 
should cease to grant licences for the cultivation of the poppy and sale of opium in 
British India, except to supply the legitimate demand for medical purposes, and they 
should at the same time take measures to arrest the transit of Malwa opium through 
British territory.121 
 
                                                          
121 ‘The Indian Opium Traffic’. HC Deb, 10 April, 1891. Vol. 352, cc. 285-344.  
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The motion received support from many MPs, with several rising to speak on the issue, but 
was eventually shelved due to an adjournment on the grounds of a lack of time. 
 
On the 30th June 1893, Sir Joseph Pease’s 1891 motion was again raised by the Irish Quaker 
MP Alfred Webb, who also proposed a new and more radical motion. Unlike many within 
the anti-opium movement, which mostly consisted of political moderates, Webb was a 
genuine radical, a critic of the government’s opium policy as well as an Irish nationalist and 
supporter of Indian rights. Webb pressed for direct government action in the calling of a 
Royal Commission on Opium, in contrast to Pease’s more moderate proffering of a 
rhetorical statement of moral objection to Britain’s opium system, which he had sought to 
lay as a foundation for further reform. Webb’s motion set out that: 
 
This House is of opinion that a Royal Commission should be appointed to inquire, both 
in India and in this country, and to report as to (1) what retrenchments and reforms can 
be effected in the Military and Civil expenditure of India; (2) by what means Indian 
resources can be best developed: (3) and what, if any, temporary assistance from the 
British Exchequer would be required in order to meet any deficit of revenue which 
would be occasioned by the suppression of the opium traffic.122 
 
This motion was overwhelmingly carried in its amended form, becoming a Resolution, 
demonstrating the renewed vigour of Parliament to deal with the subject and forcing the 
government to seriously consider the issue. In setting out the new motion, Webb noted the 
effect of the failed 1891 motion on exciting a general discussion on the topic, and helping to 
influence parliamentary and public opinion on the subject.123 The final Resolution expanded 
the scope of the proposed Royal Commission to consider the questions of whether poppy 
growth should be restricted purely to that required to meet the needs of medical usage, 
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whether any restrictions should apply to the Native States in addition to British territory 
(targeted at the Malwa opium transit system),124 the financial considerations in revenue 
replacement and compensation to be paid out to cultivators, the consumption practices 
among the various different races residing in India, the disposition of the Indian population 
towards non-medical consumption of opium, and their willingness to bear the cost of 
prohibitive measures.125  
 
Alfred Webb was an ally of the anti-opium lobby in parliament, a cause which ran in his 
family, and a member of the Irish Parliamentary Party. He was extremely interested in Indian 
affairs, and a key activist bridging Irish and Indian nationalist networks. In 1894 he would go 
on to become President of the Indian National Congress.126 In light of his activities in India, 
and his active participation in the cause of Irish nationalism, he was a markedly more radical 
individual than the English Quakers who dominated the British anti-opium movement. Webb 
operated within established Irish networks in India, and was an important individual in the 
negotiation of themes of colonial nationalism within the imperial world in India and Ireland. 
Webb’s activities in India were preceded by more than a century of Irish involvement in the 
subcontinent, which witnessed the playing out of complex and often competing political and 
national identities.127 He was a rare supporter of the anti-opium cause in British politics, in 
that his involvement encompassed the bridging of national divides and networks in England, 
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entire Indian subcontinent. 
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Ireland and India, bringing with this engagement an element of transnationalism that was 
lacking throughout most of the rest of the movement, and which would not be effectively 
realised until the eventual advent of the 1907 reform agreement between the British and 
Chinese governments. 
 
On the 7th July 1893, a week after Webb’s Motion and its passage as a parliamentary 
Resolution, an anxious Sir Joseph Pease, perhaps mindful of the previous failures of anti-
opium motions to reach the stage of implementation, took time to remind the government 
and the House of the status of the question. George Russell, Under-Secretary of State for 
India in Gladstone’s government, confirmed to parliament that measures were being taken 
with a view to considering the proposed Royal Commission, and that the Secretary of State 
was in communication with the British India government on the issue.128 Although a 
necessary formality in the process of the consideration of such a commission, it was not lost 
on anti-opium reformers that the metropolitan government held sway over the British India 
government, and would have the final call on any measures to be adopted or change in policy 
to be implemented. Indeed, Sir Joseph Pease, in the April 1891 debate, had stressed that ‘we, 
practically, make the laws which govern the Government of India, and we are responsible for 
the fact that all things go on in India under the jurisdiction of this country’. He followed that 
Britain ‘cannot separate the Government of India from our Government’.129 It was apparent 
that, for the anti-opium movement, the profession of British Indian governmental autonomy 
would not be an acceptable justification for metropolitan inaction. 
 
On the 10th July 1893, George Curzon MP broached the question of whether the proposed 
Royal Commission would also encompass an examination of the trade in opium from India 
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to China, and the accompanying prospective renegotiation of the trading relationship 
between British India and China with regards to opium cultivated in India. The response 
from Under-Secretary of State for India George Russell that, while the Commission may 
discuss the issue it was not bound by the terms of Reference of the Resolution to do so, 
clearly unsatisfactory to the increasingly agitated Curzon, revealed yet another failure in the 
efforts of the anti-opium lobby.130 The failure to include any mention of the factor of China 
and of the opium trade itself in the parliamentary Resolution, in addition to the system of its 
cultivation in India, was to prove a significant oversight, as it was an issue which the 
eventual Royal Commission on Opium would entirely avoid. This in itself constituted 
somewhat of a defeat for the wider concerns of the anti-opium movement, which had 
unintentionally tied itself down with the omission of the China context in its initial motion 
and subsequent Resolution, the wording of which the government was not willing, and not 
required, to deviate from. That being said, in 1895 the commissioners made it clear in the 
conclusion of their report that they neither felt compelled to address the topic of opium in 
China under the terms put forward by the parliamentary Resolution which had brought the 
Royal Commission into being, nor that they should have any power to influence British 
foreign policy. They had been sent to deal with an imperial inquiry in India, and did not see 
fit to stray into the realms of foreign policy. They suggested that ‘In this matter, 
responsibility mainly lies with the Chinese Government. It is for them to make the first step 
in any modification of the present Treaty arrangements.’131 They followed that, with the at-
present unchallenged existent commercial treaties between Britain and China, a destruction 
of the British system of opium cultivation in India was a measure simply ‘unasked by 
China’.132 But this was to ignore the considerable popularity among both the Chinese 
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government and public for the cause of opium suppression. The reality of unhindered British 
imports, protected by commercial treaty, though, made this an unsustainable policy. 
 
The scope of the Royal Commission to make its inquiries in India, but not in China, was a 
significant limiting factor in preventing its recommending any major reforms to the British 
opium system in India. Due to the lack of any reference to the Chinese context of opium 
consumption in the terms of the Resolution, and to their appointment to investigate the 
sphere of imperial affairs as was represented by India, the Commissioners were neither 
empowered, nor required, to make inquiries in China. The anti-opium movement regarded 
Chinese opium consumption to be far and away the bigger problem than consumption in 
India, but the terms of the parliamentary Resolution that had been put forward on their behalf 
denied them the prospect of any progress in this area from the start. It may have been so that 
the Royal Commission’s remit to focus on India was conservative with regards to its 
propensity to address the wider issues involved in the cultivation and export of opium, and 
that this focus was to prove fortuitous for the India government in removing the more 
pressing moral and social concern that Chinese consumption of opium was seen to represent, 
but for the anti-opium movement the inability of the Royal Commission to address the issue 
of Chinese consumption was also partially self-inflicted. 
 
The anti-opium movement had not succeeded in convincing the government to directly 
implement a programme of reform itself during the 1890s, but its position had gained such 
support in parliament that the government was to bow to MPs’ demands on the issue in 
organising the Royal Commission. The investigation of Britain’s opium system had become 
a popular cause, and was becoming economically viable, but, more importantly, it had also 
become politically acceptable. This political aspect of the question, and the widespread 
support for the anti-opium position by 1893, was in no small part due to the work of the anti-
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opium movement, and it is difficult to imagine how such an anti-opium environment among 
parliament could have been achieved in its absence. Despite some of the early concerns of 
Sir Joseph Pease as to the wisdom of a prolonged commission of inquiry given the perceived 
urgency of the issue, and the undesirability of leaving what he viewed as ‘a question of 
morality’ to the cool bureaucracy of a Royal Commission, the SSOT at the forefront of the 
British anti-opium movement were satisfied with the terms of the Royal Commission, and 
eagerly awaited the prospective progress and reform that its results might bring. In The 
Friend of China, its periodical journal, the SSOT commented that the Royal Commission 
was ‘as fair-minded and impartial a tribunal as could have desired to hear our case’.133 Pease 
conceded, though, that an appropriate fiscal solution to the problem would have to be arrived 
at in reforming the opium system in India, given the inability of the poverty and famine 
stricken people of India to bear the burden of any further taxation.134 Some MPs were less 
optimistic, and as the latter months of 1893 dragged on a line of questioning began as to the 
sense of organising a long and costly Royal Commission into a subject that would be settled 
by the government one way or another in any case.  
 
In August, Sir John Gorst, MP for Cambridge University, was already expressing 
disapproval as to the confusion among the government as to whom (British metropolitan 
government or British India government) would have to bear the cost of the commission, 
which George Russell admitted would certainly be substantial.135 Gorst rose again in a 
debate on the 16th September on the value of Royal Commissions, making clear his view as 
to the ‘entire uselessness’ of Royal Commissions in general, and adding that ‘when the 
House chose to have a Royal Commission the least it could do was to pay for it’. Gorst did 
not at all think that the costs of the investigation should be ‘imposed upon the impoverished 
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taxpayers of India, who did not want a Commission of the kind, and would gain nothing 
whatever by its inquiry’. These were points seconded by Sir Richard Temple, MP for 
Kingston upon Thames, who questioned the morality of saddling an Indian population who 
had not desired any commission with its cost, and by Sir Alpheus Morton MP, who opined 
that Royal Commissions were, in and of themselves, ‘shams and frauds on the nation’.136 A 
few days later, Morton rose once again saying that, in his view, Royal Commissions ‘were 
moved and appointed for the purpose of putting off a question instead of settling it’. The 
‘Government would take another five or six years to consider the matter, and eventually they 
would be all dead and buried before anything was done in the way of a settlement’.137 The 
frustrations of anti-opium agitators in parliament, as well as of unaffiliated members of the 
House, with the complex and protracted bureaucracy of the government and its commissions 
is difficult to ignore. Their objections cut repeatedly into debates on the subject, and often 
drew others to rise and speak in support of the notion, but however protracted, the process 
had been set in motion. The Royal Commission was a contested bureaucratic compromise to 
a question the origin of which was tied up in complex moral quandaries, but it offered 
reformers hope. For the British anti-opium movement, it finally looked as though the end 
might be in sight, and that Britain might at last cast off the opium albatross from around its 
neck. 
 
The Report of the Royal Commission on Opium was released in 1895. In its conclusion it 
identified opium as a ‘stimulant’138 substance not unlike alcohol, that consumption could be 
‘harmful, harmless, or beneficial’ ‘according to the measure and discretion with which it is 
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used’, and detracted from the view espoused by the anti-opium movement that all 
consumption was necessarily harmful. In this way, the Royal Commission’s report relied 
upon, and propagated, many of the defensive normalising discourses about opium, discussed 
in chapter one of this thesis, that had emerged on the side in support of the opium status quo 
in the debates over opium that the anti-opium movement had initiated since the mid-1870s. 
The report argued that opium had been cultivated in India long before the advent of British 
rule on the subcontinent, and that the arguments of missionaries, however sincerely 
expressed, should not outweigh such considerations. The Commissioners expressed their 
strong doubts as to whether it was the ‘duty’ of the British government to legislate against 
this.139 They also doubted that it was the wish of the population to see a prohibition of opium 
on the subcontinent, as they noted that those among the Indian population who came to them 
directly to express their support for prohibition were in the minority, and suggesting that that 
minority were principally comprised of Bengalis from the by then relatively small Brahmo 
Samaj religious movement.140 The Commission also cited the relative lack of urgency of the 
Indian National Congress regarding the subject of opium in India, which they noted was far 
more concerned with the spread of alcohol consumption.141 The Commissioners held that 
‘the revenue derived from opium is indispensable for carrying on with efficiency the 
Government of India’. They were unwilling to recommend that the British government ‘deal 
experimentally’ with the some two hundred and ninety million people of India, and that the 
government should not act without their consent on such a matter. As has already been 
mentioned, the Commissioners also declined to recommend changes to the export of opium 
to China, stating that such a matter was a concern of British commerce and foreign relations 
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with China, and would have to be discussed with the Chinese directly.142 In the end, the 
report concluded that whatever problems might exist in India as a result of opium cultivation, 
they could not justify the ‘heavy loss of public revenue on the government and people of 
India’.143 The conclusions of the report dealt a stinging blow to the anti-opium movement, 
denying the need or even desire for change among the Indian population, and effectively 
removing the issue of governmental reform of the opium system from the immediate 
political agenda for a further decade; it was difficult for advocates to raise further political 
arguments in the face of a definitive Royal Commission verdict against their position. It is a 
credit to the cultural reach of the anti-opium movement’s work, then, that support was to 
remain among Liberal MPs and among parliament in general, to re-emerge amid more 
favourable political conditions after 1906. 
 
Perhaps most damning for the British anti-opium movement was that the Commission 
concluded that the movement had ‘proceeded from an exaggerated impression as to the 
nature and extent of the evil to be controlled’. They intimated that ‘The gloomy descriptions 
presented to British audiences of extensive moral and physical degradation by opium, have 
not been accepted by the witnesses representing the people of India, nor by those most 
responsible for the government of the country.’144 This conclusion was almost insulting in its 
ignoring of the Chinese context of opium consumption, and reflected a single-mindedness on 
the part of the majority of the commissioners to close the debate down, a whitewashing on 
behalf of the protection of British India government’s position. In addition to ignoring the 
movement’s demands for reform, the Royal Commission had denied the veracity of their 
claims, implying the propensity of the movement towards naivety and exaggeration on the 
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issue. Although the anti-opium movement insisted that, though these conclusions might well 
be reached in India, the circumstances in China were far more dire, the damage had already 
been done, and the Royal Commission had given the British government all that they would 
require to side-line the issue for the time being. The monetary and political cost of the Royal 
Commission had been high, and its findings and recommendations had removed the opium 
issue from the political agenda. It was not until 1906 that reform would be agreed upon, and 
this time it would be by direct bilateral negotiation with China, through the realm of foreign 
policy, and not in consideration of British domestic political currents or imperial concerns. 
 
Kathleen Lodwick has argued that the Royal Commission on Opium was set up to fail, that it 
included and represented pro-opium interests, and that its purpose was to give a metropolitan 
political seal of approval to the continuation of the British opium establishment in India, 
while also giving the appearance of due parliamentary process.145 As discussed, this was a 
concern held by some within the anti-opium movement. It was also a concern that those 
representing the government, including Gladstone himself as Prime Minister, were keen to 
dispel. In the initial debate on Webb’s motion on the 30th June 1893, Gladstone suggested 
that it would be most desirous that the proposed Commission be carried out in a careful and 
thoughtful manner, and that it should be comprised of those responsible enough to reflect the 
importance of the issue.146 He and his Liberal government were aware of issues of moral 
standing and of the necessity of achievement of progressive change over historical time. 
Gladstone’s moral credentials had been famously and prominently displayed through he and 
his government’s stance over the issue of the Bulgarian Atrocities of 1876, which together 
with his Midlothian Campaign of 1878-80 had pioneered a new form of popular political 
engagement on issues of moral standing. In doing so, Gladstone and the Liberal Party at 
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which he was at the helm had moved Britain towards a more national form of politics and 
away from the local concern which it had previously represented. In the words of Rowan 
McWilliam, Gladstone had helped forge ‘a national constituency’ that were moved by his 
‘moralising of politics’.147 Gladstone also had a previous track record on the issue of opium. 
As a young member of parliament at the time of the First Opium War in 1840, Gladstone had 
given several impassioned speeches against the war, highlighting the moral iniquities of the 
opium trade and Britain’s decision to go to war to defend what he had then described as a 
morally dubious trade.148 At the time of the proposing of the Royal Commission in 1893, 
Gladstone and his government were not the cynical granters of empty concessions that both 
the anti-opium movement and some sympathetic scholars have supposed. As David Owen 
argued back in the 1930s, Gladstone may have been sympathetic to the notion of reform, and 
to the liberal anti-opium movement, who were one of his natural constituencies of support, 
but he was distracted by greater and more pressing, immediate concerns. Principally, 
Gladstone’s attentions were occupied by the issue of Irish Home Rule, with his potentially 
ground-breaking Irish Home Rule Bill hanging in the balance by 1893, at a time when both 
his minority government held but a precarious grip in parliament, and his own Cabinet was 
on the verge of rebellion.149 
 
In his speech in the initial debate, Gladstone asserted his wish that the proposed commission 
not be the sole domain of ‘experts’, but that its composition should also reflect ‘responsible’ 
and ‘independent’ individuals, able to consider the moral aspects of the question. He cited 
the example of the question of the slave trade of the previous generation, where many 
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“experts” had insisted that parliamentary opposition to slavery was simply not considering 
what they supposed to be the fundamental differences of the ‘negro character’, and 
Gladstone argued that any inquiry headed by the cold judgement of experts of India and 
China might well reach the same kinds of “racially specific” and essentialising 
conclusions.150 This is somewhat ironic given the eventual conclusions of the Royal 
Commission, which in part emphasised the cultural normality of opium eating among Indian 
ethnic groups and opium smoking among the Chinese in India, and downplayed the 
substance’s potency on the bodies of the various Indian peoples. But such a conclusion was a 
product of the Royal Commission itself and the powerful British Indian establishment which 
inevitably influenced its inquiry in India, and not one pre-ascertained by the metropolitan 
government which sanctioned it. Gladstone concluded with the assurance that, ‘I certainly, 
for my part, do not propose to abide finally and decisively by official opinion.’151 Though 
Gladstone may have been ideologically sympathetic to the anti-opium position, particularly 
given his credentials in moral politics in foreign policy and his historical background in the 
opium issue itself, his hands were largely tied by circumstances. 
 
It has been argued that the mere fact that the anti-opium movement were able to pressure the 
British government into sanctioning a Royal Commission on Opium by the end of the 
century constitutes an achievement on their part in successfully bringing the issue on to the 
political agenda. Lodwick has overstated the opposition to the Royal Commission from 
within parliament, the Resolution for which in general passed unmolested through the House 
of Commons, though with some qualifying amendments which have already been discussed. 
Lodwick has curiously chosen to cite clearly partisan anti-opium publications, in the form of 
the prominent SSOT member, and long-time Quaker Society of Friends Opium Traffic 
Committee Secretary, Joseph Rowntree’s book The Opium Habit in East Asia: A Study of the 
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Evidence Given to the Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-4, and the Chinese Recorder’s 
sympathetic missionary-centric articles, rather than dealing with the unadulterated 
parliamentary sources themselves, and her evidence is at times unfortunately somewhat 
second hand as a result.152 While it may have been the case that the Royal Commission 
marked an achievement of sorts for the anti-opium movement, and general parliamentary 
opinion in the wake of its conclusions was broadly sympathetic to the anti-opium position, 
the lack of willingness of the British India government to budge on the issue and the lack of 
political will of the British metropolitan government to force the issue meant that, in the end, 
the movement’s efforts failed to produce the results that they had sought. It was not the 
British domestic anti-opium movement itself that was to finally bring about a change in 
British opium policy, but rather its cultural legacy, given a new lease of life through the 
reformism and zeal of the 1906 Liberal government, and made achievable by the successful 
bilateral negotiations between Britain and China and the genesis and rise to prominence of 
an international political arena centred on the issue in the first decade of the twentieth 
century. 
 
Towards a government reforming of the British opium system 
 
The beginning of the twentieth century was a period which was to see a sustained shift in 
attitudes towards the issue of Britain’s opium system in India and the opium trade to China 
and South East Asia. Following from the low point in the hopes of the anti-opium cause in 
the wake of the failure of the 1895 report of the Royal Commission on Opium to produce an 
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outcome favourable to the anti-opium position, and widely perceived to have been a farce in 
the face of mounting pressure in parliament and in the missionary press, the anti-opium 
movement declined in organisation and energy. This was a position made all the more 
definitive by the death of Joseph Pease, the movement’s primary financial backer, in 1903.153 
The failure of the Royal Commission to recommend any substantial changes to the British 
opium system in India appeared to anger many parliamentarians, and the 1891 measure 
characterising the opium system as ‘morally indefensible’ was once again raised by Sir 
Joseph Pease in May 1895, this time passing overwhelmingly by 176 votes to 59.154 This 
effort, though, was insufficient to remobilise parliament on the subject, or to convince the 
government to re-evaluate its position; the Commission had spoken, and the government had 
dropped the issue. In the face of such a stinging defeat as that represented by the 
commission’s failure, and the stubborn refusal of the government, and in particular the India 
Office, to back down on the issue, the fact that the outlook with regards to opium policy in 
parliament and in government was to achieve an almost complete reversal in the next decade 
is quite remarkable. In the end, this reversal owed much to the cultural force and staying 
power of the position developed by the anti-opium movement, and its prevailing discursive 
legacy informed much of the moral thinking on the issue that the Liberal government of 
1906 would take up. 
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In 1900, at a time of acute famine in many parts of India, the focus in Parliament regarding 
the topic of opium cultivation was fixed on the position of opium agriculture and on the 
prospects for crop replacement, as evident from two questions raised mid-year in the House 
of Commons, the only mentions of the subject in parliament that year. The government, 
represented by Lord George Hamilton the Secretary of State for India, in response to 
accusations that opium cultivation might be leading rural poverty in India, defended the 
British India Government by reassuring the House that farmers were not required to sow 
opium seeds, and were in fact free to grow whatever produce they desired.155 In a short 
question in the House of Commons on the 19th February 1901, his first speech in the House, 
the MP for Armagh South, John Campbell, asked the government if in light of the general 
popularity of the 1891 motion that Britain’s opium system was ‘morally indefensible’ and 
the ongoing continuation of the trade, the government was going to do anything to curtail it. 
It was a moot point, as the 1895 Report of the Royal Commission on Opium had given the 
government all the justification it needed to dismiss the question. Lord George Hamilton, the 
Secretary of State for India, cited the ‘exhaustive investigation’ of the Royal Commission in 
confirming that the government did not intend to act further on the issue.156 Not all within 
parliament were willing to accept this view, but those seeking reform despite the findings of 
the Royal Commission remained a minority. A week after Campbell’s question, Sir Henry 
Fowler MP raised the motion that this ‘country and the House of Commons will arrive at a 
different conclusion than that at which the Royal Commission has arrived’. It was swiftly 
voted on by the House and defeated by 204 votes to 112.157 In March 1902, a petition was 
sent to Lord George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, by the SSOT, followed up in 
parliament over the course of two days by John Gordon MP, but the government decided to 
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take no action.158 The influence of the anti-opium movement had waned since its heyday in 
the last decade of the nineteenth century, and it could not excite within parliament the level 
of support needed for the passage of a new Resolution. Instead, the transition away from 
opium revenues in India was to be gradually achieved through changes in the economic 
conditions surrounding the substance and political expediency. In this regard, the 
government was to provide hints at the changing economic importance of opium revenue in 
India, almost concurrently with these isolated parliamentary questions on opium reform.  
 
In a debate on the subject of India revenues on the 10th November 1902, Lord George 
Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, noted that, despite the suggestions of the anti-
opium movement to the contrary, Chinese opium consumers had probably always consumed 
more Chinese-grown opium than the Indian imported variety. He stated that opium revenues 
at the peak of their importance in the 1880s accounted for approximately six million pounds 
sterling annually, while by the turn of the twentieth century they were accounting for only 
half of that figure, at around three million pounds a year.159 Later that month he elaborated 
that the average net opium revenue for the years 1900-1902 had been £3,075,084.160 In fact, 
British India Government revenues from opium had been steadily decreasing year by year 
throughout that period, as cultivators, supported by improvements in transportation 
infrastructure, moved to different, more robust crops, and as the twentieth century arrived 
and rolled on, the opium system came under increasing international scrutiny. R. K. Newham 
has noted by way of example that the district of Ghazipur alone, which had had 43, 000 
bighas161 cultivating opium in 1876, had only 23, 000 bighas given over to opium crops by 
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the beginning of the twentieth century. Newham also suggests that the unwillingness of the 
India Government to pass on the price increases to Indian cultivators resultant from 
increasingly unfavourable market forces, which would have drawn criticism from the British 
metropolitan parliament, meant that the government itself eventually absorbed these extra 
costs.162 In the last few years prior to the shift in British opium policy after 1906, and most 
especially from 1903-4, the price of opium was ‘abnormally high’, resulting in particularly 
low revenue receipts for the India Government, which William Brodrick as Secretary of 
State for India made clear to parliament in a mid-1904 debate on the India revenues.163 The 
competition to the comparatively expensive Indian opium in the Chinese market from 
Persian and Turkish imports was also not insubstantial.164 The potency of Indian opium was 
on a par with that of these varieties, while the Chinese domestic variety was comparatively 
weaker, and even on the British domestic market throughout the nineteenth century the 
Turkish and Persian varieties were favoured over the Indian variety, which occupied only a 
small minority share. Although China remained the principal export destination of Indian 
opium, it was increasingly passed over in favour of other cheaper types, principally the 
Chinese variety.165 
 
In the Final Report of the Royal Commission on Opium, it had been stated that a commission 
of inquiry working within the imperial sphere of Britain’s opium system could not, and 
should not, act to influence foreign policy regarding China. The Commissioners had added 
that such action that would require the renegotiation of treaties with China should be 
initiated at the behest of the Chinese government. In addition, the report quoted Sir Nicholas 
Roderick O’Conor, the British Minister in Beijing, as saying that no accommodation could 
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be reached with the Chinese government without a concurrent reduction of the yields of 
Chinese domestic opium cultivation, the Chinese edicts prohibiting opium cultivation in the 
country having largely fallen out of observance. He noted that the quantity of opium grown 
in China had increased significantly throughout the latter decades of the nineteenth century, 
and would certainly swell to fill the supply deficit provided by a cessation of British 
exported opium.166 This was an eventuality, clear to British officials from early in the 
process of the renegotiation of British involvement with opium, which was to come to the 
fore in the upcoming dialogue with the Chinese government that was to take place after 
1906. The 1906 Liberal government was to waste no time in approaching the issue, 
reflecting a resounding continuity in the strength of feeling on the subject, that had also seen 
the “morally indefensible” parliamentary verdict on opium passed in 1895, and re-affirmed 
in May 1906 in the immediate aftermath of the Liberal election victory, but it was to be 
complicated by such issues of bilateral political negotiation. 
 
 
 
The advent of bilateral action on the opium issue 
 
In September 1906 a Chinese Imperial Edict was issued from the Chinese government in 
Beijing stating its intention to eradicate domestic and foreign opium from China within a 
period of ten years.167 The Edict revitalised opium suppression activities in China, which had 
had to be abandoned during the latter decades of the nineteenth century after the legalising of 
imported opium by the terms of the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin, and the Chinese anti-opium 
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movement also began to re-emerge in force, now firmly bolstered by the ascendant trend of 
Chinese nationalism that targeted opium as a source of national shame. The Edict was the 
product of the late-Qing government that had become increasingly reformist after the 
tumultuous events of the Boxer Rebellion,168 and reflected both a renewed commitment to 
officially sanctioned opium suppression in China, and a response to the changing 
circumstances of the British metropolitan government towards a new government with a 
more reformist agenda.169 Coming just four months after the renewal of the May “morally 
indefensible” anti-opium resolution in the British parliament and the Liberal election victory 
of February that year, it reflected a new atmosphere where the stated political positions of 
the two countries had come into alignment on the issue for the first time. The renewed 
official position in favour of opium suppression in China, announced by the Imperial Edict, 
also provided scope for the renegotiation of Sino-British commercial treaties, which the 
British government had intimated during the debates surrounding the Royal Commission on 
Opium could take place following official Chinese overtures on the subject.170 This point 
was also reaffirmed in the Report of the Royal Commission.171 The issuing of the Imperial 
Edict also had the effect of reigniting interest in the subject in parliament. The general 
consensus against Britain’s opium system and the China opium trade still existed in 
parliament, as demonstrated by the reaffirming of the 1891 and 1895 ‘morally indefensible’ 
                                                          
168 For a study of the course of reform adopted by the late-Qing administration by 1906, and its 
intersection with British and American diplomacy and commercial interests in the country, see T. 
Reins, ‘Reform, Nationalism, and Internationalism: The Opium Suppression Movement in China and 
the Anglo-American Influence, 1900-1908’, Modern Asian Studies, 25, 1 (1991), pp. 101-142. 
169 The anti-opium position in China comprised two quite different agendas, at times in competition 
with one another politically. From within the Qing government, a position of imperial reformism 
raised the issue of opium suppression as a means of raising national prestige and forcing the 
renegotiation of the exploitative foreign commercial treaties, while a predominantly extra-
governmental nationalist anti-opium position had been developing in the latter years of the nineteenth 
century, whose ideology viewed opium as the crux of the imperialist penetration of China and the 
source of its decline and national shame, encompassing groups that would also come to challenge the 
Qing Dynasty’s legitimacy. 
170 John Morley, the Secretary of State for India, acknowledged the positive effect of the Edict in 
stimulating renewed discussions between the British and Chinese governments on the issue. See ‘East 
India Revenue Accounts’. HC Deb, 06 June, 1907. Vol. 175, cc. 870-71. 
171 ‘The Royal Commission on Opium’. HC Deb, 10 July, 1893. Vol. 14, cc. 1148-9; Royal 
Commission on Opium, Final Report of the Royal Commission on Opium, pp. 94, 95. See articles 268 
and 273.  
96 
 
motion by successful vote in May 1906, but this consensus had not found a viable political 
outlet since the 1893 Resolution which had led to the Royal Commission.172 In June 1907, 
John Morley, the Secretary of State for India, informed parliament that, following the 
announcement of the Chinese Imperial Edict of September the previous year, the British and 
Chinese governments had been in communication on the issue.173 The Edict interested the 
British government with its inclusion of suppression of Chinese domestic as well as foreign 
opium, and the practicality of the ten year time frame in which reductions were to be made, 
and demonstrated a renewed zeal in China for opium suppression that implied the potential 
workability of a future joint accommodation between the two countries regarding the parallel 
reduction of opium cultivation. Sir John Jordan, the British Minister to China, reassured the 
British Foreign Office as to the sincerity of the Chinese in their efforts, and reflected that, on 
balance, he thought they might well succeed. He noted that ‘there is a great awakening going 
on in this country’, implying the changing of the political conditions surrounding the subject 
in China, and nodding towards the rising tide of Chinese nationalism that would increasingly 
push the issue of opium to the forefront of the Chinese political scene.174 The issue of Indian 
revenue, though, was still a priority for the British government, and the need for parallel 
action from the Chinese government was paramount in the protection of revenues in India, as 
without reductions in Chinese opium cultivation to match any reductions in Indian 
cultivation, it was seen that Chinese-grown opium would simply fill the void left by the 
contraction of the Indian imports. Morley summed up the government’s stance when he 
quipped, in response to the renewed preponderance of the anti-opium slogan ‘righteousness 
before revenue’, that ‘you must not satisfy your own righteousness at the expense of other 
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people's revenue’.175 Broadly, though, John Morley was one of the anti-opium position’s 
chief proponents in the new Liberal administration, and he effectively advanced the issue of 
renegotiation in such a way as to take into account the economic ramifications of reform. 
 
After prolonged negotiations between the British metropolitan, British India, and Chinese 
governments on the prospect of a joint reduction of opium cultivation in India and China, an 
agreement was reached which was to come into force in the form of the Anglo-Chinese Ten 
Year Agreement on the 1st January 1908, just under eighteen months on from the issuing of 
the Chinese Imperial Edict.176 In its simplest terms, the agreement stipulated the joint 
progressive reduction in the levels of opium cultivation in India and China over a period of 
ten years, to run from 1908-1918. By 1908, the British government, despite the protestations 
of some within the British India administration, was on the path towards the reduction and 
replacement of opium cultivation in India. Bilateral negotiations, brought about by the 
revival of opium suppression efforts following the Edict, had succeeded in convincing the 
British government of the workability of such a reform that could take place without 
significantly damaging the imperial revenues of British India.  
 
The 1907 Agreement established vital precedents in joint action between Britain and China, 
and was followed relatively enthusiastically in British India, but its implementation in China 
was to prove somewhat problematic and a significant headache for officials in the British 
India Government, eventually forcing British cooperation and coordination in China itself, in 
the Chinese Treaty Ports and foreign concessions, and in British Hong Kong.177 Eventually 
British frustrations at the difficulty of practicing joint reductions were to be compounded by 
the 1911 Xinhai Revolution in China and the political instability which followed, 
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culminating eventually in the warlord period of the 1910s and 1920s, when reliance on 
opium revenues in various regions of China once more returned to prominence in the 
absence of a strong and unified central government, and in light of the fiscal requirements of 
civil war between the multiple competing political entities that emerged.178 Under these 
circumstances, British government concerns that hasty reforming of the British system of 
opium cultivation in India might unduly and detrimentally impact on the Indian cultivators, 
and on the revenues of the British India government, that had been demonstrated in the 
earlier debates, were to be partially vindicated, but also to become somewhat irrelevant given 
the expansion of opium cultivation in areas outside of the political reach of the Chinese 
republican government. The international movement that began to grow up in earnest by 
1909, though, proved that the British decision to finally take action was the correct course 
after all, and the British position would continue to be moderated, and eventually 
substantially expanded, in the succeeding decades, as the British emerged as a leading force 
in the international regulation of drugs. The 1908 Agreement paved the way for future 
bilateral agreements before the cause of international narcotics control was negotiated under 
the remits of the several international opium conferences that were to take place between the 
years 1909 and 1914, and then enshrined within the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. 
 
The 1907 Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement reflected the significant continuities which 
informed the Liberal government of 1906 and its populist “new liberalism”. In reality, this 
new liberalism held at its heart many of the same ideological commitments as the 
Gladstonian liberalism that had preceded it, including a central support for the principles of 
morality and justice in foreign policy, and a sympathetic view towards the need for imperial 
reformism. Michelle Tusan has argued that the development of a humanitarian element in the 
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discourses of liberal thought during the Gladstonian epoch allowed for the ‘articulation of a 
vision of a moral and just British Empire’. The true value of this, in addition to providing a 
demonstration of the core ideological principles of the party, can be seen in the effective 
utilisation of Gladstone’s Bulgarian Horrors pamphlet, and subsequent political speeches, to 
raise public awareness on the issue, and to generate politically legitimising moral capital and 
support.179 The path towards the 1907 agreement was set out upon almost immediately upon 
the new administration taking office, demonstrating the strength of the government’s 
commitment on the issue and the prevailing influence of the anti-opium movement, its views 
on China and the empire in India, and the global reach of its reformist agenda. The course of 
reform that would proceed with this bilateral approach to opium reform, and which would be 
presided over by John Morley and Earl Grey in particular, was carefully introduced 
alongside a pragmatic consideration of the economic conditions, both in relation to Indian 
agriculture and the British India revenues, attendant on successful and sustainable reform. 
By 1906 the rejuvenated zeal of the Chinese government for opium suppression, coupled 
with its burgeoning popularity among the Chinese population, helped accelerate the process 
of negotiation and reduction in India. The nuances of the joint approach begun in January 
1908, which took into account the need to preserve Indian revenues during the process of the 
reduction of opium exports, presented the British India government with a suitable way out 
of its overreliance on opium revenues, which were increasingly regarded as unsustainable 
and even unpredictable, and which might also pacify the anti-opium movement in Britain. 
The time frame provided by the ten year agreement allowed the British India Government 
the opportunity to readjust its budget without severely jeopardising revenues or the interests 
of Indian farmers, which remained a British priority throughout the process of the 
agreement’s implementation.180 The British government was therefore already on the path of 
reforming its opium system and its part in the India-China opium trade before the advent of 
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the internationalisation of the movement to control opium and other drugs, which was to 
crystallise a year later, with the first international meeting in the form of the Shanghai 
Opium Commission of 1909. 
 
The failure of the Royal Commission on Opium illustrated that the British anti-opium 
movement, though determined, vocal, and increasingly resonating in parliamentary circles by 
the end of the nineteenth century, could not hope to achieve its aims in a political mode that 
presupposed unilateral action on the part of the British government in enacting self-reform. 
Domestic activism, no matter how strong its networks, was not going to be enough to force 
change. The Report of the Royal Commission, and British officials in the lead up to the 
commission, had made clear the unwillingness of the British government to consider an 
abandonment of revenue or an undue application of prohibition of Indian farmers without the 
existence of adequate protections. In the view of the government, such protections of 
imperial revenue and the livelihoods of cultivators could only be afforded by the securing of 
action by bilateral agreement with China. This was confirmed by the eventual adoption of 
the 1907 Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement, with its ten year timeframe, after much 
negotiation following the 1906 Imperial Edict reviving Chinese opium suppression. Such a 
timeframe was seen as necessary for the gradual implementation of changes to the make up 
of the British India revenues and agricultural system so as to minimise the potential for 
economic, social and political disruption. The bilateral action between the British and 
Chinese governments encouraged further international involvement that the United States 
was also eager to expand upon, following on from its own foray into opium policy review in 
the Philippine Commission of 1903-5, in which the United States decided to implement a 
policy of gradual suppression in its new colonial possession. The joint Anglo-Chinese action 
from 1908 provided both an impetus to, and venue for, the international deliberations on the 
future of narcotics controls which were to begin the following year with the 1909 Shanghai 
Opium Commission.  
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Chapter Three 
Empire, trade and diplomacy in China: The United States’ Open Door Policy shift and 
the challenge to British pre-eminence 
 
The move towards bilateral renegotiation of British opium policy was closely followed by an 
American led initiative to expand the scope of opium regulation into the sphere of 
international politics, a policy which had been developing for several years among key 
personnel in the American colonial government of the Philippines and in the United States 
State Department. The United States had become an Asia-Pacific imperial power in its own 
right following its victory in the Spanish-American War in 1898, and had developed its own 
distinct opium policy, centred on the tenets of regulation and suppression, within its new 
colonial territory of the Philippines, a position that enabled a moral aspect of the American 
colonial presence to be stressed and provided for a higher degree of American domestic 
palatability for the colonial possession in a country historically suspicious of overseas 
empire. Following the conclusion of the Philippine Commission in 1905, established to 
investigate the territory and formulate plans for effective future governance, the discourses 
surrounding American policy were increasingly directed towards those of the pursuit of a 
moral imperialism, to the eking of moral capital, and thereby colonial legitimisation, from 
American imperialism. In this respect, the objectives of the policy approach were not entirely 
dissimilar to those at the heart of the anti-opium position in the British political sphere, with 
its championing of moral politics in foreign policy and moralising view of imperial reform. 
This cultural and ideological position on the issue was largely inherited by the reformist 
British Liberal government from 1906, encompassing many continuities in support for the 
position, but the political approach to reform taken by the two countries’ governments after 
1906 would cause a short period of fairly significant Anglo-American friction over the issue. 
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The approach to regulation developed by the United States, and its evangelical aspect in the 
international applications of the position, crossed over into American foreign policy in 
China, where it mirrored the nation’s commercial positions, as developed through the 
American Open Door Policy (from 1899) and Dollar Diplomacy (1909-1913. This economic 
approach to foreign policy in China, which aimed at expanding the American commercial 
operations outside of a reliance merely on the treaty ports, and to challenge the hegemony of 
other countries in China (particularly Britain), contrasted with the positions of the other 
imperial powers. The United States applied pressure on the imperial powers to converge with 
its position in China, and this would increasingly come to cover the sphere of opium policy, 
as American officials at the State Department began to push for the organising of 
commissions and conferences of international arbitration on the issue. This became 
particularly pronounced with the beginning of the presidency of William Howard Taft in 
1909, who had been the first colonial Governor General of the Philippines from the 
establishment of the American colonial government in 1901, and who had presided over the 
Philippine Commission, when American opium policy had first been developed. Taft 
proceeded from a position of close experience of the opium issue, and the preference for its 
regulation, from his time as colonial governor. He was a legalist and proponent of 
international law as a framework for diplomacy and international relations, and this was 
reflected both in his push for commercial cooperation and equality of opportunity in China, 
and for his orchestration of the legalising of the movement for the regulation of drugs on the 
international stage, positions he supported whilst colonial governor, and which he 
increasingly realised in his first years as President of the United States after 1909. This 
approach would culminate in the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909, which first 
broached the issue in a multilateral international setting, and laid the foundations which 
would lead to the much more successful Hague Opium Conferences of 1911, 1913, and 
1914, which produced conventionalised agreements under the jurisdiction of international 
law. This move towards an internationalisation of the issue also reflected the focus of the 
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Taft Presidency on the paramountcy of international law, a prioritisation which is also 
reflected by the administration’s approach to pursuing the Taft Arbitration Treaties, 
negotiated with Britain and France in 1911, an attempt to move towards the ‘legalising of 
international relations’ through a new form of internationalist, legalist, and cooperative 
diplomacy.181  
 
The concentration of this international political and economic action within the context of 
foreign policy in China involved a significant imperial entanglement between imperial 
powers at odds over their respective foreign policies in the region, and seeking to challenge 
the position of British pre-eminence. As such, American initiatives were fiercely resisted by 
Britain in these early years of the international movement for reform, as British 
administrators mediated between the competing political impulses of bilateral opium reform, 
the notion of imperial autonomy, and the complicated geopolitical situation in East Asia. 
Though these early American international proposals encountered resistance, they laid the 
groundwork for later initiatives, which built upon an underlying current of the convergence 
of geopolitical priorities, and a general warming of  relations, between the United States and 
Britain. The dynamics of this developing Anglo-American entente, with its attendant 
imperial entanglement, also formed the backdrop to the increasing problematising of Anglo-
Japanese relations, as priorities and positions regarding regional commerce, and drugs in 
particular, diverged to become increasingly at odds, first during the course of the 1909 
Commission and then later as Britain began to adopt a position of leadership within the 
burgeoning international movement for the regulation of the traffic in drugs into the 1920s. 
This chapter examines the currents of these political and economic policy developments in 
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China, and their impacts on the course of British opium policy within the context of the 
developing imperial dynamics in the region. 
 
Throughout the latter decades of the nineteenth century, British commercial policy in East 
Asia had operated under the guiding principle of free trade, and trade with China was 
governed by the terms of several consecutive commercial treaties, the first of which had been 
signed in the aftermath of the First Opium War. Despite insisting upon the presence of a 
“most favoured nation” clause in all such agreements, and with the exception of a few 
coordinated actions in China such as the international response to the Boxer movement in 
1901, Britain operated independently in its commercial dealings, insisting on complete 
autonomy in the direction of British policy; debates over the direction of policy took place 
between different branches of the British government and imperial establishment, and were 
intra-imperial in nature. British imperial policy in India, too, was largely autonomous, 
though it was also affected by directives issued by the British metropolitan government. By 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the existing agricultural system in India, with opium 
cultivation comprising a not insignificant element of the agricultural produce and associated 
government revenue from taxation, and the commercial trade of the opium commodity to 
China, were both beginning to undergo reforms. As discussed in chapter two, these reforms 
would culminate in the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement of 1907, a measure which both 
established a clear British position and firm line to be followed in the direction of British 
policy, and also conversely opened up the potentiality for further reform, which would come 
to fruition with the genesis of an international campaign to discuss the regulation of opium 
and other drugs, led by the United States. These reforms, along with the later agreements 
reached in the international sphere, with regards to the key imperial and commercial issue of 
opium, would lead to a gradual, eventual, surrender of absolute autonomy by Britain in the 
years shortly before the outbreak of the First World War, as global regulation of the trade in 
drugs was discussed and introduced by international agreement.  
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This chapter traces that diplomatic transition, and locates much of the formative processes of 
the growing international drugs regulation movement, and with it Britain’s strong resistance 
to change, but gradual relinquishing of its sole right to policy autonomy, within the nascent 
international movement at arbitration of the issue of the regulation of opium and other drugs. 
It was only after a period of significant tension and controversy between Britain and the 
United States, with China at times also being a focus of diplomatic discord, that the path 
towards cooperation could begin to be successfully negotiated. This process, and with it the 
gradual convergence of interests which underlined its trajectory, was to bring about the 
facilitation of serious international cooperation on the issue of drugs regulation. It was by 
1912 that events would begin to bring British priorities and interests into a degree of 
convergence with those of the United States, reflected both by the transition of British policy 
to a position more in line with American initiatives, and in part because of the process of 
these international negotiations and the underlying imperial and commercial issues which 
acted upon the main powers involved in the discussions. American pressure on British 
policymakers was a key factor in acceleration and diversifying the British strategy of reform 
that had already been decided upon by the 1907 agreement, discussed in chapter two, and the 
United States’ position increasingly offered the British government an effective route 
towards achieving a discursive legitimisation of its imperial and commercial relationships 
with opium through the international reform movement. This transitional process, with its 
initial period of fractious resistance and conflict, and eventual convergence, that was 
beginning to transpire by the time of the 1912 Hague Opium Convention, had its roots a 
decade earlier. The British Royal Commission on Opium of 1895, with its deeply 
conservative recommendations, set out a policy of the maintenance of the status quo, 
whereas the United States’ Philippine Commission of 1905 recommended a complete end to 
the toleration of an opium economy in the colony and the gradual suppression of opium 
consumption. While the differences in priorities set out by these two imperial commissions 
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was stark, the debate and arbitration process that they would lead to would come to lay the 
foundations, and the international regulatory vehicle, for an eventual coming together of 
interests.  
 
Anglo-American relations in historical perspective: Issues of opium and empire 
 
A topic of central importance to the development of British politics and global policymaking 
into the twentieth century is that of Britain’s changing relationship with the United States, 
which greatly influenced both British foreign policy and imperial policy in the first three 
decades of the twentieth century. The trajectory of this relationship would continue to define 
British foreign policy, and influence Britain’s imperial development and eventual relative 
decline, throughout the remainder of the century. From its beginnings as an independent 
nation in the events of the American Revolution, the United States was to become a strong 
economic and imperial rival to Britain over the course of the nineteenth century. The 
transition from this state of affairs towards alliance, and by the mid-twentieth century what 
has often popularly been termed the “special relationship” following the Second World War 
and throughout the Cold War years, was by no means inevitable. Less likely still, perhaps, 
had been the move towards economic and military cooperation during the First World War. 
Following the Revolutionary War of 1775-83, the two countries went to war again in 1812, 
and relations continued to be at best frosty for much of the rest of the nineteenth century. In 
the latter half of the nineteenth century, with the growing imperial ambitions of the United 
States and its increasing assertiveness on the international stage, the country moved into a 
position of imperial rivalry with Britain, most notably in South America and in East Asia. 
With the increasing prosecution and realisation of the ideals of manifest destiny, the United 
States expanded from a regional coastal power in North America to a continent-spanning 
entity, and then an overseas empire, with a commercially and culturally expansionist agenda.  
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With the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, whereby the United States 
government under President James Monroe declared an end to American toleration of 
European nations pursuing colonial projects or installing puppet regimes on the American 
continent, American imperial intentions and designs for its diplomatic and commercial 
influence on the Americas marked a turning point in its inexorable rise to great power status, 
and posed a clear challenge to the existing British informal imperial-commercial dominance 
in much of the South American continent that would reach its peak with the Venezuela 
border crisis of 1895. These events were occurring within the wider global imperial context 
of the Scramble for Africa and the increasingly virulent competition for concessions in 
China, in which the European imperial powers, with the addition of the United States and 
Japan in China, competed for commercial and diplomatic supremacy and the establishment 
and protection of spheres of influence. Meanwhile, events in East Asia, and China in 
particular, were also following a course of imperial rivalry and the intersection of 
commercial and political interests, which were at least in part inseparable for Britain in the 
region given its vast imperial commerce and the interconnectedness of its system of colonial 
production and export, of which the opium trade formed a part, that would also result in a 
period of increased tension and rivalry between the two powers beginning in the latter years 
of the nineteenth century. 
 
These imperial tensions that had built during the nineteenth century would remain, reaching 
a crescendo in several points of crisis, first over the issue of commercial and diplomatic 
influence in Venezuela and the wider implications for the British position in South America, 
and also increasingly over the British commercial position in China. Charles Campbell has 
argued that, despite tensions during the American Civil War and during events in Venezuela 
in the 1890s, by the end of the 19th century the road towards an Anglo-American 
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rapprochement was clear and was being progressively traversed. In light of the British 
position during the Spanish-American War, elements of shared heritage, economic 
cooperation, late-19th century democratisation in the British political system, a decline in 
strength of Irish American anti-British feeling, and views on Anglo-Saxon race, Campbell 
contends, ‘at the end of the century Anglo-American friendship had replaced the long years 
of hostility’.182 Despite this, though, there was an increasingly concerted American challenge 
to the British commercial status quo in Asia, relating particularly to the issue of the opium 
trade, which focussed on the legitimacy of the cultivation of opium in India and its trade to 
China, which emerged over the course of the first two decades of the twentieth century. This 
relative high point in imperial tensions between the two countries occurred following the 
establishment of the United States as a regional colonial power in its own right with its 
acquisition of the Philippines as a colonial territory in 1898, following the conclusion of the 
Spanish-American War. Indeed, tensions and rivalries which had been building throughout 
the nineteenth century remained for much of the twentieth century, revolving around 
imperial, commercial, and foreign policy rivalries and concerns. These Anglo-American 
tensions in China grew and became interspersed with wider imperial rivalries from about 
1909 onwards, as Japan was recognised as becoming increasingly involved in the imperial 
commerce of the region, in a narcotics trade of its own in the north of China, and was 
increasingly regarded as a serious global contender and potential imperial rival by the 
western powers.183 The issue of opium was one bound up throughout these critical areas of 
British and American policy in East Asia, and was particularly central to the two countries’ 
foreign and imperial policymaking in the region during the late-nineteenth and twentieth 
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centuries. A discussion of the development of these Anglo-American tensions, how they 
became transmuted and complicated over time and in light of the course of international 
arbitration and mediation in the series of early-twentieth century narcotics conference 
programmes, and the intricacies of how they developed in light of the growing Japanese 
imperial involvement in the region, forms the basis of this section of the thesis. It would be 
too simplistic simply to characterise Anglo-American relations in the early-twentieth century 
as consisting solely of increasing amity and cooperation, and there were significant imperial 
interests, not to mention commercial and diplomatic agendas, at stake for both countries in 
future political and commercial developments in East Asia. 
 
Despite this though, the period between the years 1898 and 1914 is generally characterised 
as one of unprecedented rapprochement in Anglo-American relations. The transition towards 
increased cooperation and eventual wartime alliance by 1917, considering the serious clashes 
of British and American interests in imperial and commercial policy at precisely the same 
time, is all the more incredible, and is testament perhaps to the very strength of the other 
geopolitical challenges facing the two countries. Acknowledging this shift in diplomacy and 
foreign policy towards alliance, however, should not detract from the significant stumbling 
block and complicating factor that the issue of the British opium system, and India-China 
opium trade, and its importance to wider British imperial priorities, indicative also of serious 
intra-imperial departmental divisions at the very heart of the structure of British rule, 
nonetheless remained during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Indeed, the issue 
of opium posed a not insignificant obstacle to closer ties and international cooperation. Over 
the course of the international opium conferences of the 1910s and 1920s, these imperial 
rivalries were transcended by the emergence and recognition of new geopolitical 
circumstances, focussing on the changing balance of power in East Asia, the relative 
imperial growth of Japan, and the pursuit and increasing realisation of the internationalist 
agenda at the heart of the conferences. This internationalist agenda provided significant 
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benefits in the form of furnishing political capital for legitimising discourses of moral and 
just empire, effectively confirming the nominal ideological tenets of the liberal imperialism 
and “moral politics” that had informed the foreign and imperial policy of the British Liberal 
Party since the days of Gladstone’s governments (though not always being realised), and 
allowing for the conceptual differentiation of British and American “benign” imperialisms 
from the old exploitative ones, and from the emerging Japanese expansionist project in the 
East Asia region. The move towards closer ties with the United States was not an inevitable 
one, and it was one which was seriously jeopardised at several points in the late-nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries by disputes and tensions over the issue of opium cultivation in 
British India, and the opium trade to China and South-East Asia, but it was an important 
convergence that would provide real benefits to British foreign policy, and allow for the 
demonstration of Liberal commitments in international affairs by the reformist Liberal 
government of 1906 and its successors, who would continue to form governments in one 
form or another until 1918. The international arbitrations on the issue, organised largely 
under the auspices of American State Department planners, provided both a focal point of 
significant tension and, eventually, a route towards increased international cooperation and a 
transitional direction for British opium policy. 
 
American merchants had been involved in opium trading in East Asia in the early decades of 
the nineteenth century, with many of the major American trading companies dealing in the 
substance. Operating a parallel private trade alongside established British trading networks, 
as well as at times under the protection of British trading companies including the British 
Levant Company and East India Company, American firms plied the seaborne commerce in 
opium exports from British India, as well as from Turkish ports such as Smyrna, linking 
these to American mercantile markets in China as part of the China trade under the Canton 
System. Perhaps the most notable of the American firms dealing in the opium trade was 
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Russel and Company, a large American China trading concern.184 This early opium trade was 
encapsulated in, and permeated through, the wider American involvement in China prior to 
the ending of the Canton System and the subsequent first formal commercial treaties with the 
country after the events of the First Opium War, and American commercial interests, as well 
as the burgeoning missionary presence, were also bound up in these early networks of opium 
commerce.185 By mid-century, though, the United States government had distanced itself 
from the opium trade, and eventually forbade its citizens from participating in it. This policy, 
as a meaningful measure with long-term significance, began in Japan with the advent of 
American commercial relations there. The American naval officer Commodore Matthew 
Perry was sent on a mission to Japan to open the country’s markets to American trade 
interests and to establish commercial and diplomatic relations in 1853, with a fleet of modern 
battleships, his “black ships”. In the period which followed Perry’s arrival in Japan, the 
United States government had taken the decision, at the strong request of the Japanese 
government, not to allow opium imports to the country during the early commercial 
negotiations between the two nations, in the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Amity in 
1854. The treaty stipulated that Japan would open five ports to American vessels, in addition 
to the port of Nagasaki, which had previously been the sole site of a limited foreign trade 
carried on with Chinese and Dutch representatives on Dejima Island, and would allow for the 
establishment of an American Consul at a Legation in Edo (Tokyo). Perry and the Japanese 
representatives agreed to forestall the negotiation of specific commercial arrangements for a 
time, pending further negotiations. The shadow of the Opium War of 1839-41, fought 
between Britain and China, hung heavily over proceedings, and would continue to do so. 
With the humiliation of the latter country and its subsequent loss of sovereignty in the 
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opening of extraterritorial treaty ports, and tariff autonomy in the conducting of commerce in 
these sites, an example was offered to the Japanese of what to avoid in dealing with 
expansionist western imperial powers.  
 
The first American Consul following the provisions of the Convention of Kanagawa and the 
Treaty of Peace and Amity, Townsend Harris, arrived in Japan in 1856, and immediately 
began efforts to negotiate a formal commercial treaty. Using the example of events in China, 
and the promise of the United States forbidding opium imports to Japan as leverage, Harris 
negotiated the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in July 1858. It was suggested by Harris that 
by agreeing to such terms, and opening Japanese ports to American trade, the British would 
also follow in being bound by them, with particular reference to the exclusion of opium from 
the country, and that thereby Japan would not suffer the same fate as China had to what was 
widely perceived to be the rapacious hunger of the British imperial commercial machine.186 
Indeed, as the first country to establish formal commercial relations with Japan, the 
American agreement set the precedent for western nations signing commercial treaties with 
Japan. This was in stark contrast to the British “opening” of China to western trade, which 
has often been regarded as aggressive expansion of British free trade interests, and has been 
seen by some as an action in defence of the British opium trade.187 This contrast illustrated a 
difference in approach between the American and British regimes, both favouring free trade 
arrangements, but with the British government also having to cater to its wider imperial 
interests, important among which was the need to support and enable the export of the 
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significant agricultural produce of opium in British India. The American precedent in Japan 
was not popular with British officials, and posed a barrier to the expansion of British 
imperial commerce in the country. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi characterises Harris’s offer of 
forbidding opium imports to Japan as coercive, a veiled threat in order to extract the desired 
commercial concessions, but there was a historical precedent for proscription of opium 
trading in American commercial policy in the region.188 The American representatives in 
China had agreed to ban American citizens from participating in the opium trade, in large 
part due to the domestic pressures of public opinion in the United States, in their first 
commercial treaty with China, the Wangxia Treaty of 1844. This was largely an empty 
concession in practice, however, as the treaty included a clause granting Americans 
extraterritoriality in China, preventing any eventuality of American citizens being tried by 
Chinese courts for the offense, and the impracticability of this concession was further 
demonstrated by the American government’s decision to grant consular status to the trading 
firm Russell & Company, the principle American traders in opium.189 Russell & Company 
were an American commercial firm, formed in 1824, that plied the Canton trade, and had 
traded in opium since the inception of the company. By the 1830s, they held a virtual 
monopoly over American commercial opium trading. They bowed out of the opium trade in 
1839, under strong pressure from the Chinese Viceroy Lin Zexu who had been appointed to 
suppress the trade in opium in China, but this pressure was relieved by the resounding 
British victory in the First Opium War that followed these events.190 The American 
assurances in the Treaty of Wangxia of 1844 were effectively nullified by the signing of the 
British Treaty of Tianjin in June 1858, following the conclusion of the Second Opium War, 
in which the trade in opium was legalised in China. Therefore, although American 
administrations had at several times during the nineteenth century demonstrated attempts at a 
principled rejection of the legitimacy of the opium trade in East Asia, these instances were 
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each weakened by the presence of competing ulterior motives and nullifying wider 
circumstances, and were perhaps intended as much to set the United States off against the 
rival British presence in the region, presenting itself in a more favourable light, as to show 
any concrete opposition to opium trading. Indeed, this is precisely how future American 
State Department officials would characterise the United States’ government’s prevailing 
position regarding the opium trade, setting the historical American approach off against that 
pursued by the British government. At the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909, Hamilton 
Wright, the head of the United States delegation, would cite the history of the American 
approach as evidence of a long-standing historical commitment to opium regulation and 
legitimate commerce in the region.191 In reality though, this was something of a myth given 
the aforementioned weaknesses of this approach in China under the real terms of the 
commercial treaties and the informal imperial environment in the Chinese treaty ports, but 
the principled nature of this historical position continued to influence the United States’ 
approach to the international trade in drugs, and to capture the imagination of American 
policymakers. 
 
The background to Anglo-American opium tensions: Commerce, colonialism, and the 
genesis of an organised American approach to global drugs regulation 
 
The United States’ contact with widespread opium consumption in one of its own territories 
was first established with its colonial acquisition of the Philippines in the aftermath of the 
Spanish-American War in 1898, where opium was widely consumed amongst the Chinese 
community. The United States State Department was charged with carrying out a survey and 
report on the status of opium consumption in the Philippines, and on the desirability and 
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relative merits of regulation or toleration as the basis of the future colonial policy. This 
survey became a part of the wider fact-finding mission and policymaking exercise of the 
Philippine Commission, and was carried out from 1902-5 under the supervision of Charles 
Henry Brent, the American Episcopal Bishop of Manilla, under the supervision until 1903 of 
the colonial Governor General, and future President of the United States, William Howard 
Taft. This initial state contact with opium spawned both an appraisal of opium consumption 
and the narcotics economy in this particular colonial context, and a more pervasive political 
and social survey of the position of narcotics in American society.192 This also encompassed 
a widespread, though by today’s standards perhaps somewhat unsophisticated, drugs census 
within American domestic society at the state level, and within the United States prison 
system.193 In the final report of the Philippine Commission, Brent and his colleagues, with 
Taft’s gubernatorial support, concluded that opium should be tightly controlled and slowly 
phased out in the colony, and this verdict came to define the American colonial approach to 
opium consumption, as well as to influence American drug policy more broadly.194 A policy 
of gradual suppression was thereafter adopted in the Philippines, while the major alternative 
of a system of taxation and revenue generation was rejected.  
 
It was upon the completion of this process that Brent was to urge for a joint commission on 
the issue of opium in the Far East, to include all other regional colonial powers. His 
experiences in the Philippine Commission enthused him, along with his views on opium 
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consumption, with a desire to spread the American colonial (and nascent domestic) efforts at 
drug control to the wider regional and global arenas. Brent’s approach can be characterised 
as evangelical, perhaps unsurprising considering his position as the Episcopal Bishop of 
Manila, and his enthusiasm helped spur a new interest in opium and the consumption of 
drugs within the State Department of the United States. It was Brent’s opinion that only 
through concerted international action could the issue of opium consumption be adequately 
addressed, and he broached the idea of international cooperation on the issue as a means of 
achieving a meaningful and peaceful solution. In July 1906, in the context of the British 
bilateral negotiations with the Chinese government discussed in the previous chapter, he 
wrote to President Theodore Roosevelt that: 
 
…My experience on the Philippine opium investigating committee leads me to 
believe that the problem is of sufficient merit to warrant an endeavour to secure 
international action. From the earliest days of our international relations with the 
East the course of the United States of America has been so manifestly high in 
relation to the traffic in opium that it seems to me almost our duty, now we have the 
responsibility of actually handling the matter in our own possessions, to promote 
some movement that would gather in its embrace representatives from all countries 
where the traffic in and use of opium is a matter of moment.195 
 
With regards to the necessity of a coherent international approach to the issue, he followed 
that: 
 
Why could we not hope to have an investigation on the basis of science as well as of 
practical observation of actual conditions, in which England, France, Holland, 
China, and Japan should take part with ourselves? The sole hope for the Chinese is 
in concerted action. As a side issue, but as a consideration that would in my mind 
enhance the value of the movement, it would tend to unify in some measure nations 
that are oriental either by nature or through the possession of dependencies in the 
Orient. Nothing tends to promote peace more than a common aim.196 
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President Roosevelt approved of the notion. Roosevelt was a pioneer of the new American 
liberal imperialism, a modernist who ridiculed the isolationist position and stressed the need 
for the country to think globally, and the first major American political figure to advocate for 
an ambitious expansion of the American position into the realm of international politics.197 
Roosevelt’s successor as President from 1909, William Howard Taft brought his experience 
of opium policy, and the United States’ foreign policy agenda in East Asia, from his time as 
Governor General of the Philippines, and directed a firm American commitment to the 
notion of international action on the opium issue in China. The United States Government 
unsurprisingly took up Brent’s call, and together with representatives from the United States, 
Austria-Hungary, China, France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Persia, 
Portugal, Russia and Siam, formed the first International Opium Commission held at 
Shanghai in February 1909.198 Following the Chinese Imperial Edict of September 1906, 
which announced the intention of the Chinese government to eradicate domestic and foreign 
opium from China within a period of ten years and which encouraged renewed opium 
suppression activities, the United States government had been in communication with the 
British government and others regarding the proposal to organise an International 
Commission on the subject of opium, and in June 1907 John Morley, the British Secretary of 
State for India announced in the British House of Commons the support of the British 
government for such a proposition.199 Less amenable, though, were the Colonial Office and 
India Office, and this international approach also raised potential conflicts with the existing 
recent British bilateral negotiations with China, which has been discussed in chapter two.200 
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In this respect, amenability and practicability were two different things for the British, as a 
potential international agreement would have to fit with British imperial interests, and not 
merely with those of the domestic government.  
 
The colonial contact with opium consumption in the Philippines also prompted a new 
trajectory in American foreign policy. It was American opium officials who were to 
spearhead the first major international conference focusing on the issue of opium and other 
narcotic drugs, the issues at stake in their consumption, and the topic of the legitimacy and 
status of the international trade in opium. This action, encouraged by the findings of the 
Philippine Commission, coalesced with the organising of the 1909 Shanghai Opium 
Commission, which was attended by thirteen nations,201 and presided over by Charles Henry 
Brent, who acted as President of the commission. It was largely the product of the 
enthusiasm of Brent and of Hamilton Wright at the United States State Department, but also 
reflected the expanding remits of the American position, and its increasing ambition to affect 
change in the sphere of international politics and the dynamics of the imperial powers in 
China. The American involvement, and leadership in encouraging the convening of the 
commission, was significant, and marked what represented a new era in the sphere of 
international politics, centred on the issue of the international arbitration and deliberation 
regarding drugs policy. Indeed, it was one of the first major modern international 
conferences of its kind, and would come to define a new, though still limited, internationalist 
approach to global politics that was beginning to emerge in the early twentieth century, a 
precursor to both the increasing internationalist arbitration efforts in the 1910s and to the 
League of Nations that would come to define the international political arbitration of the 
interwar years. Its use of the format of the “commission”, though, rather than that of the 
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“conference”, reflected the recommendatory level of its status, and its non-binding position 
in international law, reflecting also the non-committal attitude towards the proceedings and 
the prospects of reform adopted by many of the attending nations’ delegates, including 
Britain’s.202 
 
The role of the personal commitment to international narcotics control of Hamilton Wright 
should not be understated, and he saw himself very much as continuing the legacy of the 
British anti-opium movement that had been active in British social networks and political 
forums between 1875 and 1895, much of the impetus of which was curtailed by the failure of 
the 1895 Report of the Royal Commission on Opium to recommend any meaningful changes 
to the British opium system in India. But in their renewed vigour for reform, including on the 
opium issue from 1906-7, Wright would have recognised the continuities and ideological 
commitments of the British anti-opium movement within his opposite numbers in the British 
Liberal administration. He was appointed as the United States’ Opium Commissioner in 
1908, and pursued an anti-opium and drugs regulation line in American foreign policy. 
Wright referred to ‘the new movement against opium’ that he envisioned in the international 
sphere, and that he already credited with the forming of the international Shanghai Opium 
Commission of 1909.203  
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Wright suggested for the British anti-opium movement of the late nineteenth century an 
international dimension that critical study of the movement itself has failed to uncover; the 
British anti-opium movement had clearly stated commitments to enforcing moral politics in 
the sphere of British foreign policy, but its operational anachronisms limited it to a domestic, 
and socially elitist, approach to achieving reform by influencing elite centres of opinion in 
Britain, an approach which precluded any serious efforts at achieving a meaningful 
transnational approach. Indeed, Wright overstates somewhat the role and aims of the British 
movement, which was not particularly moved into action by the prospects of international 
cooperation, and for the most part relied on the extension of its interests and dissemination of 
its arguments through traditional elite social networks, which were limited to the locations of 
British domestic and imperial space. For the British anti-opium movement, Britain was a 
responsible global actor, an imperial power with a duty of care to its colonial subjects in 
India, and a commitment to fostering moral agricultural and commercial trading practices 
within its imperial orbit, its ideological commitment to Gladstonian liberalism entailed a 
support for moral politics in the realm of foreign policy, but in the movement’s 
understanding, the means for achieving this were internal, and based on British 
parliamentary action. For the anti-opium movement, the Chinese people were victims of an 
immoral commercial relationship, supplied by a dubious imperial agricultural policy in 
British India, and suppression in China would rely on British unilateral action in India to 
bring an end to the British involvement in the trade. The Chinese anti-opium movement, far 
more societally wide-reaching and influential in China than the British movement had been 
in the United Kingdom, achieved a good deal of impact in Chinese society, building upon 
and fostering strong national narratives of moral and cultural decline, and of imperial 
subjugation by the late-nineteenth century. A parallel movement existed in the late-Qing 
imperial administration, partly a reflection of its commitment to continued efforts at imperial 
reform following the disastrous events of the Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the century, and 
partly also, no doubt, as a response to the increasing fervour of the nationalist position 
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against opium in China, and this position was evidenced by the renewed governmental 
commitment to opium suppression made in the Imperial Edict of 1906. The Chinese anti-
opium movement encountered a degree of discursive cooperation with western missionaries 
in the country, but this did not equate to cooperation in the nascent national project which 
was at the forefront of the Chinese anti-opium movement, and did not carry with it any 
significant degree of transfer to the British or American metropolitan centres.204 Both of 
these anti-opium movements had been predominantly national affairs, and had not achieved, 
or even pursued, any significant degree of transnational contact or cooperation. Indeed, Brent 
and Taft’s fact-finding mission in the course of the Philippine Commission represented one 
of the few cases of official government agents of a western nation making contact with 
Chinese imperial reformers within the Qing administration, and nationalists throughout the 
country, within the anti-opium movement.205 This is perhaps because the different anti-
opium movements in these countries proceeded with significantly distinct and contrasting 
motives and from differing national and cultural contexts, as has been explored in previous 
chapters. Hamilton Wright tended to ignore the details and historical contexts of these 
movements, and saw the United States’ own project of international arbitration as a logical, 
even organisational, continuation of these dislocated national contexts of anti-opium 
agitation. 
 
From the Philippine Commission to the Shanghai Opium Commission: The transition 
towards an international approach to the debate over imperial drugs policy 
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As has been discussed, major differences in the British and American imperial drugs policies 
had begun to emerge after the United States’ acquisition of the Philippines colony in 1898, 
and in particular after 1905 when the United States’ Philippine Commission had come out 
sharply in opposition to the toleration of an opium economy in the new American colonial 
acquisition. As early as 1906, Brent had pushed for what he viewed as the logical evolution 
of this policy on to the international stage. On this subject, Brent wrote to then United States 
President Theodore Roosevelt, and his proposition was well-received. With the President’s 
backing, Brent and others began making plans for the organising of a prospective 
international meeting to discuss the subject of opium and its connected issues of cultivation, 
trade, and consumption.206 In response to the increasing likelihood of the initiative meeting 
with a favourable reception from the key powers whose attendance was being sought, 
principally Britain, Japan and China, but also other important global powers and nations 
connected to opium, the United States appointed an opium commission with three key 
members, whose responsibility it was to coordinate the American policy and approach to 
negotiations, and to represent the United States at any future international meetings. These 
representatives included the now experienced Charles Henry Brent and Hamilton Wright, 
and a Secretary to the American Legation in Beijing and former China missionary named 
Charles Tenney.207 Their efforts in bringing together international representatives from key 
world powers to discuss opium and its associated issues culminated in the organising of the 
International Opium Commission of 1909, held in Shanghai. These developments in the 
international sphere of the opium issue would lead to a direct, if muted, confrontation 
between the American and British positions regarding opium, increasingly at odds with one 
another, with the events of the commission.  
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The British delegation consisted of seven individuals with experience in China and in the 
politics, commerce and diplomacy in the region. With the exception of the Chinese 
delegation, in whose country the commission was to take place, the British was the largest of 
the delegations to the commission, reflecting both the importance that the Foreign Office 
attached to prosecuting and defending British policy at the commission, and the scale and 
nature of the British position in China. The British delegation was led by its Chief 
Commissioner, Sir Cecil Clementi Smith, an experienced civil servant, senior colonial 
administrator in the Straits Settlements and Malaya, and sometime scholar of China. 
Clementi Smith had previously held positions as the Governor of the Straits Settlements, and 
later as High Commissioner of Malaya until 1893. The delegation also included another 
senior figure in the form of Sir Alexander Hosie, the British Consul General in China. The 
India Government was also represented among the British delegation by James Bennett 
Brunyate, who was Acting Financial Secretary to the Government of India. Brunyate’s 
inclusion on the delegation comprised a barely disguised indication of the importance still 
attached to the position of opium in the British India Government’s revenues. For Britain, 
the commission was to be as much an exercise in the containment of the scope and pace of 
the emergent internationally-sanctioned opium reform campaign, especially in defence of its 
opium system in India and the sanctity of its existing bilateral agreements with China, as it 
was an opportunity to partake in the drafting of new resolutions. The British delegation also 
included William Lyon MacKenzie King as representative for the Dominion of Canada, a 
senior figure in the Dominion who would later go on to see election three times as Prime 
Minister of Canada. The delegation also included Richard Laidlaw MP, a member of 
parliament with a dedicated interest in opium and its attendant issues who was active in 
debates on the topic, and colonial matters more broadly,208 who would go on to write to the 
Foreign Office to personally volunteer his services again upon the announcement of the 
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British attendance of the Hague Opium Conference of 1911.209 The British delegation also 
included two assessors whose role was to oversee proceedings and to represent their colonial 
governments, each of which operated significant opium monopolies. These were Cecil 
Clementi, nephew of Sir Cecil Clementi Smith and an Assistant Colonial Secretary in Hong 
Kong, and Warren D. Barnes, Secretary for Chinese Affairs of the government of the Straits 
Settlements and Federated Malay States. As such, representatives from the governments of 
India, the Straits Settlements and from Hong Kong formed part of the British representation 
at the commission, illustrating both the significance placed upon the meeting by the British 
government, and the importance of the issue of opium cultivation, sale and consumption to 
British colonial interests in the region.210  
 
As the careers, interests, and backgrounds of the American delegates belied a commitment to 
the regulation of the traffic in opium and other drugs and the suppression of opium 
consumption, the make up of the British delegation suggested a stern establishment stance in 
the protection of British interests, with its inclusion of senior regional imperial and colonial 
figures, as well as a consideration of the position of the colonial governments in India, Hong 
Kong, and the Straits Settlements. The British government and its delegates held serious 
concerns about American intentions in the commission, and these concerns spawned a 
contentious, yet cautious, period of political tension and potential diplomatic discord in 
Anglo-American relations centred on the issue of opium. The debates of the commission, 
and the international pressure that it was able to bring to bear on Britain, led by the United 
States and Chinese delegations, put sustained international pressure and public scrutiny on 
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British opium policy for the first time. Scrutiny at the heyday of the British anti-opium 
movement and during the course of the Royal Commission on Opium had been limited. 
Though this period of time had seen the issue become a hot topic in India, there had not been 
any serious international element putting pressure on the British government, and the issue 
had been confined largely to the domestic sphere. Over the course of the Shanghai Opium 
Commission, the British delegation were forced to defend their government’s position, both 
in terms of the status quo of opium cultivation in British India and in terms of the scale of 
exports. The debates throughout the commission were centred primarily on the issues 
surrounding the restricting of exports to the scope of medical requirements only, clamping 
down on the practice of opium smoking, and the legitimate and illegitimate trading practices 
in drugs, among several other more general areas of discussion.   
 
Before the commission was even to begin, however, a minor diplomatic incident occurred, 
one which was to be indicative of certain underlying tensions, and the issues at stake at the 
commission, that would cast a shadow over the discussions and test the resolve of the parties 
involved. The commission was set to begin with an address to the assembled international 
representatives by the Chinese Viceroy of Liangjiang, Duan Fang, an important Qing official 
who had supported the implementation of a policy of government taxation of Chinese opium 
before the 1906 Edict, and an imperial reformer with a strong view in support of opium 
suppression by 1909.211 Shortly before the commencement of the commission, the British 
Minister to China, Sir John Jordan, received an admission from the Chinese foreign office, 
the Wai-Wu-Pu, that they were satisfied with the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement as it 
stood. Frustrated, the American delegation enquired with their Chinese counterparts as to 
whether the agreement would, indeed, continue to be in force, and whether or not it might 
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still be up for discussion. In their view, such a declaration from the Chinese government 
would remove power from the commission to implement any real change on the issue. The 
American delegation also raised their concerns with the British delegation, who, while 
repeating that they had received a declaration of satisfaction with the agreement from the 
Chinese foreign office, declined to state that the topic would be off-limits for discussion. In 
confidential talks with the Chinese delegation, the American representatives learned of 
disagreements between the Chinese foreign office, which had concluded not to push the 
issue without first waiting to see the outlook of the various national delegations, and Viceroy 
Duan Fang and several other commissioners, who had instead proposed to take the initiative 
in suggesting new measures of government monopoly and a reduction in the time-frame of 
the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement. So as to avoid any potential conflict between the 
Chinese and British representatives on the eve of the commission, an eventuality which 
might derail the entire venture, the American commissioners Hamilton Wright and Charles 
Tenney carefully vetted and amended the transcript of Viceroy Duan Fang’s speech. Much to 
their dismay, however, the chairman of the British delegation to the Commission, Cecil 
Clementi Smith, sent word to Duan Fang directly that he was not to bring up the subject of 
the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement, as this topic had been placed off-limits for the 
commission’s discussions by the recent acknowledgements of the agreement made by the 
Chinese foreign office. Incensed by what he regarded as a diplomatic slight and overreaching 
demand, Viceroy Duan Fang discarded the amendments that the American delegates had 
prepared, and returned to the original version of his speech, complete with its attendant 
controversies. In his speech, he referred to the progress that China had made in suppressing 
opium cultivation and consumption, but alluded to the suffocating restrictions placed upon 
China by existing treaties and agreements, which were acting to limit the scope and efficacy 
of Chinese opium suppression. He expressed his wishes that the commission should 
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thoroughly consider this subject, and praised the American initiative in organising the 
international commission to deal with the issue.212  
 
A detailed account of the diplomatic activity, and hurried correspondence, behind this 
incident is given in Taylor’s study, the analysis of which is based upon the correspondence 
of the American delegation with those of the British and Chinese. Taylor identifies the 
incident and the controversy it caused in the build-up to the commission, and in the period 
following Chinese Viceroy Duan Fang’s opening speech, but the issues at the heart of the 
dispute would continue to plague the activities of the commission throughout its sittings.213 
This discordance between the British and Chinese representatives over the issue of treaties 
and agreements, and the propensity for renegotiation or supersession within the international 
arbitration, is also clear from the commission’s minutes, and the issue remained close to the 
surface throughout the discussions of the commission. It was illustrative of the policy of 
closely monitored bilateral agreement, and the high degree of control over the direction of 
policy, that had characterised the British approach to the negotiation of the Anglo-Chinese 
Ten Year Agreement, and which continued to define British priorities during the 
International Opium Commission. Clementi Smith’s insistence to Viceroy Duan Fang also 
hinted at other underlying aspects of British attitudes regarding negotiations with China, 
represented at the International Opium Commission, an official meeting on the global stage, 
on an equal basis to Britain and the other imperial powers for the first time, and perhaps 
were illustrative of notions of superiority indicative of British imperial and commercial pre-
eminence in the region. 
 
                                                          
212 Taylor, American diplomacy and the narcotics traffic, pp. 64-65. 
213 Taylor, American diplomacy and the narcotics traffic, pp. 64-66. 
128 
 
In his speech, Viceroy Duan Fang appealed to the progressive consciences of the 
international representatives, characterising the endeavour as being the product of ‘world-
wide philanthropy and enlightenment’. He urged the commission to put aside any 
preconceptions that might exist, and to avoid ‘prejudices of nationality and race’, in reaching 
a fair and just conclusion to the opium issue as it affected China.214 This in itself was a 
significant point, and something of a departure from the prevailing context of international 
politics and imperialism,215 and given the reality of racial politics at the time, where the 
United States and several of the British Dominions had specific exclusion laws prohibiting 
Chinese immigration, a time where racial theories, the trend in so-called scientific racism, 
and discourses of ‘national characteristics’ acted to define much of the public understanding 
of China and the Chinese people and their customs.216 This appeal to the commission to look 
beyond the factors of race and nationality when considering the issue was indicative of the 
opportunity presented by the commission for Chinese officials to interact on an equal basis 
with the imperial powers, and to challenge some of the political and commercial status quo 
in China. It was perhaps also representative of a renewed desire among officials like Duan 
Fang to assert Chinese sovereignty in light of the continuing expansion of informal empire, 
extraterritoriality, and treaty port commercial interests in China, at a time of emergent and 
burgeoning Chinese nationalism during the first decade of the twentieth century. The 
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Chinese representatives were seizing the opportunity offered by the American government’s 
international approach to the issue, and to the prosecution of American commercial, foreign 
and imperial policies in the region, in order to challenge the status quo of the imperial 
powers’ positions in China, adding an additional dynamic of imperial entanglement at the 
heart of the international sphere of the opium issue. Despite the animosities over the right to 
discuss existing treaties and agreements, the Viceroy nevertheless plied the route of 
diplomatic language to an extent, and stopped short of openly blaming the British 
government for the traffic, decrying instead the self-interest of trading interests in China and 
their role in blocking meaningful reform.217 He made no illusions to the fact that one of the 
prime objectives of the Chinese delegation at the commission was to secure more favourable 
terms in related international treaties and agreements, however, stating plainly that ‘the 
attempts of this Government to suppress opium are hampered by existing treaties’, which 
were ‘preventing China from putting into effect a proper control over opium and the spread 
of the opium prohibition throughout the country’. That the Chinese government sought to 
utilise the International Opium Commission, and its groundswell of cooperative 
internationalist arbitration, as a vehicle to renegotiate existing treaties, and as leverage to 
secure concessions and future amendments to existing agreements such as the Anglo-
Chinese Ten Year Agreement, was no secret. Viceroy Duan Fang’s rhetoric was highly 
charged, and when he referred to ‘the benevolence and philanthropy’ of the delegations in 
their ‘desire to eradicate a poison and a bane to mankind’, the implied meaning as to the 
responsibility for the continued traffic would not have been lost on the British 
representatives.218 As such, the commission got off to a somewhat rocky start, and it was left 
to Bishop Charles Henry Brent, as its president, to try to enthuse a renewed spirit of 
cooperation and internationalism into proceedings. 
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Brent, the erstwhile American Opium Commissioner, Bishop of the Manila, and chief 
administrator behind the carrying out of the Philippine Commission, who had been one of 
the principle voices pushing for the organising of international meetings to discuss the issue 
of opium, was unanimously appointed as the President of the International Opium 
Commission upon its commencement in 1909. In his opening address at the beginning of the 
meeting’s first session, he laid out the scope of the commission’s coverage, its agenda and 
the primary intentions behind its inception, as well as hinting at the underlying priorities of 
his own government in calling for international action on the issue. Brent welcomed the 
assembled delegates, and immediately began by referring to the ‘great problem’ that had 
brought the representatives together, calling for realism and honesty in dealing with the issue 
by ‘facing facts and facing them squarely’.219 While being diplomatic, from the outset he 
injected a sense of seriousness and urgency in striving to achieve real solutions and 
definitive action. Utilising the discourse of nascent internationalism that had been 
developing in certain theatres of international diplomacy, at least since two years earlier 
during the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, Brent identified two distinct stages that must be 
traversed in the mediation of international issues. He characterised these as, firstly, an 
‘emotional stage’, ‘based largely upon sentiment and ideals’. He held that the various 
international actors had been traversing this stage for some decades already, with regards to 
the issue of opium, and that it was now time for something more serious and concrete. As he 
put it to the assembled delegations, ‘The emotional stage finds expression in agitation. We 
have had agitation.’220 The second stage he characterised as the ‘scientific stage’, and it was 
upon this stage that he saw the significance of the role of international meetings to resolve 
the issue, and its associated disputes, calling for this stage, and the present Shanghai Opium 
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Commission as its first meeting, to deal with the facts of the matter, and to allow the 
reaching of practical and final conclusions between all responsible parties. He urged the 
assembled representatives to work under a spirit of united action, to put aside ‘side issues’ 
and ‘controversial matters’, in order to reach ‘certain unanimous resolutions’ towards 
enacting a programme of international regulation. Brent employed the rhetoric of scientific 
analysis throughout his speech, and implored the representatives to endeavour cooperatively 
towards a logical and practical resolution of the issue, building upon key discourses of the 
internationalism that had begun to emerge among certain elements on the international stage 
since the turn of the twentieth century.221 Brent encouraged those present to see themselves 
not as belligerent powers with competing priorities and rivalries at stake in the issues under 
discussion, but as a ‘family of nations’, a discursive trend that, after the obvious interruption 
of the First World War, would be further developed during the inter-war years.222 This also 
reflected the direction that would come to define the American foreign policy position in 
East Asia, especially from the outset of the Taft administration in December 1909, and 
provided the basis for legitimising discourses of cooperative international relations and 
supportive commercial relations, rather than the more traditional exploitative impulses of 
imperial commerce in the region, contrasting the American and British commercial 
positions. Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States during the events in Shanghai, 
also addressed the commission by telegram, adding his support to Brent’s comments.223 The 
American delegation accepted that at this early stage the parties to the discussions were ‘not 
sufficiently well informed, and not sufficiently unanimous in our attitude, to have a 
conference with any great hope of immediate success’, and this was in large part the reason 
given by the American Opium Commissioners for having organised a legally non-binding 
international commission rather than an international conference with an accompanying legal 
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treaty.224 The American approach to securing international action through the commission 
was nonetheless unified, well-organised, and determined, and was seen as a necessary 
preliminary step on the path towards the reaching of fully-fledged international agreements. 
Indeed, the next stage in this process would encompass the International Opium Conference 
of 1911, but the American commissioners first saw the need to discuss and to attempt to gain 
ground on key issues through the achievement of a form of international consensus, so as to 
lay the foundations for the negotiation of future concrete agreements, and to mediate 
potentially fractious disagreements about the very direction of prospective regulations, 
principally between themselves, the Chinese, the Japanese, and the British.225 
 
The process of the diversification of agriculture in British India in areas where opium formed 
a substantial part of the agricultural produce of the land had begun in the aftermath of the 
reaching of the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement of 1907, and had been under 
consideration for some years prior to that. The need to achieve this kind of diversification, 
and to move away from overreliance on cash crops in certain regions, had been a theme 
which had received widespread coverage and debate within the British imperial and 
parliamentary arenas for some decades, and particularly in times of famine in India.226 Not 
even the British anti-opium movement at the height of its influence in the early 1890s had 
argued for an immediate end to opium cultivation. The Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement 
marked a point of departure in British opium policy after which the process of reducing 
opium exports would have to be exponentially expanded upon. This demanded lower levels 
of production in India and gave added impetus to efforts to replace opium crops, more so as 
                                                          
224 TNA, FO405/418 ‘Report of the International Opium Commission’, p. 12. 
225 TNA, FO405/418 ‘Report of the International Opium Commission’, p. 42. Brent suggested that a 
gradualist approach with a relatively drawn out process of negotiation and mediation would be the 
surest way to achieve a lasting international consensus on the issue, allowing time for parties’ 
positions to adapt and through which ‘intermediate consideration may dispose of … objections.’  
226 See chapters one and three of this thesis for instances of the raising of these topics in parliamentary 
debates and in the publications of the British anti-opium movement. 
133 
 
the course of the period of the Agreement went on.  Although opium produced in excess of 
the quantities stipulated for acceptance into the Chinese market under the terms of the 
Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement would not be allowed for export to China, this did not 
mean that the quantity of opium prohibited from being exported to China would necessarily 
be equivalent to the level of reductions in cultivation carried out in India. Despite this, J. 
Brunyate of the British delegation argued that the British government were committed to 
seeing the stipulations of the agreement put into practice, arguing that, in areas under the 
direct control of the British India government, ‘a more than proportionate diminution of area 
had already been effected’. He intimated the concern though that, despite such commitment 
being displayed by the British India government, it was not in their power to regulate the 
cultivation of opium in the areas of the autonomous Princely States of India.227 A stockpile 
of residual opium, which might previously have found its way to markets in China, began to 
build up in the warehouses of Calcutta, and other destinations for export were inevitably 
sought. Indeed, this excess opium which was excluded from exportation to the China market 
would increasingly come to find its way to markets in the British colonies in Asia – to Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and Malaya – and to other markets in South-East Asia.228 Though opium 
was to be less relied upon as a product for cultivation from 1907, this should not be seen as 
an abandonment of the system of opium cultivation in India, and it was viewed by British 
policymakers as essential to preserve the structure of cultivation and exportation, and to 
maintain the value of opium as much as possible during this process of reduction and 
agricultural diversification, both as a measure to protect what was a necessary continuing 
part of the British India Government’s revenues and for the preservation of the wellbeing of 
the opium farmers in large areas of India. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the victory of the Liberal Party in the general election 
of 1906 had ushered in a reforming administration, elected on a groundswell of the promise 
of reform and social justice. The Liberal Party too, had long been the political vehicle for 
anti-opium organisations within Britain and, though these groups had declined in influence 
since their failure to achieve any immediate reform in British India following the limited 
report of the Royal Commission on Opium in 1895, they nonetheless continued this political 
association. Moreover, following the 1906 Liberal victory, Earl Grey was appointed as 
Foreign Minister and Sir John Morley as Secretary of State for India, and both men 
avowedly held anti-opium sentiments. Indeed, Virginia Berridge has credited the two for the 
very decision of the British government to send a delegation to the Shanghai Opium 
Commission in 1909, in light of the general preference for bilateral action among British 
policymakers and the particular suspicions and mistrust surrounding the commission.229 With 
regards to India policy, John Morley was Secretary of State for India from 1906, and the Earl 
of Minto had been Viceroy and Governor General of India since 1905. By the end of 1907, 
and following the concluding of the Anglo-Chinese Opium Agreement, both men had issued 
statements in support of reform in British India, including of the system of opium cultivation 
and revenue generation, though the reality behind the rhetoric was to be somewhat more 
conservative. In the India Budget Statement of March 1907, Minto had demonstrated a 
recognition of the moral necessity of opium reform in India, and a commitment on the part of 
the British India government to working closely alongside the Chinese government in 
respecting the terms of the recently made Anglo-Chinese Opium Agreement. The position 
laid out in his speech also quite succinctly summarised that adopted by the British delegation 
at the Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909. In the Budget Statement, Minto intimated that: 
 
At first sight I grant that China’s proposals are very alarming as to their possible 
effects on the India revenues. But I am afraid I am unable to follow the’ … 
‘sweeping assumption that India is about to be sacrificed for the pleasure of a few 
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faddists. Neither do I think we are entitled to doubt the good faith of the Chinese 
Government as to the objects of their proposals.230 
 
Here Minto essentially echoed the stance adopted by the Foreign Office in the negotiations 
leading to the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement. The British India Government had been 
recalcitrant, and a force of great conservatism and resistance, during the Royal Commission 
on Opium from 1893-1895, but by 1907, with Minto as the new Viceroy and Governor 
General in India, the position was beginning to move more into line with the position of the 
domestic British government, and of the Foreign Office. In his speech, Minto accepted the 
immediate likely outcome of reductions on the India revenues, but nonetheless intimated that 
this new course should nonetheless be adopted. Minto’s use of the term ‘faddists’ to describe 
critics of the opium system in India summarised the dismissive attitude of many 
establishment figures in India, and their supporters in Britain, of the British Anti-Opium 
Movement and its argument for a complete end to opium cultivation in India.  
 
Papers which I have had recently before me indicate every intention on the part of 
China to reduce with a strong hand the consumption of opium and the growth of the 
poppy in her own territory. I am no opium faddist. I quite admit the hardship a 
proscription of opium would entail on those who use it in moderation, as many in 
this country [India] do, and I am well aware of the difficulties surrounding any 
attempt to reduce its production.231 
 
Here Minto recognised what the Foreign Office representatives had during the bilateral 
negotiations with China, which was a renewed commitment to opium suppression and a 
willingness to coordinate with foreign powers in order to realistically achieve this, supported 
by the burgeoning nationalism in the country, which was increasingly demanding an end to 
opium imports and their symbolic position as the symptom of the domineering exploitation 
of foreign imperialism. Despite this willingness to work with the Chinese government in 
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reducing opium exports to China, Minto’s reference to the problems posed by opium 
suppression to those consuming opium ‘in moderation’ was illustrative of a broader British 
concern to protect the cultural autonomy of peoples under their imperial rule, and not to 
intercede in this regard without a broad base of popular support.232 Certainly, this was the 
position set out by the British delegation as to the justification of its policy of regulation, and 
not prohibition or suppression, of opium consumption on the Indian subcontinent. In this 
regard, Sir Cecil Clementi Smith commented that ‘The opium habit has been known in India 
for centuries’, outside of the accepted cultural reach of British jurisdiction, owing to its 
established cultural position predating British rule. So as to fully outline this position, he 
then followed that: 
 
‘You have only to consider for a moment the relations between the ruling power and 
the subject populations of India to realise that despotic interference with a national 
habit, dating, as I have said, from a period long anterior to British rule, could only be 
justified if that habit had been the cause of extensive social degradation, of which we 
have no sufficient evidence, or by the assurance of strong and genuinely popular 
support from Indian public opinion’.233  
 
This approach had defined many of the conclusions of the Royal Commission on Opium, 
especially in regard to the Indian practice of eating opium, which was viewed as a culturally 
normalised practice and not as excessive in the way that the smoking of opium was often 
perceived.234 This approach to the paramountcy of the preservation of cultural autonomy 
would come to underpin the British refusal during the Shanghai Opium Commission to limit 
opium cultivation solely to that for medicinal purposes, on the basis that this would 
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constitute undue cultural interference on their part in India. This encompassed the acceptance 
of legitimate consumption outside of purely medical uses, a designation contrary to the 
approach adopted by the American Commissioners. Indeed, this insistence on the part of the 
British delegation upon this concession was to undermine the passing of any resolutions in 
favour of meaningful active prohibitive measures of the sort that were being pushed for by 
the United States delegation, as first established in the conclusion of the United States 
Philippine Commission in 1905. 
 
But there is no doubt throughout the whole civilized world a feeling of disgust at the 
demoralizing effect of the opium habit in excess. It is a feeling in which we cannot 
but share. We could not with any self respect refuse to assist china on the grounds of 
loss of revenue to India. … I admit the task that China has set herself may be greater 
than she can accomplish, and that we have a perfect right to require that in agreeing 
to the reduction of imports from India we should be satisfied of the results of 
China’s efforts to reduce her own internal opium production. But, not withstanding 
the prospect of a heavy loss in revenue, I hope we may accept … the … view that, 
provided the transition state through which we must pass is spread over a sufficient 
number of years, we need apprehend no financial disaster.235 
 
With the conclusion of the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement, and as reiterated in Minto’s 
Budget Statement of the same year, the British government and India government had come 
to the conclusion that a temporary blow to India revenues was tolerable, so long as this was 
mitigated by the drawing out of reductions in the quantity of opium to be exported over a 
reasonable period of time. Indeed, such was the British need for such an extended period of 
transition, that the Chinese delegation’s stated wish during the Commission to narrow down 
the time-frame of the Ten Year Agreement was to become one of the major points of 
contention between the two countries during the meetings of the Commission. It was with 
the tacit support of the India government, as outlined by Minto’s official statement, and with 
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a broad range of British domestic and colonial government representation, that the British 
approached the Commission. 
  
Further to the British delegation proceeding on the basis of the position set out by the Anglo-
Chinese Ten Year Agreement, the British delegation expressed dissatisfaction with the 
progress of the Chinese government with regards to opium suppression, arguing that 
reductions of opium cultivation in British India were far exceeding those in Chinese 
territory, which they opined were uneven and limited in scope to just a few areas.236 Sir 
Alexander Hosie, speaking of the contents of the Chinese Report to the Commission, also 
criticised the lack of precision or methodology in the collection and analysis of data 
regarding opium cultivation and consumption throughout China, suggesting that without 
accurate information on these points it would be impossible to coordinate joint reductions 
effectively as per the stipulations of the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement.237 This was a 
serious problem for the British delegation, and exacerbated the irritation of the British 
delegates when the Chinese delegation later probed as to the possibility of accelerating the 
speed and shortening the time frame of the joint reductions. In the question and answer 
segment towards the end of the report, the Chinese delegation proffered the question as to 
whether the stated British target for reductions of 5,100 opium chests annually from the 
quantity exported from India would necessarily equate to the reduction exported to China, 
regardless of the actual quantity of reductions achieved by China over the same period. At 
this point, the British delegation coolly responded that they would not consent to answer 
questions concerning existing diplomatic agreements, which in the view of the British 
delegation were not up for discussion at the Commission.238 Tang Kuo’an, of the Chinese 
delegation, had earlier posed this question to the British delegation, during the Commission’s 
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ninth session, as the Chinese Report was under discussion, adding that it was perceived by 
many in China that this was indeed the case. Brunyate had replied that the agreement meant 
simply that Britain would reduce the total quantity of opium exported by 5,100 chests per 
annum, and that this had no direct bearing on exports to China. Tang had then requested that 
the British government issue a written clarification to explain this to the Chinese people, to 
which the head of the British delegation, Clementi Smith, had simply responded that this 
would be better coming from the Chinese government.239 Not to be drawn on the issue, or to 
accept the notion that either British attendance of the Shanghai Opium Commission, or the 
terms of the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement, denoted any direct British responsibility to 
China, or to bow to the pressure of Chinese national feeling, Clementi Smith had sought to 
shut down this avenue of discussion. The British delegation had determined not to allow the 
events of the Commission, or the topics discussed or resolutions adopted at its conclusion, to 
undermine existing British policy. 
 
This response was indicative of a wider British feeling that the Chinese delegation were 
actively attempting to utilise the commission as a vehicle to subvert previous agreements, 
and to take advantage of their equal status at the commission, and the international platform 
which it offered, as a means by which to achieve treaty renegotiation. As already discussed, 
Viceroy Duan Fang had directly stated that the existing treaties and agreements that China 
was party to blocked any progress in opium suppression in the country, implying the 
immediate need for treaty renegotiation, in his opening speech to the Commission.240 
Towards the end of the Commission’s sittings, each power presented a set of Resolutions 
that it had drafted for deliberation among representatives, and thereafter for potential 
adoption by the Commission. After the United States delegation had finished presenting its 
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seven Resolutions, Charles Tenney rose to propose an additional Resolution. The Resolution 
held that: 
  
Be it Resolved, that in the opinion of the International Opium Commission every 
nation which effectively prohibits the production of opium and its derivatives in that 
country, except for medical purposes, should be free to prohibit the importation into 
its territories of opium and its derivatives, except for medical purposes.241 
 
Tenney explained the reasoning of the Resolution by adding that:  
 
Every nation represented at this Commission, with one exception, has a free hand to 
take such steps as it deems necessary to safeguard its people from the injury which 
results from the misuse of opium. But that one nation whose hands are not free is 
unfortunately the one which, in its own opinion as well as in that of all competent 
observers, has suffered most severely from the spread of the opium habit.242 
 
Further to this, and at some length, Tenney expressed the view of the United States 
delegation that ‘The existing Treaties prevent China from exercising her right as a Sovereign 
Power to act for the protection of her own people’. He followed by stating to the assembled 
delegations, ‘Gentlemen, I wish to say clearly and deliberately that in our opinion it is a 
disgrace to modern civilization that such a condition should be allowed to continue.’ He 
continued with the assertion that ‘Action by all the Treaty Powers is necessarily involved if 
China is to enjoy her rights as a Sovereign State in dealing with the opium question.’ Though 
he prefaced his comments with the reassurance that ‘This resolution is not to be interpreted 
as a fling against Great Britain on the part of the American Delegation’, this was in large part 
how it was interpreted.243 This approach was representative of the American policy direction 
in China since the Open Door Note of 1899, in which the United States was increasingly 
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sought to challenge the position of British pre-eminence in the country; the opium commerce 
of which Britain was implicated as the central foreign actor, stood in the way of American 
ambitions at an equal and legitimated free commerce in China. Tang Kuo’an, of the Chinese 
delegation, rose to express the support of his delegation for the Resolution, intimating that 
‘we endorse every word that has just been uttered by Dr Tenney’. The proposing of this 
Resolution, and the Chinese response in support of it, drew a heated response from Clementi 
Smith and the British delegation. In light of the previous statement of satisfaction issued by 
the Chinese government with regards to the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement, Clementi 
Smith demanded to know whether Tang and the Chinese delegation were speaking with the 
authority of the Chinese government. Upon receiving a response in the affirmative from 
Tang, Clementi Smith determined to set out the British position with regards to the 
Resolution proposed by the United States delegation. He stated that: 
 
As far as I understand, Mr. Tang, on behalf of the Chinese Delegation, supports this 
resolution which has been submitted to the Commission by Dr. Tenney. The effect, 
which, of course, would not escape Mr. Tang is an entire abrogation of Treaties.244 
 
After questioning whether the Chinese government seriously supported this view, he 
continued: 
  
… I think it would be amazing to suppose that any Power would agree for one 
moment to the repudiation of Agreements solemnly entered into. It is only necessary 
to make a statement to that effect to show the absolute absurdity of the situation, and 
I trust that this International Opium Commission will not for one moment allow 
itself to agree to any form of words which will be interpreted as meaning that nations 
can lightly break Treaties solemnly entered into by them.245 
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The strength of feeling displayed by Clementi Smith, along with the significance of this issue 
to the British government’s position, were obvious. The British delegation would not 
contemplate allowing a resolution suggestive of the right to subvert the obligations 
demanded by legal treaties, and the stipulations afforded under diplomatic agreements to go 
unchallenged, let alone offer any support to one. This view defined the British approach to 
the Commission, and to the whole international effort towards introducing regulations of 
opium, by 1909, but it was also a larger rejection of the American approach to reforming the 
commercial establishment in China and challenge to the existing imperial dynamics in the 
region. Echoing the view expressed by Mr. Miyaoka of the Japanese delegation, in response 
to continuing discussion of the issue, Clementi Smith simply concluded that ‘This is not the 
place for discussing diplomatic engagements’…‘this is not a subject which can be dealt with 
by this Commission’. He brought the curtain down on the exchange with the typically 
pointed remark that ‘If Treaties and Agreements are to be treated as waste paper by any one 
power I might say that we could get rid of all Agreements at once’. The French delegation 
agreed with this his assessment, adding that any such consideration of the circumvention of 
existing treaties and agreements would be positively ‘dangerous’.246 
 
In addition to the controversy surrounding the additional Resolution pertaining to treaties 
and agreements proposed by Charles Tenney of the American delegation, discussed above, 
several other of the American Resolutions proved contentious, especially with the British 
delegation. Of note among the Resolutions proposed was the first Resolution, which held 
that opium and its derivatives should be ‘confined to legitimate medical practice’. This also 
proved to be unacceptable to the British delegation, who described it as too uniform in nature 
to be applicable in the same way in the particular contexts of all of the countries present, and 
was to not acknowledge the national or cultural differences pertaining to various forms of 
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opium consumption practices. The specific example of opium consumption in India was 
given as illustrative of this fact. Blanket prohibition of opium consumption, regardless of 
differences in the national and cultural contexts of these practices, was viewed as 
impracticable, as was the failure to determine exactly what constituted ‘legitimate medical 
practice’, which the British delegation also argued was likely to be affected by these 
different contexts.247 The second proposed American Resolution suggested that no 
government should continue to rely on revenues derived from opium. This was quite clearly 
pointed at the situation in India, where the opium revenue continued to be a significant point 
of both contention with a bearing on the development of British policy, and which had been 
a key aspect in the negotiation of the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement. As such, the 
proposal of this Resolution also provoked a strong response from the British delegation, who 
argued that revenue derived from opium was not, in any case, primarily associated with the 
‘unguarded and indiscriminate use of the drug’, but was instead a matter of taxation 
practices, and that the revenue aspect of the question was quite unrelated to the moral aspect, 
which was related to consumption.248 The third American Resolution proposed that all of the 
nations represented at the Commission should act towards the prohibition of the smoking of 
opium. The British held that, as with the first Resolution and its focus on containing opium 
production and consumption to legitimate medical practices, this Resolution too was far too 
general in nature, and as such did not adequately take into account the specific contexts 
prevalent in the various different countries where opium smoking took place.249 Resolutions 
four and five, proposing the strict prevention of the smuggling of opium, and the regulation 
of the traffic and consumption of morphine, respectively, were passed largely 
unchallenged.250 The sixth American Resolution proposed that each of the governments 
represented at the Commission should make ‘a concerted effort’ … ‘to assist every other 
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Government in the solution of its internal opium problem’. This too drew a somewhat 
incredulous response from the British delegation, who argued that the Resolution would be 
‘a direct interference with the internal administration of a country’.251 It is worth bearing in 
mind too, that this was exactly the type of unilateral approach that Britain, in its 
disagreement over the sanctity of the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement during the 
Commission, outlined earlier, had sought to discourage; the bilateral nature of existing 
agreements, in the British delegation’s view, should remain the primary focus for action, and 
points of reference for the dictation of policy. If every country had a duty to assist those 
countries dealing with problems relating to opium consumption, the British logic ran, how 
could any agreement pertaining to a gradualist approach to change and reductions in the 
cultivation and subsequent exportation of opium, with its focus on the need for joint and 
cooperative measures and the necessity of attaining a just degree of simultaneous action, be 
maintained? The seventh and final Resolution proposed by the United States delegation 
suggested that, as any Resolutions adopted by the Commission would not themselves possess 
any power to affect change, the international representatives should express their support for 
the organising of an International Conference to discuss the issue. This, too, the British 
delegation were unwilling to support, arguing that there would be no need for any immediate 
moves to organise a full international conference to deal with the issue, that such moves 
would invariably be premature, and that it must be left to the individual governments of 
those countries representatives to decide on this issue.252 This refusal flew in the face of the 
underlying American objectives in having organised the International Opium Commission 
which, as already discussed, was the laying of provisional groundwork on the topic, the 
reaching of preliminary agreements on the key issues that pertained to opium production, 
trading, and consumption, and the facilitation of future fully-binding international 
conferences which would produce legal conventions. As such, the majority of the 
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Resolutions proposed by the United States delegation provoked a dismissive reaction from 
the British delegation, and reflected significant differences in policy and approach to the 
issue. 
 
The Commission concluded on the 26th February 1909 by adopting and issuing the nine 
Resolutions that had been approved during its sessions. The first Resolution recognised the 
commitment of the Chinese government towards opium suppression in the country, and the 
strength of public opinion support of this course. The second Resolution, in recognising the 
efforts at the suppression of opium smoking in China, suggested that all governments 
concerned should also adopt an approach to suppressing opium smoking in their territories. 
The third Resolution, while accepting the variations of different national contexts, suggested 
the introduction of ‘prohibition or careful regulation’ of the consumption of opium, on a 
progressively incremental basis. The fourth Resolution held that, in recognition of the laws 
regulating the import of opium and its derivatives among the countries present, represented 
countries should also not export opium or its derivatives to any country which prohibits 
them. The fifth Resolution suggested that, in recognition of the increasing problem of posed 
by morphine, the manufacture, sale and distribution of the substance should be strongly 
regulated. The seventh Resolution stated that, without proper scientific representation at the 
Commission, the issue of anti-opium remedies must be further investigated by those 
represented. The eighth Resolution suggested that nations represented should take measures 
to prohibit and control anti-opium remedies containing opium or its derivatives in their 
foreign concessions and settlements in China. The ninth and final Resolution recommended 
that each delegation represented at the Commission should move its government to extend its 
own pharmacy laws to their own subjects in the ‘Consular districts, Concessions, and 
Settlements in China’.253 These resolutions were non-bindings recommendations, suggestive 
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of the importance of making changes to the opium policies of individual represented 
countries, but without the power to enforce any such changes. They were overwhelmingly of 
a general character, devoid of any serious proposed references to the limitation of opium to 
medical practices, and not recommendatory of extracting concessions relating to existing 
treaties and agreements relating to the issue of opium, in large part due to British pressure. 
 
At the commission, the British priorities were twofold. First, the sanctity of the Anglo-
Chinese Ten Year Agreement was not to be allowed for discussion, and as such was to be 
preserved from international interference. This was despite the protestations and plans of 
both the Chinese and American delegations, who viewed the renegotiation of this agreement 
as a vital objective of the commission. Second, the existing treaties that enshrined the British 
commercial position in China were also to be defended. For the Foreign Office, the 
commission might discuss, and potentially even produce some useful resolutions regarding 
the production and trafficking of drugs, both licit and illicit, especially regarding the 
increasingly prevalent problem of morphine and synthetic opiates, but it was not to be 
allowed to challenge any aspect of Britain’s imperial or commercial establishment in China. 
Preference was to be given to ensuring the continued viability of Britain’s existing bilateral 
arrangements, be they agreements or treaties, British policy was not to be surrendered on the 
altar of international consensus, and British sovereignty to determine its own colonial policy 
regarding drugs was seen as paramount. Despite the utilisation of diplomatic language and 
the statement of Britain’s commitment to reform and towards a globally relevant progressive 
policy, the British delegation remained resolute in reiterating the sanctity of the existing 
British position throughout the commission. 
 
In organising the Shanghai Opium Commission, the United States State Department and its 
Opium Commissioners had intended to delineate and determine the discursive basis of 
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opium consumption, to confine the legitimate aspect of consumption to a purely medical 
definition, which would also determine acceptable exports of the substance. They had also 
sought to challenge the legitimacy of continuing reliance on opium revenues as a part of 
government finances, and to lay the foundations for further more serious international 
discussions, with the view to passing legal Conventions within a few short years. Due to the 
resistance displayed by the delegations of Britain and other powers, especially also by the 
Japanese and French representatives, this had not been achieved. Instead, the Commission 
produced a few non-binding recommendations of a general character, a product of several 
significant disagreements and contentions throughout the course of the Commission, and 
largely without the attached impetus for achieving further concrete measures for 
international regulation. The British delegation in particular had squarely refused to 
contemplate any restrictions or moves to challenge its existing treaties and agreements on the 
subject. As Britain remained the major power, other than China, involved in the cultivation 
and export of opium, this had seriously narrowed the scope of what the Commission could 
possibly achieve. Despite agreeing to the principle of reform and regulation of opium, in 
cultivation, exporting, and consumption, as had already been set out in the reaching of the 
Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement, the British government had refused to surrender sole 
control over the making of its opium policy. Its insistence on the preference for bilateral 
negotiation remained, and this approach defined the British position regarding international 
initiatives until the end of the decade. This was representative of the mutual contestation of 
the prevailing imperial dynamics that was playing out in the region, as the American 
administration continued to pioneer its Open Door approach to challenging the existing 
imperial establishment in China, championing the discourses of Chinese sovereignty, equal 
diplomatic status, and treaty renegotiation that defined its diplomatic charm offensive in the 
country. In this new American foreign policy, begun under President Roosevelt and greatly 
expanded under President Taft, a new status quo was sought, and as part of this transitional 
phase British pre-eminence had to be broken, and given the importance of opium in the 
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British China commerce, and the existing transitional arrangement around the substance in 
Anglo-Chinese diplomatic policy, opium was one of the more obvious targets for the 
American commercial initiative. This point was only reinforced by the United States’ recent 
colonial experience with formulating its own opium policy in the Philippines by 1905, with 
the American adoption of regulation and suppression of opium mirroring the stated desired 
position of the Qing government in China of its passing of the Imperial Edict of 1906, and 
Taft’s own position and experience on the subject from his time as the colonial Governor 
General of the Philippines, once he was to become president in December 1909, reflected 
this even more closely. Britain had not bowed to American pressure on the issue at the 
Shanghai Opium Commission, but owing to the strength of the American initiative, the 
commitment of key American policymakers such as President Taft from December 1909, 
and the emerging power of the legitimising imperial discourses relating to regulating opium, 
the strength of which was already being demonstrated by the United States as the 
international champion of moral regulation at the Shanghai Opium Commission, it was only 
a matter of time before British policymakers sought to emulate the American approach. This 
would become increasingly apparent with the organising of the next batch of international 
conferences on the subject, which convened at The Hague in 1911. 
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Chapter Four 
Moral capital and the new internationalism: Opium regulation and the cultural basis of 
“legitimate empire” in the early twentieth century 
 
Following the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909, the initiative that had been pioneered 
by the United States and the Taft administration, as part of its foreign policy approach for the 
‘legalising of international relations’254 through concerted multilateral international meetings, 
was expanded in the region. The issue of opium remained one of paramount importance, and 
the United States State Department acted to organise and facilitate further international 
conferences to conventionalise the recommendations reached during the 1909 commission, 
culminating in the Hague Opium Conferences of 1911, 1913 and 1914. During these 
conferences, despite having been staunchly opposed to the very notion of multilateral action 
on opium, Britain eventually joined the initiative, and grew to become one of its most vocal 
supporters. This transition represented a further development of the British position that had 
been reached with the Anglo-Chinese Opium Agreement of 1907, and a broadening of the 
scope of British reform from the sphere of direct bilateral negotiations to one of multilateral 
cooperation and coordination. Essentially, the British commitment to reform was entrenched, 
and the failsafe built into the 1907 agreement whereby the course of British reform in India 
enacted within the agreement might be abandoned in the case of the Chinese government’s 
failure to conduct a parallel suppression campaign of Chinese domestic opium cultivation, 
was effectively jettisoned by the British government.  
 
Following the conclusion of the Hague Opium Convention, the future course of British 
opium policy had been settled upon as being one of reform, international regulation and 
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suppression, and the decision to support and enact opium regulation within this international 
framework, reached during the negotiations at the Hague Opium Conferences, set a new 
policy direction for Britain, heralding the beginnings of a phase of internationalist leadership 
in Britain’s global role, and a proto-typical “comity of nations” approach in British foreign 
policy.255 This new British approach to opium and foreign policy would expand in the 
interwar years to comprise its position of leadership within the League of Nations, and of 
especial relevance to this study, its leading position within the League’s Opium Advisory 
Committee, a position which was also attained through continued international efforts for the 
regulation of the production and traffic in opium and other drugs during the course of the 
Geneva Opium Conferences of the 1920s. In the years following the First World War, 
tensions in the East Asia region between the imperial powers were building, particularly as 
Japanese foreign policy became increasingly expansionist following the close of the First 
World War, as the narcotics economy in Japanese controlled North China expanded, and as 
British geopolitical priorities began to change, culminating in the ending of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance and the continued convergence of Anglo-American relations. The 
convergence of Anglo-American relations, and the development of a shared approach to 
global opium policy, within the context of the imperial entanglement in China, produced an 
environment where the imperial powers were competitively vying for economic space in the 
country while simultaneously seeking to renegotiate their regional, and for Britain its global, 
positions through the forging of legitimising discourses of moral imperialism with relation to 
opium policy. This process of the convergence of British and American priorities, interests, 
and eventually policy in the sphere of opium, and how it was, throughout the course of the 
negotiations at the Hague Opium Conferences, to become a lynchpin of the new 
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internationalist conception of moral imperialism, with a focus on propagating legitimising 
discourses of imperial power, colonial rule, and economic exploitation in the emergent early-
twentieth environment of internationalism, forms the basis of this chapter. 
 
The Hague Opium Conferences and the transition in the British approach: From imperial 
tensions towards a new international drugs control regime, 1911-1919 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission, efforts were made to 
organise another international meeting to follow up on the issues raised and resolutions 
drawn up during these proceedings, again primarily under the initiative of the United States 
Department of State. In addition to being at loggerheads over the direction of policy, and the 
approach to international measures to regulate opium, the issues behind the adversarial 
Anglo-American relationship at the international meetings went deeper. Peter Lowes has 
argued that the disagreements also took on a personal dimension, with leading American 
policymakers at the State Department actively disliking key British personnel. Referring to 
illuminating correspondence between Charles Henry Brent and Hamilton Wright following 
the Shanghai Opium Commission, Brent had described Britain as ‘bullies’ and characterised 
the conduct of the British delegation in like terms, referring to the lead British negotiator, Sir 
Cecil Clementi Smith, though perhaps somewhat in jest, as ‘the enemy’.256 By resisting the 
American advances for their proposed path towards regulation during the Shanghai 
Commission, at times rather strongly, Clementi Smith and the British delegation had not 
exactly ingratiated themselves with the American reformers. The British delegates too, for 
their part, disliked working with Hamilton Wright, and had, by late 1911, decided to pursue 
their own programme for the Hague Opium Conference, with a focus on the principle of 
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reducing the illicit trade in raw and prepared opium, but also to push for the regulation of 
morphine and cocaine.257 This discordance, the British resistance to serious multilateral 
efforts, and the underlying adversarial relations between the two countries’ delegations over 
the desired nature and scope of regulation, and the path by which it should be reached, would 
come to define much of the following negotiations at the Hague, in the three international 
conferences that would meet there in 1911, 1913, and 1914. The British reluctance to join 
further international initiatives on the subject of opium regulation, especially as they 
concerned the calling of a full international conference in the months following the Shanghai 
Commission, was clearly demonstrated as Britain rebuffed subsequent American invitations 
to join in the organising of a conference in 1910. But the British were not alone, as many of 
the other major imperial powers also expressed their lack of commitment, either to a 
conference immediately to follow the Shanghai Commission, or in the case of Britain, for 
any conference at all, and it was just to be the American and Chinese governments who were 
to show any real enthusiasm for the notion.258 The United States State Department, in 
making plans for an upcoming conference, had issued a programme for the ground which the 
conference was likely to cover, and it was the content of this programme, with its several 
contentious points and clear demonstration of American leadership in the affair, that was to 
prove even more of a sticking point for several nations. 
 
Most of the imperial powers had by the end of 1910 eventually agreed to the principle of an 
international conference, if still without a great deal of enthusiasm from most quarters. The 
British, in particular, were slow to respond, not replying officially to the American invitation 
for over a year, ostensibly to allow full time for the British metropolitan and British India 
governments to discuss the matter and to coordinate a response. In reality, the British 
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government and the British India government were less than keen to proceed at a fast pace 
towards international meetings to further discuss reform measures, and their procrastination 
was partly to delay proceedings for a time. The participation of the British government was 
seen as requisite for the achieving of any meaningful objectives during the conference, given 
the continuing status of British India as a major exporter of opium, and so the United States 
accepted some key concessions in order to secure the British participation in the conference. 
Principally, the terms of reference for discussion at the conference would include the 
subjects of morphine and cocaine, and any discussion of the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year 
Agreement was not to be considered. The eventual British consent to join the conference 
may well have proceeded as a result, at least in part, of a renewal of the Anglo-Chinese Ten 
Year Agreement in March, 1911, which revised the terms of the agreement so that it would 
not finish any later than 1917, and would be shortened in time-frame if China could 
demonstrate similar levels of domestic reductions.259 Such a revision of the time-frame of the 
agreement, a factor which had proved a topic of some considerable controversy during the 
Shanghai Opium Commission just two years earlier, demonstrated a new commitment to 
reductions in opium exports on the part of the British government that was almost unilateral 
in character. Given the political instability in large parts of China resulting from the Xinhai 
Revolution later that year, which began in October of 1911, the British decision to stick by 
this amendment of the agreement also demonstrated a degree of political realism from the 
British metropolitan and India governments in realising that the original course of the 
agreement would now likely be jeopardised by the unfolding of political events in China, and 
the concession that the British measures being implemented to reduce the scale of opium 
cultivation in India should be proceeded with in any case. Indeed, the years after the 1911 
revolution were to see a return to large-scale reliance on opium revenues to fund the various 
competing political entities throughout China, especially during the Warlord Period in the 
1910s and 1920s where opium revenues were relied upon to fund military campaigns. As 
                                                          
259 Ibid, pp. 89-91. 
154 
 
such, it would increasingly be the case that the British metropolitan and India governments 
would have less to lose in future international conferences discussing regulation of opium, 
and this may, at least in part, explain the increasing enthusiasm behind the British 
participation in these conferences in the years after 1911. 
 
Despite this, though, in the build up to this second international meeting to discuss opium 
regulation, British policymakers at the Foreign Office did still maintain some fairly deep 
reservations. Much as had been the case at the first international meeting on the subject in 
1909, the British government’s approach was one of resistance to joining or supporting 
international measures for the wholescale regulation of opium. As the Foreign Office, with 
Sir Edward Grey at the helm, noted in the instructions issued to its delegates for the 
conference, the primary purpose of this second international meeting was to ‘conventionalise 
the resolutions of the Shanghai Opium Commission’, and to expand the remits of these 
resolutions to also consider the issue of morphia and cocaine. This, before the 1911 
conference got under way, the Foreign Office considered to be somewhat too rash, informing 
the British delegates that the British domestic government was fully in agreement with the 
British India government that the implementation of the resolutions of the 1909 Shanghai 
Commission was ‘premature’. Indeed, the Foreign Office noted that the British involvement 
in the Hague Conference would be cautious and subject to conditions, and the inclusion of 
morphia and cocaine on the conference agenda was a precondition to British involvement.260 
The British Government’s wish to see these two substances included on the conference 
agenda was ostensibly that it was ‘a subject to which His Majesty’s Government attach 
especial importance in view of the spread of the morphia and cocaine habit in India, in 
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China, and in other Eastern countries.’261 The broadening of the scope of the conference, 
though, with the inclusion of morphia and cocaine in addition to opium, also had the effect 
of directing some of the international focus away from Britain’s own position with regards to 
opium cultivation, by diversifying and generalising the terms of reference for matters to be 
discussed during the conference. The substances of morphia and cocaine also held some 
domestic significance in Britain, as social problems and illicit and unregulated use had begun 
to be recognised and associated with them.262 Within a few short years, during the First 
World War and certainly by the 1920s, morphine, cocaine, and later heroine increasingly 
carried connotations of criminality, illicit global trafficking, and substance abuse in British 
society.263 
 
Further to this domestic relevance, Walker has argued that the British insistence upon the 
inclusion of morphine within the remits of the conference was a means by which to frustrate 
Japanese imperial ambitions in China, where Japanese commercial interests were 
increasingly carving out a market for synthetic opiates such as morphine and heroin, 
especially in North China.264 The protracted and hands-off nature of the Japanese approach 
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to limiting the trade in opiates in North China was noted by contemporary observers, and it 
took direct pressure from the United States State Department to bring the issue to a 
conclusion, and to push the Japanese authorities towards implementing a policy of regulation 
in the territory. Indeed, the development of Japanese commercial interests in drug trafficking 
in China in the years preceding the 1911 Hague Opium Conference, in addition to its 
changing role in East Asia, as its imperial interests greatly expanded in the first two decades 
of the twentieth century, have been cited as one of the primary factors behind Japan’s lack of 
active participation at the conference.265 Having considered this, though, John Jennings has 
put what Walker perceived to be a lack of overt enthusiasm by Japan at the Shanghai Opium 
Commission down to the willingness of the Japanese delegation to follow the British lead at 
the commission, in an effort to form a semblance of unity in the area of drugs policy, and to 
best act to preserve the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, still a policy of great 
importance to the Japanese government in 1909.266 It is also necessary to consider the role, 
particularly during the proceedings at the Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909, of the 
Japanese monopoly and regulation of opium in its territory of Taiwan, under Japanese 
control since 1895 but with a predominantly Chinese population, which was often utilised by 
the Japanese government in an effort to eke out moral capital to justify its colonial presence 
on the island. The Japanese, it was argued, were reforming and modernising the island, and 
bringing Japanese civilisation to its inhabitants, by controlling the excesses of opium 
consumption as a benevolent imperial regime.267 It was a discourse of imperial reformism 
through opium regulation efforts that, in a way, mirrored the ideological direction and 
discourses associated with the British policy behind the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year 
Agreement. 
                                                          
265 W. O. Walker III, Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo-American Search for Order in Asia, 
1912-1954 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 17-19. 
266 J. M. Jennings, The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia, 1895-
1945 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), p. 62. 
267 Ibid, p. 63. 
157 
 
 
Having said this, though, over the course of the international arbitration on the issue of drugs 
regulation at the Hague, and its associated changing regional imperial dynamics, the 
geopolitical status quo was to change quite markedly, making the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
increasingly untenable in the years after 1909, and especially following the First World War. 
In the twentieth century, but particularly within the context of the international realignment 
in imperial dynamics between about 1909 and 1914, the interrelationships between the 
imperial powers in Asia would undergo significant changes. The United States had arrived 
on the scene with its acquisition of the Philippines colonial territory in 1898, thereafter 
gradually introducing its Open Door Policy approach in the region, and Russian ambitions 
had been contained with the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Thereafter, 
and in the context of these two parallel developments regarding the British relations with the 
United States and Japan, the Anglo-Japanese relationship would become increasingly cool, 
as the two empires’ imperial and commercial priorities became ever more at odds, and the 
United States would come to represent a more logical partner for Britain. After having been 
a relatively active party to the 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission, Japan was becoming 
increasingly diplomatically isolated by the time of the 1911 Hague Conference, and was 
falling out of the orbit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The British participation in the 1911 
Hague Opium Conference, therefore, necessary to demonstrate Britain’s global stature and to 
avoid the full pressures of international scrutiny on its India opium system, also allowed 
British policymakers to address other drug matters of domestic and imperial significance. 
British delegates would exercise caution throughout the proceedings, but would be able to 
act to steer and to pursue elements of a British agenda. Though initially suspicions prevailed 
as to the exact nature of American intentions in organising the conference, as they had 
during the 1909 commission at Shanghai, the British presence and participation at the 
conference allowed British delegates to cement a degree of political goodwill and to partake 
in the diplomatic niceties consequent from agreeing to join the American initiative, which 
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would have been somewhat hollow without British involvement given the scale of British 
opium interests. 
 
The British participation in the 1911 conference, at first, proceeded from a position of 
extreme caution. Further to the British purposes in joining the conference, the Foreign Office 
communicated forthrightly to the British delegates on what they were to expect at the 
conference, the parameters within which they were to operate with regards to policy, and the 
limits of their authority. The concerns of the Foreign Office were manifold, and addressed 
multiple potential points of conflict. Chief among their concerns, the Foreign Office were at 
pains to reject outright several of the United States’ propositions for the conference, which 
the United States State Department had made clear in the aftermath of the 1909 Shanghai 
Opium Commission, in their proposed programme for the Hague Conference. The State 
Department, and Opium Commissioners Hamilton Wright and Charles Henry Brent, had not 
substantially changed tact in their approach, and sought to push forward with much of the 
same programme as they had tried to have adopted in the Shanghai Commission two years 
earlier. To cement the progress underway in reducing exports from India to China, under the 
terms of the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement, the American commissioners sought to 
prevent other opium-producing nations from themselves replacing the Indian trade, by 
making all such traffic in opium, but also morphine, cocaine and hemp contraband, and 
thereby open to search. They also sought to clearly reiterate their view that treaty obligations 
and existing agreements, which they regarded as hampering China’s domestic opium 
suppression measures, should be renegotiated.268 As they had done during the 1909 
commission, the British delegation was to be determined to resist any such measures. They 
were also eager not to overcommit to any resolutions that the conference might reach, and 
were cautious not to unduly limit or impinge upon the freedom of British action and the 
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carrying on of British interests. This was a point that the British delegates, in their report 
back to the Foreign Office, thought necessary to specify, noting the position that they had 
adopted during the conference in line with an unwillingness to commit to ‘self-denying 
ordinances that the participating powers might impose upon themselves’.269  
  
Perhaps most significantly, the Foreign Office questioned ‘the propriety of restudying treaty 
obligations and international agreements under which the opium traffic is at present 
conducted’.270 For the Foreign Office, this was a rejection of any surrendering of the 
paramountcy of British sovereignty in the renegotiation of its commercial arrangements and 
imperial policy regarding opium, that was not only related to the informal commercial 
empire in the treaty port concessions of China, but also to British imperial policy in India. It 
hinted at an almost total refusal to allow the negotiations of the conference to challenge the 
position of Britain with regards to its opium system in India and the Asia region, its imperial 
economy, and its commercial arrangements. Further to any suspicions of possible American 
motives, it also suggested an unwillingness to address the topic of imperial concessions or a 
challenge to the treaty rights and extraterritoriality of informal empire in China, and a 
reluctance to place a renegotiation of the favourable commercial arrangements that Britain 
enjoyed in China on the agenda at all, least of all in the hands of a multilateral international 
coalition of interests. This also highlighted the position of the Foreign Office with regard to 
the preference for bilateral negotiations relating to its imperial commerce, at the time of the 
conference and in the period shortly before its commencement, and this reflected the 
continuation of the policy that the Foreign Office had pursued during the negotiations with 
China which had produced the 1907 Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement, discussed in the 
previous chapter. The Foreign Office were perhaps also wary of giving ground to the 
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increasingly vocal nationalist movement in China, particularly pertinent in December 1911 
given the context of the recent events of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, and the overthrow of 
the Qing Dynasty by a new regime dominated by nationalists, whose position regarding 
opium suppression was far more radical than that of the Qing imperial reformers who had 
represented China at the 1909 Shanghai Commission, such as Duan Fang, who had since 
been killed by revolutionaries. Given the subsequent rejection of the return of sovereignty in 
the treaty ports to China, and even of the former German concessions following the defeat of 
the German Empire after the First World War and the conclusion of the Versailles peace 
treaty negotiations in 1919, this was a pervasive theme, and not merely a British one.  
 
Further to this, the Foreign Office specified that the ‘progressive restriction’ of opium 
exported from India to China, as referenced in the ten year agreement of 1907, were to be 
excluded from discussions at the conference. Likewise, all commercial and other treaties 
between Britain and China were not up for discussion, and the Foreign Office were also at 
pains to stress that issues relating to the ‘domestic regulation of the production and use of 
opium’ and the ‘internal administration of India’ were absolutely not on the agenda.271 As 
such, the Foreign Office authorised the British delegates to partake in talks on non-specified 
international contexts relating to opium and the other named drugs, and not British imperial 
or domestic contexts, which were not up for discussion. Therefore, at this preliminary stage 
in the build up to the 1912 discussions, the hands of the British delegates were tied, and the 
British presence appeared largely to be a box-ticking initiative. Clearly, the Foreign Office 
was not willing to surrender any control on the part of Britain, or the imperial administration 
in India, over the right to make British imperial and commercial policy, or to negotiate 
bilateral commercial agreements. This attitude, set forth in the instructions issued to the 
British delegates, as well as being demonstrated by the general attitude of the Foreign Office 
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regarding the issue of opium policy, underpinned the British approach in attending the 
conference, and highlighted the wishes of Foreign Office officials to safeguard these primary 
interests, as had similarly been the case during the 1909 Shanghai Commission. 
 
The Foreign Office strongly questioned ‘the advisability of reciprocal right of search of 
vessels suspected of carrying contraband opium’, proposed in the American programme for 
the conference.272 This objection is particularly interesting, as it hints at aspects of significant 
tension peculiar to the history of Anglo-American relations since the American Revolution, 
centring on differing understanding of notions of maritime law, the right of search of vessels 
in international waters, and international law. British impressment of American sailors up to 
and during the War of 1812, and the Union seizure of two prominent Confederate diplomats 
from aboard a British mail steamer during the American Civil War, had provided two 
previous significant flashpoints in Anglo-American relations, and this issue again proved a 
point of tension in the build up to the 1911 conference. The Foreign Office also sought to 
defend, and not to undermine, the legitimacy which it placed on its own historical actions 
and precedents on the issue. Nowhere was this more clear than with its strong questioning of 
‘the advisability of measures to prevent unlawful use of a flag by vessels engaged in the 
opium traffic’, a proposed resolution made by the American State Department for the 
conference, with quite obvious allusions to the British justifications for the Second Opium 
War in the Chinese seizure of the British-flagged ship the Arrow.273 The Foreign Office also 
had significant reservations regarding ‘the advisability of an international commission to be 
entrusted with the carrying out of any international agreement concluded’, which had been 
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suggested in the proposed American conference programme.274 This rejection of an outside 
institution separate to the British state apparatus again suggested that the British Foreign 
Office were unwilling to commit to any far-reaching multilateral agreement that would 
reduce British control of its opium system by putting the implementation of any convention 
agreed upon by the conference into the hands of international actors, or any international 
body given authority by the conference. At this point, the British Foreign Office had not 
surrendered the notion of the need for direct and unfettered British control over any 
renegotiation of such an important aspect of its imperial economy, and such a shift was not 
to occur until well into the meetings and deliberations of the conference. That such a 
transition was to take place is testament to the role and impact of the international conference 
on the direction and trajectory of British policy and the British presence in the newly 
emergent international community of nations that was at this point still in its nascent stages, 
at times complicated and overshadowed by the conflicting priorities of the various imperial 
powers. 
 
Despite harbouring these reservations about the proposed American programme for the 
conference, the British delegation proceeded with a relatively progressive outlook. Perhaps 
owing in part to the recent accommodations made with the Chinese government to 
definitively limit the maximum time-frame of the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement, and 
potentially to reduce it in length, the British delegation did not display the same recalcitrance 
as had been the order of the day at the Shanghai Commission, once the Hague Conference 
had convened. The conference proceeded with the conventionalisation of the resolutions of 
the Shanghai Opium Commission, and in this it began relatively well, with Chapter One of 
the Convention being passed, providing for the regulation and restriction of the traffic in raw 
opium. This part of the conventions established that production and distribution of raw 
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opium would be controlled, export would be controlled and export routes limited, packages 
for export would have to be clearly marked, and only authorised persons would be permitted 
to export raw opium.275 This was a major achievement, and marked a new in international 
commercial law, and a fairly big step in establishing legal precedents behind a new 
international regulatory culture regarding drugs. Its weaknesses, though, lay in the fact that it 
did not stipulate any requirement for reduction of the cultivation of the opium from which 
the raw opium came.276 
 
Chapter Two of the convention covered measures pertaining to the suppression of prepared 
opium. It was agreed that the represented powers would ‘take measures for the gradual and 
effective suppression of the manufacture of, internal trade in, and use of prepared opium’, 
with some consideration given to the individual circumstances of each country. Powers 
would also prohibit the import and export of prepared opium, with the exception of those 
nations not ready, who would do it as soon as possible, while restricting the routes and 
destinations for its exportation.277 This chapter related principally to China, which was the 
most significant destination for prepared opium. Prepared opium, being a substance 
consisting of a preparation of opium specifically for smoking, was not viewed as being 
viable for other uses, such as medicinal use, and so its restriction was a relatively 
uncontroversial issue compared to that of some of the other substances considered by the 
conference. Chapter Three related to the domestic and international traffic in the synthetic 
opiates morphine and heroin, and also cocaine. It held that the powers would ‘enact 
pharmacy laws to confine to medical and legitimate purposes’ the manufacture, sale, and use 
of these substances. They would also establish controls over all those manufacturing, 
importing, selling, exporting, or distributing the substances. Exportation from the country or 
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colonial territory of manufacture was also to be prohibited without licenses.278 Much of the 
British fixation with the issue of the traffic in synthetic opiates – primarily morphine and 
heroin – and also of the traffic in cocaine, was as a result of alarm felt at the burgeoning 
markets for these drugs in British colonial territories in the region. This was one of the key 
reasons behind the British government making the inclusion of this topic a precondition of 
their participation in the conference.279 This awareness would later also expand to include 
concerns over the growing Japanese traffic in these drugs in the Japanese territories in China, 
a factor which would come to complicate the Anglo-Japanese relationship, and exacerbate 
the inter-imperial tensions in the region between Japan and the other imperial powers, adding 
fuel to the fire of the fracturing of the Anglo-Japanese relationship in the region and the 
alliance which had been enshrined in it.280 The British demand to include synthetic opiates 
and cocaine within the remits of the conference discussions also had the somewhat 
unintended consequence of putting the British and German governments at odds, as the 
German representatives received a great deal of pressure from the German chemical 
industry, fearful of receiving the damaging effects of any international limitations and 
regulations, with the government being urged not even to attend the conference. 
Consequently, this chapter of the convention was not terribly strong as passed.281 
 
Chapter Four related principally to China, and held that both China and the imperial powers 
with territorial concessions and extraterritoriality under their various commercial treaties 
with China, would agree to prohibit the smuggling of drugs into China, and into the foreign 
concessions in China. Opium smoking in the foreign concessions in China would also be 
controlled, and the number of shops selling raw and prepared opium reduced. China was also 
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to adopt strict new pharmacy laws for its subjects, which, subject to the consideration and 
approval of the imperial powers, would also be extended to their citizens in China.282 In this 
way, this chapter of the convention effectively allowed for a degree of reduction in the 
principle of extraterritoriality in China, and therefore a return of elements of sovereignty to 
the Chinese government to enact these laws, albeit with the permission of the various 
imperial powers. This therefore constituted something of a coup for the Chinese delegation 
and, in theory, allowed for greater measures to be taken to suppress opium and to combat the 
import and sale of opiates. Chapter Five held that the signatory powers should consider 
examining the prospect of introducing laws to make it a penal offence ‘to be in illegal 
possession’ of raw opium, prepared opium, morphine, cocaine, and their ‘respective salts’. 
The chapter also considered the agreement between the powers to share with one another 
their respective laws, regulations and data on the traffic in drugs going forward.283 This 
chapter encouraged a modification of the criminal laws of the powers represented at the 
conference, and enshrined this precedent regarding illegal possession of drugs into 
international law, in addition to the measures regarding the regulation of the traffic in drugs. 
The British government had demonstrated a commitment to active participation during the 
First Hague Opium Conference of 1911, and had adopted a far more constructive position 
within the international arbitrations on the subject of opium regulation, as evidenced by the 
proposing of specific measures relating to the traffic in synthetic drugs. After the 1911 
conference, the British delegates were no longer recalcitrant in their approach, characterised 
by resistance to the very notion of international arbitration of the subject or the proposal of 
major international regulations, but rather had moved towards a position more akin to 
progressivism, even of leadership, and more in line with that of the American government. 
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Meetings to try and secure ratifications of the Hague Convention, which had been drawn up 
at the close of the first Hague Opium Conference in January 1912, also took place in 1913 
and 1914. These meetings were referred to as the Second and Third Hague Opium 
Conferences, although little further substantive discussion was to take place, and the 
conferences focussed purely on the securing of signatures for the ratification of the Hague 
Opium Convention, as agreed in 1912. By the end of the Second Hague Opium Conference, 
in 1913, some thirty-six nations had either already signed the Convention, or had agreed to 
do so, this after an initiative led in large part by the British delegation to organise a 
combined effort in order to put pressure on those still non-signatory representatives to join in 
its ratification, a move spearheaded by Earl Grey at the Foreign Office. When the Third 
Hague Opium Conference met in early 1914, forty-three nations had already ratified the 
Convention. Although most nations had supported the Convention, having either signed it or 
declared to do so, the number of actual full ratifications of the Convention was much less, 
with only eight nations counted among those who had ratified it.284 This was a problem that 
was to hamstring the international movement and prevent it from achieving any truly 
effective regulation. Indeed, by mid-1914 the various political crises in Europe that would 
culminate in the outbreak of hostilities in July 1914, in addition to the wars that had been 
taking place in the Balkans from 1912, distracted the powers to the extent that the issue was 
to take a back seat, not to be effectively revived until after the war, where it became one of 
the key issues dealt with by the new League of Nations. 
 
The imperial and commercial contexts behind the Anglo-American convergence of interests 
in East Asia 
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With regards to the broader imperial and commercial contexts behind the developing 
geopolitical situation in East Asia between the 1909 Commission and the 1911 Conference, 
wider British and American interests were beginning to coincide precisely at the moment at 
which underlying tensions surrounding the issue of opium were causing controversy. Despite 
serious initial tensions regarding a host of imperial and foreign policy issues involving the 
two countries, with Britain’s commercial position in China and the India opium trade a 
significant part of this, the emergent new political and imperial realities in China, and in the 
Asia-Pacific region more widely, meant that Britain was required to entirely reassess its 
position. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, entered into in 1902 primarily as a response to the 
prospective Russian threat in the Pacific, was increasingly untenable, and perceived even by 
British policymakers to be of less and less use by 1919, as Japan superseded Russia as the 
principle credible threat to British commercial predominance in the region.285 The emergence 
of the United States at the beginning of this period of tension and transition at the turn of the 
twentieth century, with its acquisition of the Philippines and Pacific island colonies, along 
with its increasing commercial expansion in China, meant that it now needed to renegotiate 
its own imperial and commercial position too. It’s parallel commercial position as enshrined 
in the original “unequal treaties” was no longer satisfactory to sate the growing need for 
commercial access and security, and the naval arms race required to sustain the American 
military presence in the region that ostensibly secured these interests caused worries for 
American leaders. This was especially the case after the First World War, when American 
domestic public attitudes shifted against costly military commitments. American 
policymakers therefore sought a new approach to these issues, and increasingly exerted 
pressure on Britain to follow suit. Domestic debates in the United States in the public and 
political spheres, around competing instincts of internationalism and isolationism in the 
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inter-war years, added further urgency to these debates. Central to British discussions during 
the negotiation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in 1900, was a global focus on reaching an 
Anglo-American accord relating to all foreign and imperial policy issues and disputes 
between the two countries, from the canal and boundary disputes on the Canada-Alaska 
border, to rights of British trade with the new United States colonial possessions in Puerto 
Rica, Cuba and the Philippines.286 
 
Just a few short years after the Anglo-American tensions in Venezuela, the ratification of the 
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in 1901 signalled both a new era of prospective cooperation and 
convergence of interests, on the one hand, and a final admitting on Britain’s part of the 
hegemony and supremacy of the United States in the Americas.287 As British policymakers 
had finally, reluctantly, recognised the reality of American supremacy in the Americas by 
1901, so were they to accede to the reality of an increasing American imperial presence in 
the Pacific, with its accompanying exertion of diplomatic and political influence, in the 
events of the 1910s and 1920s, with the opium conferences of 1909 and 1912 at the forefront 
of this process of regional geopolitical and inter-imperial introspect for Britain. These events 
were connected global developments, and reflected the changing status quo of empire and 
geopolitics, and nowhere was this clearer than in the Pacific, where the United States had 
made the most significant intervention, visible in its new imperial holdings. The increasing 
cooperation and compromise between the British and American governments also reflected a 
wider convergence of interests and a desire among British diplomats for closer ties with the 
United States, the path towards which David H. Burton has called a ‘diplomatic 
revolution’.288 
                                                          
286 D. H. Burton, British-American diplomacy, 1895-1917: Early years of the special relationship 
(Malabar: Krieger, 1999), p. 30. 
287 Ibid, p. 32. 
288 Ibid, p. 32. 
169 
 
 
The American Open Door policy in China, as set out to Britain and the other imperial powers 
by Secretary of State Hay in 1899, had at its core the notion of the securing of the balance of 
power in China, and of American commercial and imperial parity with the other leading 
imperial powers in East Asia – and principally with the British. Forming the basis behind 
this claim was the new status of the United States as a regional imperial power in the 
Philippines, and with it an increasing wish among many American policymakers to redress 
what they perceived to be existing imperial imbalances, particularly those in China where the 
various spheres of influence of the imperial powers precluded the equitable expansion of 
American interests.289 At the turn of the century, and particularly following in the immediate 
aftermath of the Boxer disturbances and international action, it appeared to many observers 
as if China might be partitioned among the imperial powers, a measure that would further 
stratify the existing spheres of influence in the country. This was an eventuality made all the 
more likely by the precedent set by the ongoing events of the Scramble for Africa. American 
policymakers sought to challenge British commercial pre-eminence, and to cement their own 
country’s position in the Asia-Pacific region. This approach would have profound 
implications for the British commercial position of predominance in China and, more 
directly, for the opium trade from British India, as American aims went further than simply 
securing the availability of access to commercial opportunities. It is perhaps somewhat 
surprising, then, that British policymakers approved of the idea of an Open Door policy in 
China, and this helped bridge any prospective clash of interests over the issue, as British 
diplomats and the Foreign Office sought to keep relations with both the United States and 
Japan amicable. The Open Door policy set out by the United States State Department was 
regarded as a means of achieving this, of balancing the presence of multiple potential 
imperial rivalries in the region, in addition to laying the foundations for prospective 
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expansion of the commercial interests of the imperial powers in China, outside of the 
existing spheres of influence.290  
 
The trajectory travelled by the British delegation, and by extension the British Foreign 
Office, during the negotiations of the 1912 Hague Opium Conference was quite remarkable. 
On the one hand, it showed a confirmed commitment to opium regulation that had been 
evident since the renewal of the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement earlier in 1911, but it 
was also indicative of the changing British approach to the international movement. It 
reflected a desire among those at the Foreign Office to approach the issue diplomatically, 
and with a view to ensuring comity and closer relations among the international 
representatives present. The British government was increasingly able to utilise its now 
avowed anti-opium position to justify its continued stature as an imperial nation with a 
global empire into the twentieth century, providing it with a firm rhetorical basis for 
demonstrating its moral foreign policy credentials. The commitment to international reforms 
also allowed the British government to draw upon the discourses of good imperial 
governance in India, where opium cultivation was being progressively diversified and 
replaced, not unlike the Japanese utilisation of its Taiwan opium monopoly system for the 
demonstration of legitimising discourses of imperial domination, a position in its Indian 
empire which Britain also sought to further through the introduction of the Morley-Minto 
Reforms of 1909, which was notable for allowing a limited, but much vaunted, scope for the 
appointment and election of Indians to posts within the British imperial administration of 
India for the first time.  
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Also of critical importance in allowing for this transition in the British approach, from an 
insistence on the primacy of bilateral negotiations between Britain and China in the 1900s, 
and a suspicion of American intentions in pushing for the 1909 Shanghai Opium 
Commission and 1912 Hague Opium Conference, towards a concession for the need of 
unified international action in establishing a global regime of drugs control, was the unity of 
the British representation at the 1912 Hague conference. Indeed, at subsequent conferences, 
particularly by the 1920s, where the British India government was afforded the 
unprecedented right of separate representation to the metropolitan British government, 
significant intra-imperial differences of policy and priority were to become apparent, setting 
apart the Foreign Office and Home Office, who increasingly favoured an international-based 
approach to establishing drugs controls on the grounds of building international cooperation 
and preventing domestic drug abuse, respectively, from the India Office and Colonial Office, 
who favoured the protection of imperial revenues in India and the profitability of colonial 
monopolies.291 The approach of the Foreign Office in seeking combined international action 
on the grounds of diplomacy and a twentieth century approach to changing global realities, 
was given extra gravitas by the particular circumstances of the post-First World War context 
of increasing internationalism under the League of Nations. Indeed, the desire for peace and 
increased international cooperation in the wake of the war meant a swift return to the issue in 
the international sphere, and the inclusion of articles on the international regulation of 
narcotics in the terms of each of the peace treaties after 1919 was essentially a ratification of 
the terms and resolutions of the 1912 Hague Opium Convention.292 The profound 
disagreements between the metropolitan and imperial wings of the British state were to 
emerge as substantial barriers to unified international action on the part of Britain, and to the 
cohesiveness of the British approach to the continued negotiations into the 1920s under the 
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guise of the League of Nations Opium Advisory Committee, and the Geneva Opium 
Conferences. Despite these intra-governmental disagreements, British policy was to 
increasingly solidify around the issue of drug regulation. This process was accelerated by the 
conditions provided by the wartime situation during the First World War, and in particular 
was exacerbated by the issue of cocaine and the subsequent moral panic that grew up around 
its use. The drugs hysteria that first emerged as a critical public issue in British society 
during the First World War, and which increasingly played out into the 1920s in the press, in 
popular culture, and in parliament, gave significant added impetus to the position of drug 
control, and by extension to the imperial legitimising discourses associated with state 
regulation and control of drugs.293 Once the public hysteria against drugs had emerged, a 
policy of state production, trafficking, and revenue collection would no longer have been 
tolerable, and these factors acted to double down on the trajectory that British policymakers 
had been following since the passage of the Hague Opium Convention in 1912. 
 
During the First World War, the issue of drugs, principally their consumption and 
trafficking, had become a hot issue, causing something of a moral panic in Britain. The 
specific focus tended primarily to relate to cocaine, but there was a sense of general hysteria 
over the subject of drugs, reflecting also a change in the public perception and attitude to 
drugs in British society. These concerns were evident in the inclusion of drug offences 
within the Defence of the Realm Act, and in particular measures to tackle drug smuggling. 
Though the initial hysteria had related to the smuggling and use of cocaine in Britain, under 
the remits of the Defence of the Realm Act, the measures to deal with this were quickly 
expanded to also deal with opium. Regulation 40b under the Act made the possession or sale 
of either cocaine or opium a criminal offence, except by licensed professionals.294 As 
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Virginia Berridge has noted, the Defence of the Realm Act was ‘a catch-all act which had 
served as the cover for a variety of wartime regulatory systems’, and under its authority a 
more strict regulatory attitude to drugs trafficking was displayed, especially with regard to 
smuggling, dealing with an immediate wartime situation.295 Within the context of the 
interruption of the international conferences and movement to secure drugs regulation 
brought by the war, and the continuing failure to secure ratification of the Hague Opium 
Convention from all of the major international powers, the Defence of the Realm Act 
allowed for, and expedited, the implementation in British law of much of the content of the 
Hague Opium Convention in Britain. Following the conclusion of the First World War, the 
issue of drugs regulation returned to the international agenda. China was to insist upon the 
inclusion of stipulations regulating the traffic in drugs within the negotiations of the post-war 
treaty, and Britain supported this notion. British representatives at the peace negotiations 
took the lead in pushing for the inclusion of Article 295 of the Treaty of Versailles, the 
article relating to opium regulation, which meant that ratification of the Treaty of Versailles 
effectively meant acceptance of the 1912 Hague Opium Convention.296 Since the conclusion 
of the convention in 1912, the securing of ratifications had been a difficult endeavour, and 
universality had proved impossible, but with this one action of its inclusion within the 
treaties produced by the Paris Peace Conference, this issue was largely solved. Not only had 
there been a self-evident shift in the trajectory of British policy since the beginning of the 
international efforts, from obstinate resistance at the 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission to 
support for the Hague Opium Convention of 1912, and in the British imperial priorities upon 
which the drugs issue was centred, but the British government had emerged in the post-war 
environment as a leader in the movement to secure the international regulation of the 
production and traffic in drugs.  
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In addition to the problems emerging in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the growth of Japanese 
expansionism in China and the Japanese imperial narcotics economy, along with other 
governments within the British Commonwealth, chiefly Australia and New Zealand, had 
begun to raise serious concerns about the changing geopolitical environment in the Pacific in 
light of Japan’s expansionism, and the prospects of a future conflict between Japan and the 
United States, which as allies Britain might be called into. At the Imperial Conference in 
1921, these had been key issues on the conference agenda, and the issue was one of the 
utmost importance to the British imperial position in the region.297 At the same time that the 
Imperial Conference was taking place in London, the British ambassador in Washington was 
in deep negotiations about the future prospects of an Anglo-American alliance. Though the 
British government had initially attempted to maintain links with Japan while also achieving 
this, these hopes were quashed by the somewhat domineering American attitude, insistent 
that the United States represented the best and only viable option for Britain, a pertinent fact 
in the recent aftermath of the First World War, with the Entente powers still busy working 
together to manage the post-war situation in Europe, and fresh from the treaty negotiations at 
Versailles.298 In light of these wider priorities behind the global imperial situation regarding 
Britain, the United States and Japan, the shifting dynamics of imperial rivalries in the East 
Asia region, and a subsequent coinciding of interests between the British and American 
governments in China, particularly given the increasing expansion of Japanese imperial 
interests in the country, helped to facilitate the converging of British and American regional 
priorities. This constituted freer access to regional markets outside of the existing limitations 
placed on international trade by the spheres of influence in China, and the containment of 
Japanese expansionism. The regulation of the production and trade in drugs formed part of 
the basis of this cooperation. While Japan had been viewed by the British government very 
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much as the junior partner for the majority of the tenure of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the 
expansion of the Japanese sphere of influence in North China, as well as of its imperial 
commerce – among which were counted all of the major drugs focussed upon by the 
international opium arbitration, including opium, morphine, and cocaine – this situation 
became increasingly untenable.299 After the First World War, in light of the limited utility of 
the alliance and the lack of spirit for cooperation during the conflict, the British perception of 
the usefulness of the alliance with Japan had significantly declined. Indeed, the perceptions 
within the British government, and those of the Dominions, increasingly saw Japan as the 
most credible threat to British interests in the Asia-Pacific region.  
 
By 1921, the Washington Conference was to become another example of the growing trend 
of American policymakers dictating the direction of international policy and persuading the 
British to follow suit. What seemed at the beginning of the Washington Conference to be a 
scandalous and unacceptable predetermination to limit the naval strength of Britain and to 
essentially remove the British position of naval predominance, was mediated and explained 
in light of its significance and necessity with regards to the contemporary early-twentieth 
century imperial realities, and the position was eventually adopted by both the British and 
American representatives.300 The Washington Conference was viewed mostly as 
unacceptable to the Japanese, however, and while its acceptance in the British and American 
camps signified the fruition of their geopolitical convergence, it was one of the critical 
events that sounded the death knell for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was effectively 
annulled during the conference, and legally ended with the final ratification of the 
convention in August 1923. This convergence of British and American priorities, in addition 
to defining the international drugs control movement and being marked by the agreements at 
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the Washington Conference, was also evidenced by the conclusion of other earlier disputes 
during the first two decades of the new century, such as that over the issue of the American 
interests in Panama, especially regarding control and influence over the Panama Canal, 
where American leaders including Theodore Roosevelt sought to assert the interests and 
leading position of the United States while also bringing the British along as cooperative 
partners in the endeavour.301  
 
A similar vein of politicking can be detected throughout the negotiations at the 1912 Hague 
Opium Conference, wherein the American delegation proceeded very much along similar 
lines in leading the direction of policy in the prospective global regulation of the trade in 
narcotic drugs by international agreement, while simultaneously attempting to persuade the 
British delegation to move towards their corner, that would reach their crescendo in the 1921 
Washington Conference, with its incredibly far-reaching remits into the critical areas of 
disarmament and naval size. In each of these issues, the American State Department sought 
to influence British policy, while also offering important guarantees of American 
cooperation and the pursuit of a balance of power in the imperial dynamics of East Asia. The 
experience of obstinacy and defensive agitation at the 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission, as 
the British delegation had sought not to overcommit to a multilateral agenda and to defend 
its imperial commercial and agricultural policies, had transitioned into an alignment of 
regional imperial interests by 1912, with its support of the Hague Opium Convention, and 
through the process of the negotiations, as a combined approach had emerged for the 
cooperation in regulatory measures, which allowed for the two imperial powers, with the 
addition of the other signatories, to begin to present what was increasingly a nascent form of 
the internationalism of the comity of nations that would re-emerge after the First World War, 
with an internationalist approach to regulation, with its associated discourses of preventing 
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the exploitation, abuse and over-consumption that had been indelibly applied to opium and 
other drugs. This provided significant opportunities for the propagation of a combined 
legalising, and legitimising, position in international relations, converging around the 
initiatives of the reformist Liberal government in Britain and internationalist Taft 
administration in the United States, about which the arbitration of opium formed a crucial 
role.  
 
From the time of the 1912 Hague Opium Conference, the American representatives set out to 
establish a unified international approach to the regulation of the trade in narcotic drugs, and 
in doing so offered Britain both a route for its transition away from reliance on imperial 
revenues derived from drugs, increasingly unpopular with the public in British society and a 
position that the British government had already decided was untenable by 1907 with the 
precedent of the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement, and an approach which was also 
predicated upon the existing dynamics of imperial power in the East Asia region. This 
combined international approach would allow the British government to ascend from its 
position as a target for much of the international and domestic agitation on the issue of drugs 
to the moral high ground on the issue, to be a part of the processes of international arbitration 
and regulation, and, by way of the proposed internationally binding nature of the legislation 
under discussion, to do so without losing commercial ground to the Japanese in China. As 
Adam Tooze has succinctly put it, ‘Through naval disarmament and a China settlement, the 
Washington Conference would reanimate the vision of the Open Door, creating an 
international space swept clean of militarism in which the free flow of American capital 
would unify and pacify’.302 This was an expression of the new geopolitical situation in the 
region, and an opportunity for Britain to address the changing Japanese imperial and 
commercial position in China with an alignment with the United States. These were the 
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continuing underlying contexts at work behind the scenes as the Geneva Opium Conferences 
began in 1924, which continued the international arbitration on the drugs regulation issue in 
the interwar years, and took place under the guise of the League of Nations. 
 
Britain assumes a position of leadership: The League of Nations, the Geneva Opium 
Conferences, and international drugs regulation in the interwar period, 1919-1931 
 
In the years immediately following the First World War, an Opium Advisory Committee had 
been formed to continue the international deliberations on the subject of the production and 
trade in opium and other drugs, and this committee had existed under the authority of the 
nascent League of Nations. The United States had, from adopting the principle position of 
leadership in initiating the international movement, organising and spearheading the 1909 
Shanghai Opium Commission and the 1911 Hague Opium Conference, scaled down its 
involvement following the cessation of hostilities and the Treaty of Versailles. This was 
ostensibly due to an ambivalence towards the League of Nations, as well as owing in part to 
the fact that the American interest in the movement had been linked to how it related to its 
own domestic drugs situation, and to that in China.303 The somewhat periphery participation 
of the United States during this time, from about 1921-1924, created a void in the leadership 
of the movement, which the British stepped in to fill. The Geneva Opium Conferences, 
comprising two conferences held from 1924-1925, were organised to secure the terms of, 
and attempt to build upon, the Hague Opium Convention of 1912, and offered the United 
States an incentive to return to active participation. The uncompromising attitude of the 
United States delegation, though, along with the American government’s already cool 
relations with the League of Nations, would lead to their departure from the conferences, 
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surrendering again the position of leadership in the international efforts. The American 
recommendation that the production and export of the raw materials used in the manufacture 
of drugs had been strongly resisted by the producing nations. This had proved unacceptable 
to the American delegation, and subsequently led to their withdrawal, severely undermining 
the proceedings.304 Despite the distress and disappointment of many of the other nations’ 
delegates at this turn of events, the conferences continued on without the United States’ 
involvement. Following the departure of the American delegation, the British delegation 
stepped forward in an attempt to revitalise the efforts, and pushed the conference on to 
secure some tangible conclusions. To this effect, the convention that was produced by the 
Second Conference largely supplanted the Hague Opium Convention, expanding its 
coverage to other drugs such as coca leaves, crude cocaine, Indian hemp and ecogonine. 
Under the authority of the League of Nations, the convention also allowed for a far greater 
degree of real world implementation of the convention than had been possible under the 
Hague Opium Convention, which had relied on a non-committed and far more loose 
cooperation between nations, whilst the League of Nations (despite its later failings) was far 
more effective in keeping the powers together. The convention saw the establishment of a 
Permanent Central Board to receive and give out information about the production, 
consumption and trade in drugs, and to monitor the international traffic generally, and it also 
introduced a complex system of import and export certificates, designed to tackle the 
problem of smuggling.305 The United States’ withdrawal from the Geneva Opium 
Conferences led to its isolation from the international movement, and coincided with the 
country’s refusal to join the League of Nations, reflecting also the resurgence of the 
isolationist position within American society in the years following the First World War. In 
1931, another Opium Conference was convened in Geneva. This time, the British 
government sent a delegation intending to lead proceedings towards securing a greater 
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degree of cooperation in implementing international drugs regulation. The British delegation 
was headed by Malcolm Delevingne, who, with great enthusiasm and personal purpose, drew 
up a detailed programme for the conference. While the reception to Delevingne’s programme 
was not overall positive from among many of the other delegations, the conference was 
nonetheless successful, and cemented Britain’s place as a leader of the international 
movement. The conference produced a convention which built upon the conventions of 1912 
and 1925, delineating more thoroughly the differences between the licit and illicit traffics, 
providing for a greater degree of monitoring and surveillance of the manufacture and trade in 
drugs, through a more detailed system of licenses, and giving greater impetus to the 
monitoring of the drugs traffic to national and international authorities.306 
 
International opium negotiations were a venue for the mediation and transition in British 
opium policy, a route away from the increasingly toxic position of the opium trade, and for 
the convergence of interests behind the early twentieth century Anglo-American cooperation 
and alliance. The abandonment of the British reliance on its increasingly untenable opium 
system, followed by its determined transition to a position of leadership in support of the 
prosecution of an effective international control initiative, cemented the presentation of 
Britain’s moral imperialism through its legitimising role in shaping perceptions of the British 
global position, an eventuality made all the more pertinent with the emergence of the drugs 
hysteria in British society during the First World War – a hysteria fuelled in part by the 
prevailing assumptions that had been established and informed by the discourses of the anti-
opium movement and the earlier opium debates. The British position was also heavily 
influenced by developments in the dynamics of imperial rivalries in the East Asia region, and 
changes in the wider geopolitical environment, which acted to shape British imperial 
priorities, with opium and cooperation with the United States commercial initiatives, and 
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associated strategic alignment, becoming increasingly desirable. Moreover, though until 
1911 the Foreign Office had remained highly sceptical of American intentions, by 1912 
Britain had begun to assume a position of leadership alongside the United States in 
supporting the Hague Opium Convention, which was continued in the Geneva Opium 
Conferences of 1924-1931 through the work of Malcolm Delevingne and the British 
delegation. While remaining critical of the American draft conference programme before the 
1911 Hague Opium Conference, Britain had begun to attempt to steer proceedings in 
insisting on the expansion of the terms of reference of the conference to include synthetic 
opiates and cocaine, and by the time of the 1931 conference, the British delegation were 
actively drafting the conference programme and leading the proceedings through the work of 
Delevingne. This point of departure marked the completion in the British opium reversal, 
with Britain now firmly ensconced as a global leader in a movement increasingly heralded as 
moral and righteous, a political and discursive signifier for the effective realisation of a new 
kind of imperialism. 
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Conclusions 
 
Negotiating the domestic and international debates that accompanied, and increasingly 
necessitated, opium reform encompassed a series of profound transformations in British 
opium policy, and by extension the British world position. From 1906, successive British 
administrations were initially able to resist, but then to harness and later to commandeer, 
control of the direction and international institutions of the burgeoning movement to regulate 
drugs, enshrined in the conferences of the 1910s and then in the League of Nations after 
1919. This thereby effectively gave British policymakers a stake in engendering the 
discourses of drug use, and drug regulation, within the new twentieth century environment of 
internationalism and legalising cooperative approach to international relations, a position 
which allowed policymakers to eke moral capital out of this perceived new role. This 
allowed the British Empire to maintain its prestige as it transitioned away from its reliance 
on opium cash crops in India, a position which the discourses disseminated by the British 
anti-opium movement had made increasingly unsustainable, and edged towards a position 
that fit more closely with the guiding tenets of liberal imperialism. This transition allowed 
Britain to disguise the trajectory of its relative decline in relation to the expansion of the 
United States, and the increasing geopolitical challenge posed by Japan and Germany, to 
emerge as a global leader in a quite different international framework, with an empire that 
could be understood through a different ideological lens, through the utilisation of 
legitimising discourses of colonial rule, accompanied by the central themes of international 
law and justice. 
 
This study has argued that the anti-opium movement that was active from 1875-1895, and 
the 1906 Liberal government and its successors which the movement in many ways acted to 
inform, can be understood to have held shared ideological commitments in the defining 
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characteristics of liberalism, humanitarianism, and a beneficent conception of the role of 
empire. I have attempted to situate the historical development of the opium issue, and the 
British trajectory of reform between 1907 and 1931, within the context of the emergent 
internationalism that defined this period, a leading position in which Britain increasingly 
sought. I have also examined the cultural basis for this transition in British policy, exploring 
the interconnections of the anti-opium movement with regards to its role in establishing 
discourses, cultural production, and subsequent political action. I have argued that the 
trajectory of the imperial entanglement in East Asia that unfolded from the beginning of the 
twentieth century can also be understood through the interrelations of the major imperial 
powers in the region in the sphere of opium policy, with this competitive environment giving 
rise to the genesis of the international movement for the regulation of drugs. After Japan’s 
acquisition of a territory with an opium economy in Taiwan in 1896, and the United States’ 
expansion into the region with its own opium economy in its Philippines territory in 1898, 
the imperial powers were to become increasingly involved in the issue of opium and its 
regulation, leading to the development of commercial and imperial rivalries in the region that 
increasingly entailed a challenge to the British position. 
 
The course of British opium policy in the years 1875-1931 was indicative of wider 
developments in the political culture of empire in Britain. While the British India 
government had enjoyed a high degree of policy autonomy in the late-nineteenth century, the 
metropolitan centre was increasingly able to make its mark on events, as the effective 
dictation of foreign policy increasingly became the priority for governments in the twentieth 
century. The scope of the 1906 Liberal government’s approach to domestic reform was also 
applied to the British imperial world, and its informing ideologies of Gladstonian foreign 
policy and liberal imperialism gave added impetus to reform measures that could be 
characterised as moral politics. This, along with the cultural and political legacy of the anti-
opium movement, meant that the joint opium suppression agreement with China was one of 
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the first foreign policy initiatives begun by the new administration. In this respect, the liberal 
reformism espoused by the 1906 Liberal government was a more radical evolution of the 
approach that characterised Gladstone’s Liberal administrations of the 1870s-1890s, while its 
comparative active stance also reflected the 1906 government’s nature as a strong majority 
government. The Liberal administrations that dominated British politics for much of the next 
decade would lead the country into the international meetings of 1909 and 1911, at Shanghai 
and The Hague, agreeing to commit Britain to the notion of opium reform through the 
acceptance of the 1912 Hague Opium Convention. Britain had not yet become a global 
leader in the international movement for the regulation of drugs, and underlying 
complicating factors of imperial rivalry and differences in geopolitical priorities informed 
continuing suspicions among British policymakers, but with engagement with the 
international programme by 1912, Britain had demonstrated its political and ideological 
commitment. 
 
The First World War enhanced and accelerated the shift in international arbitration that had 
been pioneered in these opium conferences in the years that had immediately preceded it. 
The war shook up the traditional notions of empire and the isolated politics of unilateral 
imperial policymaking, leading to a quite significantly different geopolitical environment 
with regards to foreign policy in the post-war world. The pre-war drug control initiatives had 
lacked the firm institutions necessary for enforcing lasting international agreements and 
compromises, and had proceeded from a position of open challenge to Britain’s imperial 
opium establishment. With the League of Nations, Britain had become committed to a 
radically new project, the comity of nations, and this new international avenue provided both 
the opportunity to display leadership and to redefine the British Empire’s position in the 
world with regards to drugs, and the means by which to effectively negotiate, ratify, and 
enforce international agreements regarding drugs regulation. These transitions in approach 
were incremental, and should not be viewed in isolation. The calling of the Royal 
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Commission on Opium in 1893 had given expression to the impulse for reform emanating 
from within the liberal establishment in Britain, and helped to lay the groundwork in 
challenging the established system that would make the pursuing of the 1907 Ten Year 
Agreement possible. Likewise, the decision of the British government to support the 
resolutions of the Hague Opium Convention in 1912, and then to adopt a position of 
leadership at the Geneva Opium Conferences of 1924-25 and 1931, was predicated on the 
existence of the bilateral approach to opium reform since 1907, and the cultural basis of the 
opposition to the maintenance of an opium system in the British Empire, positions which had 
already been adopted and pursued by British governments. As such, the reforms in the 
British politics of opium were impacted upon by wider developments in the political culture 
of empire, commerce and geopolitical priorities, and in turn helped to influence the 
development of future reforms. The relationship between empire and metropole radically 
changed between the years 1875 and 1931, and these shifts had a direct bearing on the course 
of developments in opium policy in Britain. 
 
With regards to the impact on British society of the debate over opium, the anti-opium 
movement brought to light the failure of existing tactics and methods of liberal social 
pressure group politics, lobbying, and political reformism, and the necessity of addressing 
the growing constituencies of the new mass politics of the post-1867 political landscape in 
Britain. The British anti-opium movement had arisen out of the same liberal culture of social 
activism and humanitarianism as the abolitionist campaign, as well as of much of the 
nineteenth century’s domestic social reformism, and was ensconced in the same social, 
political and religious networks as these former campaigns. It was not until the drugs 
hysteria in British society during the First World War, with its “cocaine epidemic” and harsh 
imposition of criminal prosecution for drugs offences, and the increasing prevalence of 
images of the spectre of the opium den that had been propagated in Britain for some decades 
before, that the public mood could be adequately gauged as having moved noticeably behind 
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the international regulation of the drugs traffic. It was neither necessitated, nor relied upon, 
that a measure of strength of public opinion would be needed to support the opium reform 
initiatives, though the positions of the public and government regarding drugs regulation 
would increasingly come into alignment during the First World War. Though the process of 
reform had already been under way since 1907, this allowed for further domestic political 
capital to be extracted from the continued international reform initiatives. The anti-opium 
movement was indicative of a wider liberal culture of imperial reformism in British society, 
but was limited in the scope of its reach. Its cultural foundation was part of the intellectual 
legacy of the anti-slavery movement of previous generations and its focus on humanitarian 
reform of the British world presence. Drawing much of its ideological base and structural 
form from the legacy of the humanitarian projects of the abolitionist movement, the 
continued existence of this form of traditional reformism showed that this humanitarian 
approach to empire and reform was able to survive into the era of new ideas surrounding 
empire in the late nineteenth century, albeit with an increasingly narrowing constituency, as 
it was replaced at the forefront of politics by a more popular, engaging, and national form of 
liberal imperialism, and at the edges by emergent radical anti-imperialist critiques. It lacked 
the popular appeal of emergent late-nineteenth century imperial trends such as popular 
imperialism, for example, and did little either to inspire or include a British working class 
that was increasingly enfranchised, and which possessed the potential to exert great political 
pressure.  
 
The international debate over the position of opium had been a point of tension between 
Britain and the United States in East Asia, a counterpoint to what has often been 
characterised as a period of rapprochement. Despite the United States managing to convene 
the Shanghai Opium Commission in an effort to pioneer international action on the opium 
issue, the British delegation opposed their efforts to lay the foundations for the introduction 
of regulations through future international conferences. The British delegation defended the 
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sanctity of its bilateral agreements, refusing to surrender complete control over its policy. 
Throughout the meetings of the 1909 commission, the British government and its 
representatives remained determined to maintain full sovereignty over their own imperial 
policy, and to thereby ensure their control over the opium system in India and the British 
commercial position in China, but the development of the imperial dynamics of the region 
would problematise this traditional unilateralist geopolitical approach to empire and foreign 
relations. It would take the development of other related factors, of the change in relative 
imperial strength, spheres of influence, and the commercial situation in China, as well as the 
subsequent shift in the British approach away from a focus solely on bilateral action, for any 
substantive international agreement to be reached. The British position regarding cooperation 
with the international movement for regulation was influenced by the evolution of British 
policy in India, where gradual reductions in the quantity of opium produced and exported 
were progressively implemented, by developments in the dynamics of imperial rivalries in 
the East Asia region, and by changes in the wider geopolitical environment, which all acted 
to shape the development of British imperial priorities. It was the opportunities offered by 
the American Open Door initiative in China, and its associated legitimising discourses of 
free trade and moral foreign policy, that became increasingly attractive to British 
policymakers as the relative strength and traditional pre-eminence of the British position in 
the region steadily declined, threatened by the challenge of rival imperial powers. Though 
until 1911 the British government had remained highly sceptical of American intentions in 
organising the international movement, by 1912 Britain had moved towards taking up a 
position of leadership alongside the United States, as British policymakers increasingly 
sought to take a share in setting the advancing international agenda. When the United States 
withdrew from the international drugs regulation movement in 1925, after the international 
movement came under the authority of the League of Nations in the interwar years, Britain 
took up the mantle as the leading power steering the international efforts, marking the 
completion of its transition from the prioritisation of the protection of the establishment 
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opium system of the late-nineteenth century, to the forefront of the regulatory movement by 
the 1920s. 
 
From the election of the socially reformist Liberal administration in 1906, Britain had sought 
to minimize its national responsibility for opium consumption within an increasingly aware 
and interconnected international world. This comprised a reprioritisation of British economic 
interests in China, the nature of imperial rule in India, and a complete “rebranding” of 
Britain’s international role and image, as critical transnational entanglements between 
legitimising discourses of imperial domination forced major changes in the politics of British 
imperial rule. Through renegotiating its opium system in India and trade practices with 
China, and by taking a position of leadership in the global reforming process, British 
policymakers attempted to forge for the empire a new global role and identity as a proponent 
of a new kind of imperialism. Moving away from a reliance on opium revenues in British 
India allowed imperial administrators to give the impression of having more freedom to 
diversify the agricultural land use, and of the broadening of the scope of future reforms, on 
the subcontinent, though the extent to which this was actually to occur in the years that 
followed was questionable. This transition also masked the continued presence of opium 
monopolies in Britain’s East and South East Asia colonies, particularly important in the 
context of the increasing environment of drugs hysteria that developed in British society into 
the 1920s. British governments in these key years attempted to manoeuvre the empire into 
assuming a new position as a primary leader in the new international institutions of the 
interwar years, adding a veneer of internationalist and moralistic legitimisation to the 
prosecution of British imperialism. This was an attempt at realigning the British position 
from that of the imperial unilateralism that so defined the nineteenth century experience of 
empire to a position aligned to give the impression of the empire as a responsible and 
internationalist global actor, temporarily obscuring the effects of imperial decline in the 
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years before the events of the Second World War would bring the full extent of this decline 
to light. 
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